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Abstract 
This dissertation views the period of the Cold War and beyond through the eyes of Iraqi 
leaders, thanks to both the collections of the Conflict Records Research Center and the Baʿthist 
regime documents now housed at Stanford University.  This study not only shows the 
complexity of how the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union affected the 
Middle East; it also reveals how local and regional political, diplomatic, and military conditions 
played a crucial role in Iraq’s foreign policy initiatives and in its domestic security as well both 
before and after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.  
This work focuses on Iraqi foreign policy from 1968 through 2003.  During this time 
period, the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union was intense and 
preoccupying—to them but not necessarily to all countries with whom they interacted.  Various 
of those countries had their own agenda to pursue, and Iraq was one of them. This dissertation 
shows that Iraq was preoccupied first and foremost by its neighbors and the deep instabilities of 
the Middle East. Second, Baghdad was also fixated on regional concerns and extended its 
interests beyond the Arab world into the Horn of Africa.   
This work also traces the trajectory of Iraq’s relationship with its primary ally, the Soviet 
Union, and later, the Russian Federation. Moscow and Baghdad’s relationship was marred by 
mistrust and betrayal yet remained a matter of convenience for both even after the U.S.S.R.’s 
collapse.  But no matter the tension, these two states could never fully walk away from one 
another.  After two decades of uneasiness in their friendship, the Baʿthist regime and the 
successors to the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, resumed relations in 1993, shortly after 
the dust had settled in Moscow.  Given the exigencies of Iraq in the 1990s—isolated by a 
sanctions regime imposed at American initiative, but through U.N. auspices—Baghdad sought a 
  
political alliance with Moscow. Thanks to Russia’s seat on the U.N. Security Council, the 
Baʿthist regime believed Russia could bring tremendous benefit to an otherwise isolated and 
vulnerable Iraqi regime.   
This study joins recent works that show how smaller, and less powerful, states managed 
their statecraft in a time of ever-increasing complexity. These states were certainly caught up in 
events stemming from the U.S.-U.S.S.R. divide, but more often than not, these states had to 
confront internal frictions and intense regional rivalries first.  In some instances, these states 
operated in other ideologies outside of the traditionally understood struggle of communism 
versus democratic capitalism. In the case of Iraq, pan-Arabism and, to a lesser extent, non-
alignment played important roles in the formulation of Iraq’s foreign policy.    
Iraqi foreign policy must be understood through more than just the Iran-Iraq War (1980-
1988), the First Gulf War (1990-1991), or the run-up to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (2003-
2011). Instead, the Baʿthist regime concentrated on three components during the period from 
1968 to its April 2003 demise: 1) campaigns against its neighbors, Syria and Iran, 2) managing 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations as they connected to Iraq, especially due to oil and geopolitical concerns 
and 3) Iraq’s desire to lead the Arab world against Israel and the overreach of the superpowers 
into the Middle East.   
However, Iraqi foreign policy was complicated. Certainly, some exploits were driven to 
spite Iraq’s rivals, but this was not the key to all Iraqi foreign policy nor its main purpose. 
Rather, Iraq’s desire for autonomy in local, regional, and international environments drove its 
foreign policy initiatives. Through their embassy organizations, the Iraqis were able to extend 
their influence well beyond Iraq’s borders, reaching into a wide array of political, military, and 
diplomatic circles, Western and non-Western alike.  Even the fall of the U.S.S.R. did not spell 
  
the end of Iraqi diplomatic scheming, nor did the chaotic aftermath of the First Gulf War stop 
Iraqi diplomatic machinations.  
In two case studies—Lebanon and East Africa—the Baʿth Party archives provide further 
detail than previously available to scholars. As a context for  the pre-existing scholarship, the 
Baʿth documents provide scholars greater insight  into Iraq’s commitments to pan-Arabism and a 
clearer sense of how actions like deploying “volunteer” forces in Lebanon were actually ways in 
which Saddam Hussein and the Baʿth Party elite could exercise further control over Iraqis and 
thus strengthen the party’s domestic security. These two cases connect the domestic, regional, 
and international commitments of Iraqi foreign policy in the Cold War era and beyond.  
This dissertation considers Iraqi foreign policy on Iraqi terms. It shows that the Iraqis had 
their own foreign policy interests free from superpower meddling or prodding. Iraq’s search for 
autonomy may disorient American ways of thinking about Iraqi foreign ambitions, but by 
considering Iraqi priorities first, scholars will have a better overall understanding of Iraqi 
military and diplomatic history.  
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1 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Historians of the Cold War era are continuing to push past conventional thinking by 
actively exploring alternatives to the longstanding paradigm of binary opposition between the 
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and their respective allies.1 However, studies of the Middle East by people 
from outside the region have been limited by the challenge of mastering Arabic and the difficulty 
of  getting access to archival materials.  It is here that this dissertation is intended to contribute to 
historical scholarship.  It views the Cold War and beyond through the eyes of Iraqi leaders, 
thanks to both the collections of the Conflict Records Research Center and the Baʿthist regime 
documents now housed at Stanford University. During this time period, the tension between the 
United States and the Soviet Union was intense and preoccupying—to them but not necessarily 
to all countries with whom they interacted.  Various of those countries had their own agenda to 
pursue, and Iraq was one of them.   
During its tenure, the Baʿth Party was the driver of Iraqi foreign policy.2 The Baʿth Party 
in Iraq came to power in 1968 after a decade of internal chaos. In 1958, the British installed 
 
1 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). Artemy M. Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko, eds. The End of the Cold War 
and the Third World. (London: Routledge, 2013); Robert J. McMahon, ed. The Cold War in the Third 
World. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Gregg A. Brazinsky, Winning the Third World: Sino-American 
Rivalry During the Cold War. (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2017) Manu 
Bhagavan, ed. India and the Cold War. (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2019); 
Thomas C. Field Jr., Stella Krepp, and Vanni Pettina, eds. Latin America and the Global Cold War. Chapel Hill, 
North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2020).  
2 For this reason, this dissertation will be referring to Iraq and the Baʿthists as if there were one and the same. Future 
scholarship and research (especially within the Baʿth Party records at Stanford University) will have to flesh out the 
nuisances of this dynamic—for example, did the Foreign Ministry or the security services or military officials have 
more influence over the Baʿthist elite and Saddam? See Pesach Malovany, Wars of Modern Babylon: A History of 
2 
monarchy was violently overthrown and ten years of political instability followed. Successive 
governments were overthrown by coup d’états until 1968 when the Baʿth finally gained power 
over the country.3 From then on, the Baʿth gradually moved to assume control over all aspects of 
the government, military, and society through a system of rewards and patronage and through 
violence and intimidation.4  The authoritarian regime was removed only by American forces in 
2003 during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.5   
This dissertation puts considerable focus on the diplomatic and military relationship 
between the Soviet Union and Iraq from the 1970s throughout the 1990s, showing how this 
relationship was marred by mistrust and betrayal yet remained a matter of convenience for both 
even after the U.S.S.R.’s collapse.  There were many disputes between Moscow and Baghdad. 
One centered on the quality of weapons and the timeliness of their delivery; Iraq’s frustration 
 
the Iraqi Army from 1921 to 2003. (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2017) for a preliminary 
discussion of this.  
3 The Baʿth had been thrown out of power and persecuted in the 1960s as well. For more see Charles Tripp, A 
History of Iraq. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007), 143-185.  
4 Joseph Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Baʿth Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012); Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1989) 
5 However, like many other authoritarian regimes, the Baʿth was unable to cement complete control over all parts of 
society. In some cases, control was tenuous at best. See Aaron M. Faust, The Baʿthification of Iraq: Saddam 
Hussein’s Totalitarianism. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2016) and Samuel Helfont, Compulsion in Religion: 
The Authoritarian Roots of Saddam Hussein’s Islam, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). For more on Middle 
Eastern authoritarian regimes see Eva Bellin, “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle 
East: Lessons from the Arab Spring Comparative Politics,” Comparative Politics 44, no. 2 (2012): 127‐149; Lisa 
Blaydes and James Lo, "One Man, One Vote, One Time? A Model of Democratization in the Middle East," Journal 
of Theoretical Politics, 24, (January 2012): 110-146; Lisa Anderson, "The State in the Middle East and North 
Africa," Comparative Politics 20, no. 1 (October 1987): 1‐18; F. Gregory Gause, III, “The Middle East Academic 
Community and the “Winter of Arab Discontent”: Why Did We Miss It? Seismic Shift: Understanding the Change 
in the Middle East, The Henry L. Stimson Center, (May 2011): 11-29, 
https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/Full_Pub-Seismic_Shift.pdf  
3 
with the Soviets in this regard prompted Iraq to turn to the West, a move Moscow did not 
welcome. Each country also sought better relations with countries hostile to the other.  Moscow 
also refused to openly side with Iraq. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S.S.R. attempted to 
manipulate Iraq’s internal affairs by pushing for the inclusion of the Kurds and the Iraqi 
Communist Party into the Baʿthist apparatus.   
However, no matter the tension, these two states could never fully walk away from one 
another.  After two decades of uneasiness in their friendship, the Baʿthist regime and the 
successors to the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, resumed relations in 1993, shortly after 
the dust had settled in Moscow. For Iraq, it was as if the Cold War had never ended.  The Iraqi 
regime desperately tried to preserve its relationship with the Russians, eager to benefit from the 
Russian Federation’s vote in the Security Council as means to counter United Nations sanctions 
and growing American domination in the Middle East. At the same time, the Russian Federation 
was eager to keep a former client in its corner—different entities in the Federation had different 
reasons—and therefore it assumed a role of leadership in attempts to limit and even nullify 
United Nations sanctions against Iraq during the Clinton administration.  Yet, no matter what 
change of regime occurred in Moscow, this paradoxical relationship—mistrust and 
convenience—remained between the two.  
This study joins recent works that show how smaller, and less powerful, states managed 
their statecraft in a time of ever-increasing complexity. These states were certainly caught up in 
events stemming from the U.S.-U.S.S.R. divide, but more often than not, these states had to 
confront internal frictions and intense regional rivalries first.  In some instances, these states 
operated in other ideologies outside of the traditionally understood struggle of communism 
versus democratic capitalism. In the case of Iraq, Baghdad was preoccupied first and foremost by 
4 
its neighbors and the deep instabilities of the Middle East. Second, Baghdad was also fixated on 
regional concerns and extended its interests beyond the Arab world into the Horn of Africa.  Pan-
Arabism and, to a lesser extent, non-alignment played important roles in the formulation of 
Iraq’s foreign policy.    
To that end, Iraqi foreign policy must be understood through more than just the Iran-Iraq 
War (1980-1988), the First Gulf War (1990-1991), or the run-up to Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM (2003-2011).  Instead, the Baʿthist regime concentrated on three components during 
the period from 1968 to its April 2003 demise: 1) campaigns against its neighbors, Syria and 
Iran, 2) managing U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations as they connected to Iraq, especially due to oil and 
geopolitical concerns and 3) Iraq’s desire to lead the Arab world against Israel and the overreach 
of the superpowers into the Middle East.   
However, Iraqi foreign policy was complicated. Certainly, some exploits were driven to 
spite Iraq’s rivals, but this was not the key to all Iraqi foreign policy nor its main purpose.  
Rather, Iraq’s desire for autonomy in local, regional, and international environments drove its 
foreign policy initiatives. Using organizations that operated through their embassies, the Iraqis 
were able to extend their influence well beyond Iraq’s border, reaching into a wide array of 
political, military, and diplomatic circles, Western and non-Western alike.  Even the fall of the 
U.S.S.R. did not spell the end of Iraqi diplomatic scheming, nor did the chaotic aftermath of the 
First Gulf War stop Iraqi diplomatic machinations. Political, military, and diplomatic operations, 
both covert and overt, continued.  
In two case studies—Lebanon and East Africa—the Baʿth Party archives provide further 
detail than previously available to scholars. The Iraqis intervened in the Lebanese Civil War 
(1975-1990), framing this as its national mission. This framework served two purposes for the 
5 
Iraqi Baʿthists. In terms of foreign policy, Iraq used the civil war to counter Syrian and Iranian 
influence in the Levant with rhetoric and force while simultaneously attempting to bolster 
credibility with the Palestinians. Of course, differences between expectations and reality arose in 
the effort to achieve these goals.  No matter, foreign intervention allowed Iraqi leadership—
Saddam, really— to grow, check, and control members of the Baʿth party, both in the party 
apparatus and within the Popular Army.   
The Iraqis were very much involved in affairs outside the Middle East. To illustrate this 
point, this dissertation also examines Iraq’s role in the Horn of Africa. The Iraqis were heavily 
involved in the military and diplomatic affairs of Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. These 
interventions were predicated on three objectives: bolstering their regional achievements, 
promoting their credentials as a leading element among the Arabs, and showing that they were 
neither passive clients nor simply puppets of the Soviet Union. This case study, nevertheless, 
demonstrates that Iraqi diplomacy had unintended consequences. Not all Iraqi missions were 
successful, and, at times, they created messes that they had not originally intended to create. 
These missions reveal some of the limitations of Iraqi foreign policy and,  as in its intervention in 
Lebanon, the gaps in  between rhetoric and real results.  
An analysis of Lebanon and East Africa reveal how the Iraqis sought out their own 
foreign policy interests, free from superpower meddling or prodding. They support the argument 
made in this dissertation that Iraq maintained a considerable amount of agency in this era.  These 
two cases also connect the domestic, regional, and international commitments of Iraqi foreign 
policy in the Cold War era and beyond. 
6 
 Literature 
Hanna Batatu’s The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A 
Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Baʿthists, and Free 
Officers and Kanan Makiya’s Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq were for some time 
arguably the most important works for a general understanding of the Baʿthist regime. 6  Both 
books are critical to understand the creation  of the Baʿthist party and its exertion of control over 
all parts of Iraqi society.  However, more recent books, including Joseph Sassoon’s Saddam 
Hussein’s Baʿth Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime and Aaron Faust’s The Baʿthification of 
Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s Totalitarianism, have raised the benchmark for scholars in that they use 
available documents of the Baʿth party housed in the United States to provide a deep  
examination of the regime through the eyes of the party itself. 7  To consolidate control, Sassoon 
argues, the Baʿthist regime was able to create a system of rewards and punishments, a system in 
which ordinary citizens were willing or unwilling participants, while Faust sees the regime as 
exercising totalitarian power . 
Malcom Kerr’s seminal work The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 
1958–1970 illustrates the dynamics and different patterns in relations among Arab states, which 
were acting independently of the machinations of the superpowers. 8 In this sense, there were 
regional struggles, outside the scope of the Cold War, a separate Cold War within the Arab 
 
6 Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed 
and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Baʿthists, and Free Officers. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1978);  Makiya, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq.  
7 Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Baʿth Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime.; Faust, The Baʿthification of Iraq: 
Saddam Hussein’s Totalitarianism. 
8 Malcom Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958–1970, 3rd ed. (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1971). 
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World.9  Kerr’s work inspired others, like Efraim Karsh and Eberhard Kienle to examine the 
relationships among Arab states, as well as relationships between Arab states and the 
superpowers, but through an Arab lens. Karsh is focused on Syria—his works include Soviet 
Policy towards Syria since 1970 and The Soviet Union and Syria. 10 Eberhard Kienle expands on 
Kerr’s study and examines the friction between Syria and Iraq in Baʻth v. Baʻth: The Conflict  
Between Syria and Iraq, 1968-1989.11   Kienle analyzes the ever important origins and roots of 
the division of the Baʿth Party, illustrating how the Baʿth party at its start ranged across national 
boundaries but then split into regional commands. This schism gradually developed into a fight 
between opposing elements in Syria and in Iraq.   
These works and others heavily rely on newspapers, official party publications, and 
interviews with party members, thus providing invaluable resources for scholars who may not 
have access to these materials. They do, however, tend to stress the roles of the elites and to 
present their narratives as if these elites were primarily driven by regional ambitions. Although 
Iraq had clear regional ambitions, it was not necessarily limited by these desires. Even then, Arab 
agency and initiative did not mean that the superpowers had no interest in events and did not 
watch them unfold. Unfortunately for many Arabs who sought to break away from foreign 
domination, they were never quite able to do so. Many of these works are now a bit dated, and 
more attention is needed on events in the 1990s.  
 
9 Fred H. Lawson, "The Resurgence of The Arab Cold War." Review of Middle East Studies 49, no. 2 (2015): 163-
172. 
10 Efraim Karsh, Soviet Policy towards Syria since 1970. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Efraim 
Karsh, The Soviet Union and Syria. (London: Routledge, 2016).  
11 Eberhard Kienle, Baʿth v. Baʿth: The Conflict between Syria and Iraq, 1968-1989. (London: Tauris, 1990). 
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This work follows Oles M. and Bettie Smolansky who, in their book The U.S.S.R. and 
Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence, argued that the Soviet Union could not avoid a “dialectical 
contradiction”: the more the Soviets gave to Iraq in order to preserve their relationship, the less 
leverage Moscow actually had with which to sway events and policy in Baghdad. Essentially, the 
cost of breaking off relations with Iraq would be too much for the Kremlin to stomach; too much 
time and effort would have been lost for nothing.12  Haim Shemesh’s Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 
1968-1988:  In the Shadow of the Iraq-Iran Conflict also influenced this dissertation, providing 
an examination in depth of the Soviet-Iraqi relationship by utilizing numerous broadcasts, 
periodicals, and official government media publications from Soviet, Iraqi, and Western 
sources.13 His work follows lines like those of the Smolanskys demonstrating Iraqi agency in the 
period he studies Although these books are meticulously researched, both the Smolanskys and 
Shemesh do not use documents of the Baʿthist regime itself beyond the media publications. For 
that matter, these studies are also limited in time, only reaching 1988, both barely scratching the 
surface of Gorbachev’s era. Recent scholarship has begun to demonstrate the connections 
between Soviet satellite states and the Arab world before 1991. Sometimes these connections 
were initiated without the Kremlin’s urging, and often they  even ran counter to the policy that 
Moscow wanted.   For example, Jeffery Herf’s Undeclared Wars with Israel: East Germany and 
the West German Far Left, 1967-1989 shows the ways in which East Germany influenced Arab 
groups, among them various armed Palestinian organizations and revolutionary fronts. 14 This 
 
12 Oles M. and Bettie Smolansky, The U.S.S.R. and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence. (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1999), 289. 
13 Haim Shemesh, Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1968-1988: in the Shadow of the Iraq-Iran Conflict. (Boulder, Co.: 
Rienner, 1992). 
14 Jeffrey Herf, Undeclared Wars with Israel: East Germany and the West German Far Left, 1967-1989. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2015). 
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dissertation shows Iraq’s attempts to court the Soviet bloc as an attempt both to expand influence 
within the Soviet bloc and to test Moscow’s resolve.  
 Historians such as Lawrence Freedman, Rick Atkinson, Michael Gordon, and General 
Bernard Trainor have explored in depth the Iraq-Iraq War, the First Gulf War, and Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. 15  Many of these works heavily rely on American sources and interviews of those 
who were involved in the conflicts. Early in the 2000s, works began to appear that gave 
perspectives other than those of Americans. These include Nigel Ashton and Bryan R. Gibson’s 
The Iran-Iraq War: New International Perspectives and COL Joel Rayburn’s Iraq After 
America: Strongmen, Sectarians, and Resistance.  Works by Iraqis, including Ali A. Allawi’s 
The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace, were also being published and 
circulated within the West.16  Kevin Woods and Kenneth Pollack worked extensively on the 
Iran-Iraq War and First Gulf War, respectively, taking advantage of captured Iraqi documents, 
Saddam Hussein’s interviews during his reign and subsequent imprisonment, and information 
obtained through Iraqi defectors and prisoners of war.17 Pollack, Woods—who has worked 
 
15 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals War:  The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf. 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1995); Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II:  The Inside Story of the 
Invasion and Occupation of Iraq. (New York: Vintage, 2007); Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh. The Gulf 
Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1994);  Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Endgame: The Hidden History of Americas Struggle to 
Build Democracy in Iraq. (New York: Pantheon, 2012); Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco:  The American Military 
Adventure in Iraq. (New York: Penguin Books, 2007); Rick Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers: A Chronicle of 
Combat. (New York: Henry Holt, 2004). 
16 Nigel John Ashton and Bryan R. Gibson. The Iran-Iraq War: New International Perspectives. (London: 
Routledge, 2014); Joel Rayburn. Iraq after America: Strongmen, Sectarians, Resistance. (Stanford, CA: Hoover 
Institution Press, 2014); Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace. (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2008). 
17 Williamson Murray and Kevin M. Woods, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, 2014); Kevin M. Woods, The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein's Strategic Plan for the 
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extensively on the Saddam tapes18—and other scholars including Joseph Sassoon and Pierre 
Razoux have had access to the Captured Records Research Center (CRRC); this archive, 
formerly located in Washington D.C., housed thousands of captured Iraqi state records. By and 
large, in the first decades of the 2000s, studies in Iraqi military history were still dominated by an 
American perspective or shaped in a way focused  on American efforts in the region. However, 
new works were gradually appearing that followed Sassoon’s and Woods’s initiatives in using 
Baʿthist sources as primary evidence.  
Razoux’s book The Iran-Iraq War exemplifies Cold War studies of the 2010s.19  
Although Razoux also relied on the CRRC, he conducted the bulk of his research at the 
Historical Department of the Ministry of Defense in France. Razoux’s work shows the 
complexities of the era of the Cold War outside the Soviet-American paradigm, and it highlights 
especially the global competition among arms manufacturers to supply both Iran and Iraq. 
Razoux’s work supports the argument made in this dissertation that events in the Middle East 
 
Persian Gulf War. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2008); Kevin M. Woods, Williamson Murray, and 
Thomas Holaday with Mounir Elkhamri, Saddam's War an Iraqi Military Perspective of the Iran-Iraq War. 
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2009); Kevin Woods. et al. 
Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership. (Washington 
D.C.: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2007); Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading 
Iraq. 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 2002); Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-
1991. (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002); Kenneth M. Pollack, Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, 
and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness. (Oxford: Oxford University, 2019). 
18 Like President Richard Nixon, Saddam Hussein secretly recorded meetings, phone calls, and conferences, 
amassing thousands of hours of recorded conversations. These tapes were subsequently captured by coalition forces 
after the 2003 invasion. For transcripts and annotations of many of these tapes, see Kevin M. Woods, David D. D. 
Palkki, and Mark E. E. Stout. The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant’s Regime, 1978–2001. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
19 Pierre Razoux, The Iran-Iraq War. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2015). 
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reveal the many cold wars within the Cold War—there were several competing interests, 
rivalries, and claims with which both superpowers and non-superpowers had to reckon.  
This study draws connections between the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. 
Iraq’s perspective on the chaos and confusion caused by the Kremlin’s fall suggests that the 
conditions created by the Cold War continued to persist well into the 1990’s.  This dissertation 
delves deeper into this relationship between the Russian Federation and Iraq during and after the 
First Gulf War, illustrating how Iraq navigated this period, in which it bet that the new Russian 
Federation would eventually reconnect with Iraq. However, learning from their  own experience, 
the Iraqis were not about to count solely on Russia for support in an era of American hegemony.  
 
 Sources 
The bulk of this study rests on two Iraqi sources: the Conflict Records Research Center 
(CRRC) and the papers of the Hizb al-Baʿth al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī, or the Baʿth Arab Socialist 
Party of Iraq, a collection housed at the Hoover Institution Library and Archives at Stanford 
University.  Both are products of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, amassed by U.S. forces and brought 
back to the United States upon their capture. The former was created under the auspices of 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ Minerva Initiative; this collection houses captured Baʿth 
records such as interviews with Iraqi generals, audio recordings of Saddam Hussein and his close 
associates, battle plans, and more. The archive opened at Fort McNair’s National Defense 
University in Washington, D.C. in 2010. However, operations were closed when funding for the 
CRRC was cut-off in 2015. 20 The Baʿth Arab Socialist Party of Iraq collection was brought to 
 
20 U.S. officials have yet to announce which civilian institution will house them next. Michael Gordon, “Archive of 
Captured Enemy Documents Closes,” New York Times, 21 June 2015,  https://nyti.ms/1GBm491. ; Bruce P. 
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Stanford in 2008.21 This archive may afford the greatest insight into Iraq under Saddam Hussein.  
Eleven million original documents include everything from photographs, official government 
documents, foreign communications, and more.  
Scholars such as Joseph Sassoon, Aaron Faust, Lisa Blaydes, Samuel Helfont, and Dina 
Rizk Khoury all paved the way with their books and research derived from the Hizb al-Baʿth al-
'Arabī al-Ishtirākī collection.22 Their works, respectively, examine topics ranging from the 
development and organization of the Iraqi Baʿthist party, the state’s domestic control apparatus, 
the role of religion as means for state control, and memorialization of wars. Helfont also 
published on Iraqi political operations and the use of the embassy organizations to control Iraqis 
abroad.23  This dissertation adds to the historiography of Iraq by using these documents to show 
Iraqi perspectives in foreign policy and strategic objectives during the Cold War era and after it.   
This dissertation uses three of the larger datasets within the Hizb al-Baʿth records: the 
Baʿth Regional Command Collection (BRCC), the North Iraqi Dataset, (NIDS) and the Kuwaiti 
Dataset (KDS).  According to the Hoover Institution, the documents within the North Iraqi 
 
Montgomery and Michael P. Brill, “The Ghosts of Past Wars Live on in A Critical Archive,” War On The Rocks, 11 
September 2019, Https://Warontherocks.Com/2019/09/The-Ghosts-Of-Past-Wars-Live-On-In-A-Critical-Archive/ 
21 Adam Gorlick, “Saddam Hussein’s papers, along with controversy, find a temporary home with the Hoover 
Institution,” Stanford Report, June 18, 2008, https://news.stanford.edu/news/2008/june18/iraq-061808.html  
22 Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Baʿth Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime; Aaron M. Faust, The Baʿthification of 
Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s Totalitarianism. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2016); Makiya, Republic of Fear: The 
Politics of Modern Iraq; Dina Rizk Khoury, Iraq in Wartime Soldiering, Martyrdom, and Remembrance. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Samuel Helfont, Compulsion in Religion: The Authoritarian Roots 
of Saddam Hussein’s Islam, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Lisa Blaydes State of Repression: Iraq under 
Saddam Hussein. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018). 
23 Samuel Helfont. “Authoritarianism Beyond Borders: The Iraqi Baʿth Party as a Transnational Actor,” The Middle 
East Journal 72. No 2. (2018): 229-245.   Samuel Helfont. “Iraq’s Real Weapons of Mass Destruction were 
‘Political Operations,’” War On The Rocks, 26 February 2018. https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/iraqs-real-
weapons-mass-destruction-political-operations/  
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Dataset (NIDS) “were created by security, intelligence, military, Baʿth Party, and other 
government agency offices in northern Iraq, primarily in the three northern governates 
(provinces) of Sulaymānīyah, Dahūk, and Irbīl. Focusing on these governates, this series covers 
the period of the consolidation of power of the regime of Saddam Hussein, the Iran-Iraq war, the 
Kurdish insurgency, the Anfal operations of 1987-1988, and the prelude to the second Gulf War. 
The NIDS provides documentation of the bureaucratic apparatus of the Iraqi State.” This dataset 
contains 2,394,562 documents. Representatives of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and 
Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) collected these documents and turned them over to U.S. 
officials when the U.N. enforced a no-fly zone over northern Iraq in the aftermath of the First 
Gulf War. The U.S. Department of Defense then digitized these records.24 
The documents within the Kuwaiti Dataset (KIDS) “were created by Iraqi military and 
political agencies and were gathered by the Coalition forces after the retreat of the Iraqi military 
from Kuwait in 1991. They document the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait from 1990 to 1991, 
including the conduct of the war and the treatment of the civilian population. Personal 
documents left behind by Iraqi soldiers and operatives are included.” There are over 725,000 
pages, in PDF and JPEG formats, of documents within this dataset.25  
However, there are several issues with this archive. For one, the documents are all written 
in Arabic. While most documents are typed, there are handfuls of handwritten documents—many 
from Saddam Hussein himself, given his penchant for micro-managing just about everything 
 
24 Sometimes only the sheet file remains—the page which notes the basic information of what the document details, 
how it was collected, etc.—and the entire document itself is removed. Whenever something was deemed classified 
by the Americans, the entire document was removed from the file, leaving just an identification sheet behind. This 
process was carried out by the U.S. Department of Defense, not the staff or affiliates of the Hoover Institution. For 
more information, see http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/c84j0cg3/dsc/?query=Iraq#c01-1.2.9.2 
25 For more information, see:  http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/c84j0cg3/dsc/?query=Iraq#c01-1.2.9.3 
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until after the First Gulf War. Sometimes the script is very difficult to read; even native Arabic 
speakers can struggle trying to decipher the handwriting.  
Second, the nature in which the collection was acquired presents two challenges in itself. 
These documents were captured by members of the U.S. military and the U.S. government 
without permission of the Baʿthist regime, the coalition-formed Iraqi government, or the 
individuals whose information is part of the dataset. Therefore, photographs of the documents 
are forbidden in order to protect the personally identifiable information (PII). The Hoover 
Institution and Stanford University are required by law to protect the PII inside the collection. 
The Iraqi government has also asked that these documents be returned to Iraq, and some 
archivists and librarians have called the American possession of these documents “illegal” and a 
violation of the 1907 Hague Convention.26 
Finally, the collection itself is massive and relatively unprocessed. The entire collection 
contains around 11 million documents, with 2.7 million pages, over 6,400 boxfiles, just within 
the BRCC dataset alone. Even then, there are over a thousand markers for the Soviet Union and 
Russia in those 2.7 million pages. Documents are sorted into unorganized batches, with the 
finding aid only indicating what the entire batch contains. Sometimes these batches contain over 
900 photos, and the only option is to scroll past every document to find the one that was 
originally desired. In some cases, documents pertaining to Russia were located within documents 
ear-marked for the documents related to “Eritrea,” for example. In other words, these documents 
 
26 John Gravois, “Disputed Iraqi Archives Find a Home at the Hoover Institution,” The Chronicle of Higher 
Education, 23 January 2008, https://www.chronicle.com/article/Disputed-Iraqi-Archives-Find-a/426,; Hugh Eakin, 
“Iraqi Files in U.S.: Plunder or Rescue?,” NYT, July 1, 2008, https://nyti.ms/2pCzq3v ; Michelle Caswell, ""Thank 
You Very Much, Now Give Them Back": Cultural Property and the Fight over the Iraqi Baʿth Party Records." The 
American Archivist 74, no. 1 (2011): 211-40.  
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had not been identified by any  markers specifically related to Russia elsewhere.  A decade after 
they became available, these archival materials had scarcely been touched.  
However, as with the records of any authoritarian regime, one must not take Iraqi sources 
at face value. Therefore, this work uses the documents available in Foreign Relations of the 
United States of America (FRUSA) and records in the Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, G.H.W. 
Bush, and Clinton presidential libraries as means to support or counter the Baʿth documents. This 
work also uses recently digitized and declassified C.I.A documents that were made available 
online in January 2017. Although the position of the U.S. government is generally peripheral, an 
important aim of this dissertation is to also consider the American position on this Iraqi-Soviet 
relationship.  
Scholars are continuing to advance Middle Eastern perspectives of the Cold War.27 The 
Iraqi documents presented in this dissertation will help to provide Iraq’s viewpoint about this era. 
Iraq’s search for autonomy may disorient American ways of thinking about Iraqi foreign 
ambitions, but by considering Iraqi priorities first, scholars will have a better overall 
understanding of Iraqi military and diplomatic history. 
 
27 Salim Yaqub. Containing Arab Nationalism: the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East. United States: The 
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Union and Syria. (London: Routledge, 2016); Nigel Ashton, ed.  The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional 
Conflict and Superpowers, 1967-1973. (New York: Routledge, 2007); Kenneth M. Pollack, Armies of Sand: The 
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Chapter 2 - Iraqi Foreign Policy, 1968-1989 
 The relationship between Iraq and the Soviet Union in 1968-1989 is more complicated 
than previously recognized. An outdated Cold War narrative argued that the superpowers—the 
U.S. and U.S.S.R.—maintained a cohort of client states.  Many of these client states were located 
in the Third World, and they were usually emerging from the shadows of colonialism.  This 
narrative then argued that the superpowers supposedly used and dominated the client states in 
pursuit of their own agendas. However, recent analysis and scholarship have challenged this way 
of thinking. Instead, scholars continue to demonstrate the high levels of autonomy and agency 
exhibited by these so-called client states. 28 An examination of the Iraqi-Soviet relationship from 
Iraq’s perspective of this time supports these new interpretations. 
 Iraq’s relationship with the Soviet Union resembled other relationships between the 
Soviet Union and Third World states.  Whereas the U.S. used democracy as its rhetoric abroad, 
the U.S.S.R. used anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism especially in the Middle East, to justify its 
expansion of the Third World.29  Soviet rhetoric seemed to fit in with the Middle East, because 
 
28 See Federico Romero, “Cold War Historiography at the Crossroads,” Cold War History, 14: (2014): 685-703; Odd 
Arne Westad, "The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms." Diplomatic 
History 24, no. 4 (2000): 551-65; Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds. The Cambridge History of the Cold 
War. Vol. 1-3. The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010; Melvyn P. 
Leffler. "The Cold War: What Do "We Now Know"?" The American Historical Review 104, no. 2 (1999): 501-24.  
29 The C.I.A. wagered that the Soviets would have to tread carefully.  Giving Soviet arms and weapons helped 
secure allegiances quickly, but the Soviets had to worry that these weapons would be stockpiled for another round of 
fighting with the Israelis. As the C.I.A. argued, the Soviets will have to “dispel any Arab notions that the Soviet 
arms, training, and military doctrine were responsible for the last defeat” and “make the Arabs aware that the 
excellence of Soviet arms will not in itself bring victory against Israel.” Unfortunately for the Soviets, this fear came 
to fruition in the October 1973 war. Weekly Review: Soviet relations with the Baʿthists in Iraq and Syria, June 1969, 
FOIA (C.I.A.), https://U.S..cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000772106.pdf . For more see Isabelle Ginor 
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the 1950s, in the shadow of European decolonialization and the creation of the Jewish state in 
1947, saw an explosion of support for Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism, as championed by 
Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. Overthrowing the British-backed government in Cairo in 1952, 
Nasser’s ideology was inherently anti-imperialistic, anti-Western, and pro-Arab, calling for all 
Arabs to unite as  one state to combat and drive out all would-be conquerors.   
 The ideology of Pan-Arabism included elements of socialism, further tempting the 
Soviets to support numerous Arab independence movements.  Yet Pan-Arabism, although 
certainly influenced by Marxism-Leninism or international socialism, was not governed by it. 
According to Odd Arne Westad, Nasser himself believed in a “vague form of socialism,” but he 
believed that the ideology should be guided by Arab and Islamic principles. 30 Michel Aflaq, a 
Syrian Orthodox Christian who helped to found the Hizb al-Baʿth al’Arabi al’Ishtiraki (the Arab 
Socialist Baʿth Party), promoted socialism as a way to liberate all Arabs from the West’s 
imperialistic and capitalistic tendencies.31 Separated from these evils, the Arab world could then 
redistribute to the Arabs the land and property previously held by Westerners or their stooges in 
the Middle East. Aflaq’s followers, the Baʿthists did not call for the complete restructuring or 
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reorganization of society. Instead, socialism most importantly offered to free Arab society, 
peoples, and land from foreign meddling.32   
 This split between Western and Arab socialism would later incense Moscow and remain 
a key divider between the U.S.S.R. and its Arab client states.  For the Soviets, according to 
Kanan Makiya, “it was a weird mix of socialism that [they were] not used to.”33 Although the 
Soviets saw Pan-Arabism as a pathway to communism, many Arab states—including Syria, 
Egypt, and Iraq—began to target  anyone or anything connected with communist elements, such 
as political parties.  Communist Party members in Iraq, for example, were hunted down and 
executed throughout the Baʿth regime’s tenure. Even then, some Arab communist parties, like 
the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), were also very nationalistic, a tenet not officially espoused by 
the communists in Moscow.34 
 
32 For more on this, see Paul Salem, Bitter Legacy: Ideology and Politics in the Arab World. (Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse Univ. Press, 1994); Eberhard Kienle, Baʿth v. Baʿth: the Conflict between Syria and Iraq, 1968-1989. 
(London: Tauris, 1990);  Hashim S.H. Behbehani, The Soviet Union and Arab Nationalism, 1917-1966. (London: 
Kegan & Paul. 1987); Halim Isber Barakat, The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993); Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of 
Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Baʿthists, and Free Officers. (Princeton: 
Princeton University, 1978). 
33 Makiya, Republic of Fear: the Politics of Modern Iraq, 248-249. 
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 Iraq, a former British mandate, had only shaken off its colonial yoke in 1958, when the 
monarchy set up by the British was overthrown and King Faisal II was murdered in a bloody 
takeover.35 Moscow was drawn to Baghdad given the anti-colonial and pro-nationalistic rhetoric 
now emerging from Iraq; the new Iraqi government also admired the Soviet Union’s anti-
imperialism.36  The Soviet government sent messages celebrating Iraq’s new independence and 
its anti-Zionist stance, and soon Baghdad received Moscow’s promises of diplomatic, military, 
political, and economic support. However, Iraq was more than just a client. It had its own goals, 
ambitions, needs and wants. Iraq knew it was the lesser partner, the smaller and less advantaged.  
Yet Baghdad still attempted to exploit and manipulate this relationship.  Throughout the years of 
the Baʿthist regime from 1968 through 1991, the Soviets and Iraqis played a game of give and 
take. At times, the relationship was extremely tense. The Soviets tried to two-time the Iraqis in 
that Moscow wanted alliances and working relationships with the ICP, Syria, Kurds, and 
Iranians—relationships that Baghdad could not tolerate whatsoever. Moscow also wanted 
Baghdad to rely solely on the goods and services that the U.S.S.R. provided, but this did not stop 
Iraq from seeking more and better quality elsewhere.  
 However, the relationship was never completely severed because Baghdad and Moscow 
were too important to one another to walk away entirely. The relationship between the Soviet 
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Union and Iraq can be best characterized as one steeped in mistrust and convenience. Both 
regimes had their own goals and interests, and both consistently stabbed each another in the back 
while relying on one another at the same time. Despite knowing that it was the smaller, less 
powerful country, Baghdad consistently sought to exploit its relationship with Moscow 
throughout these decades. Iraq’s client status neither diminished its agency nor weakened its 
resolve to test Soviet patience.  
 
 The Origins of Baʿthist Iraq 
On 17 July 1968, the Baʿthists succeeded in overthrowing the government of Iraqi 
President Abdul Rahman Arif in a bloodless coup. Ever since the monarchy installed by the 
British was overthrown in July 1958, Iraq had been plagued by weak governments, revolts in the 
north, and successive coup d’états. To those outside Iraq, news of the latest coup in July 1968 did 
come as a surprise, and, if anything, it prevented many foreign governments from seeking 
relations with the Baʿthists in charge.37 In particular, for the Americans, who had no diplomatic 
relations with Iraq following the Six-Day War in 1967, Iraq’s latest coup was hard to assess. 38  
Wagering the high probability of yet another coup, the Americans hedged that a “counter-coup 
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tomorrow is conceivable.” 39 Less than a year later, U.S. officials labeled Iraq  a “radical state,” 
and, because of the “basic instability” in the country, State Department officials advocated “not 
to be quick and resume relations until regime changes.”40 
Before the coup in 1968, Iraq had been a persistent cause of headaches for the Soviets 
Following the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958, the new Iraqi leader, Major-General Abdul 
Karim al-Qasim, turned to the Soviets for economic and political support, and he welcomed 
communists into his government. The relationship between the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and 
Qasim was uneasy at times.  He feared that the Communists would try to usurp too much power 
or be perceived as a threat to Qasim’s other allies. Nevertheless, he viewed the ICP as “a useful 
ally,” a group that could “counterbalance” the rise of Arab nationalists and Islamist forces 
developing within Iraq.41 As long as Qasim maintained this delicate balance, the Soviets supplied 
economic assistance. But this somewhat happy dynamic between the Iraqis and the Soviets 
ended when Qasim was overthrown by a combination of Baʿthist and military elements in 1963.  
Then, in 1968, seeking total control, the Baʿthists removed the military elements of the 
government and consolidated control over Iraq. 42  The Soviets were quick to establish relations 
with the new regime, but, according to the C.I.A., unfortunately for the Soviets, they would 
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eventually have more “trouble with the Baʿthists than [with] any leftist regimes in the Middle 
East.”43 
 Soviet interest in Iraq rested on certain goals. For one, Iraqi oil reserves and markets were 
certainly enticing. Some historians have pointed to Soviet geopolitical concerns; Moscow was 
concerned that it could be outflanked by U.S. influence and military presence in the Persian Gulf. 
Keeping a strong relationship with Iraq was part of the Kremlin’s attempt to expand its influence 
in the Arabian peninsula.44 Other historians have argued that Soviet policy was not centered on 
oil interests or military bases in the Middle East but rather that it was to “challenge Western 
position, in a region of importance to the West, and to counter Western challenges to the U.S.S.R 
[in the region].”45  Having a foundation in Iraq also gave the Soviets a chance to influence 
regional events within the Middle East, including involvement in the complicated and perilous 
Arab-Israeli conflict.46 
Iraq was among the  emerging states of the Third World  that were shaking themselves 
free from their colonial overlords; and Moscow was enthusiastic to win the loyalty of another 
Third World state. In the Middle East, as elsewhere, the superpowers vied for influence. The 
region was highly volatile, with revolutions and coups in such places as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, 
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Yemen (Aden), Oman (Muscat), and Turkey. This left the region open to  influence, and, as Odd 
Arne Westad argues, Moscow hoped that the new “radical nationalists would break away from 
capitalistic control and form alliances” with the Kremlin.47 However, the Soviets were not the 
only ones interested in this region. As the U.S. State Department saw it, “the Soviets still prefer 
to avoid peaks of tension in the area…the Kremlin dislikes unpredictability in the Middle East, 
and in Eastern Europe, at a time when Communist China promises to remain a major headache 
for the Soviet Union for the foreseeable future.” 48  
 Iraq was important for the Soviet Union for providing access to oil, geographic security, 
and a chance to further Soviet credentials in the anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist circles of the 
world. Iraq was at the center of many key issues in the region: it had a booming global oil 
industry, it was a major player in Arab-Iranian rivalry, and it was a vocal opponent of Israel.  
Influence within Iraq could affect events, states, decisions, and playmakers in the Persian Gulf. 
Setting aside debates on the Soviets’ true motivation for expanding in the Third World, Iraq 
seemed to offer all the potential for which the Soviets could dream.    
Nevertheless, this potential proved  difficult for the Soviets to use to their advantage.  
The Baʿthists were stubborn in chasing after their own ambitions, which included confronting 
their neighbors and rivals. At the same time that the Soviets were engaged with Iraq, they also 
had to play a restraining role. They did not want Iraq to feel so emboldened that Baghdad might 
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engage in conflict that could jeopardize the stability of the Baʿthist regime. The Soviets also did 
not want to see Iraq succeed to such a point that it weakened Soviet influence altogether.49 
 
 After the 1968 Baʿthist coup 
In January 1968, as part of “an overall rearrangement of priorities,” the British 
announced their intention to “terminate or renegotiate” all commitments in Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, the Trucial States (modern day United Arab Emirates), and Oman; this action was to be 
completed by the end of the end of 1971.50  The Americans did not expect  this withdrawal to 
draw the Soviets into “greater involvement” in the region, but they did believe any potential 
Soviet action would be “harmful to our interests.” If anything, the U.S. government believed Iran 
to be the clear beneficiary of Britain’s action.  The Shah of Iran wanted to replace the British, 
and, according to the Nixon administration, the Iraqis were too “weak and pre-occupied with the 
Arab-Israeli issue” and “occupied with Shatt-al-Arab waterway” to resist the Shah effectively.51 
In 1969, the Nixon administration defined  basic U.S. interests in the Middle East. Along 
with the “independence and integrity” of NATO, it defined the security of Greece, Turkey, and 
Iran as its “vital interests.” As for the Soviets, the Nixon administration argued that, although the 
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Soviet threat remained, “powerful indigenous and self-limiting forces make it unlikely the 
U.S.S.R. can ever totally dominate the area, [yet] the high-water mark of its potential influence 
has by no means been reached.” Even then, Soviet interests in the Middle East stemmed more 
from “geopolitical factors and considerations of national security and power politics than from 
communist ideology or desire for raw materials or markets. The Soviet threat is…politico-
economic rather than narrowly military.”52 
At the start of the new decade, the Nixon administration faced three major issues in the 
Middle East: the Arab-Israeli conflict, the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, and the 
outbreak of Kurdish-Iraqi hostilities.  The Nixon administration also saw, however, the growing 
strength of the relationship between Iraq and the U.S.S.R. This culminated on 9 April 1972 when 
the Iraqis and U.S.S.R. signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Both countries pledged 
“to cooperate in the political, economic, scientific, and military fields” and to jointly fight 
against Israel.  The signatory parties said  that they “[would] continue to wage unrelenting 
struggle against imperialism and Zionism.”53  The treaty also included the term “unbreakable 
friendship,”54 a slight implication that Iraq would “be unable to release itself from Moscow’s 
friendship.”55  Yet, even though  the U.S. government  believed this treaty reflected “recent 
Soviet advances in these areas and reflects the considerable and increasing Soviet presence in 
Iraq,” the Americans also noted that it was not quite on par with the 1971 Egyptian-Soviet 
Treaty; that treaty explicitly stated that both countries would strive for “cooperation in the field 
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of strengthening the defensive capabilities of each.” 56  In other words, the Soviet military 
commitment to Iraq was not on par with its  military commitment to Egypt.  
According to Haim Shemesh, the 1972 treaty was part of the “Soviet global policy of 
[maintaining] embodied in treaties, with developing countries struggling against ‘imperialism’ 
and for ‘social progress.’”57  Geopolitically speaking, Iraq provided an alternative oil source, 
separate from the West and Eastern Europe; and Iraq granted the Soviets access to naval ports (at 
Umm Qasr).  Consolidating this relationship with Iraq was crucial for the Soviets, especially at a 
time when Egyptian-Soviet relations were proving troublesome.58 For Iraq, having Soviet 
support for its political and economic ambitions, including the removal of remaining Western 
influences within the country, galvanized Iraq to move. This was the case in June 1972, shortly 
after the 1972 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed, when the Iraqis nationalized the 
Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC), a Western conglomerate of British, Dutch, American, and 
French oil companies which controlled most of Iraqi oil production.59  
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The removal of Western imperialism was one goal, for the reduction of Western power in 
Iraq gave Baghdad room to maneuver regionally. The Iraqis were concerned with several key 
players in the area—notably, those involving the Kurds and the Iranians. In this regard, Baghdad 
hoped the treaty would signal Moscow’s willingness to side with Iraq instead of its neighbors.  
Unfortunately for the Baʿthists, the  treaty did not have this effect. Although both the U.S.S.R. 
and Iraq were concerned about  Iran, Moscow was more troubled by the growing strength of the 
U.S.-Iranian relationship than it was with Iraq’s concerns over Iranian support for the Kurds and 
Iranian aspirations within the Gulf.  Even then, the Soviets tried to keep their support of Iraq 
balanced by comparable support of Iran. 60  The Soviets informed Iraq that the treaty was “not 
aimed at another country,” hoping to signal to Iran that it would like to “improve relations with 
both Baghdad and Tehran simultaneously.” 61 
Even before the 1972 treaty was signed, the Soviets were involved in many economic and 
industrial projects within Iraq. The C.I.A. estimated that the Soviets had radio stations, dams, 
pharmaceutical plants, irrigation projects, railroad workshops, glassware factories, garment 
factories, telephone exchanges, agricultural machinery plants, canning factories, railroad 
construction sites, electrical equipment factories, grain elevators, and cotton textile mills spread 
throughout the country. 62  Soviet economic, political, and military assistance expanded 
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substantially following the signing of the 1972 treaty including the delivery of military aircraft, 
such as the TU-22 supersonic bomber. Soviet advisors were also deployed to help Iraq  develop 
its oil infrastructure, irrigation systems, and  merchant and fishing fleets.63 Sometimes aid was 
accompanied by high-level visits from the Soviets. For example, in March 1974, Marshal Andrei 
Grechko visited Iraq in March 1974, and Soviet military aid was delivered around the same time; 
this included tanks, aircraft, and missiles.64   
Soviet advisors were also sent to help the Baʿth Party structure its own government.  
According to U.S. officials in Tehran, the Iraqis asked for Soviet assistance to help “reorganize 
[the] Iraqi Ministry of Interior and to overhaul [the] governmental administrative system.” The 
Soviets were also looking to coordinate Iraqi trade unions and cooperatives with organizations in 
the U.S.S.R.65  Elements of the KGB were dispatch to Baghdad to help establish the Baʿth 
security apparatus—the very apparatus that Saddam Hussein would use to terrorize his enemies 
and his own people.66 The relationship between the KGB and Iraqi intelligence became so 
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entwined that Iraq “became ‘the only country in the non-communist world where Soviet 
espionage was discontinued.’”67 
Although the 1972 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signaled Iraq’s intent to ally 
itself with the Soviet Union, it did not mean that Iraq had any wish to transform into a Soviet 
stooge. For one thing, despite Soviet assistance, the Iraqis remained suspicious of all Soviet 
policies and ambitions in Iraq and throughout the region, for that matter. The Iraqis questioned 
how meaningful this relationship truly was since the Soviets refused to staunchly defend and 
support Iraq in its disputes with Syria, Iran, and the Kurds.68 The Iraqis resented Soviet overtures 
to  the ICP and the Kurds, especially since the 1972 treaty called for “non-interferences in each 
other’s internal affairs.”69 The Baʿthists were furious over Moscow’s desire for these groups to 
be incorporated into the Iraqi government.  Despite being the smaller party in  the relationship, 
the Iraqis were not about to let Moscow dictate its policies.  The Iraqis had their own policies 
and agendas, many of which were “objectionable to the Soviets,” including the campaign against 
the ICP, confrontation with Syria, isolation of the Kurds, territorial disputes with Iran, and 
criticism of the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.70    
To commemorate the first anniversary of the signing of the 1972 treaty, the Iraqis invited 
the Soviets to Baghdad for celebrations. Much to Saddam’s disappointment, and taken as a 
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slight, the Soviets did not send members of the highest levels of Soviet leadership but Soviet 
Naval Commander in Chief Admiral Gorshkov, along with a cruiser and two destroyers, who  
arrived in March 1973.  As the Soviets were arriving, the Iraqis launched a cross-border raid into 
Kuwait, in what is now referred to as the Samita border skirmish.71 The Americans dismissed 
any possibility of Soviet participation in the border clashes.   U.S. embassy officials in Baghdad 
calculated that “the Baʿth are cleverly using the Soviets rather than vice-versa.”  The Iraqis were 
using the visit to make it seem that the Soviets supported Iraqi ambitions in the Gulf.72  
This instance along with many more to come illustrated Iraq’s agency in this regard.       
Although Iraq knew that the Soviets were the superpower, the 1972 treaty did not terminate 
Iraq’s independence. If anything, the fact that the Soviets had put pen to paper had enhanced 
Iraq’s resolve to maneuver in the Gulf region. The Soviets did have the upper hand in that they 
were the major supplier of arms and weapons to Iraq, but this did not stop the Iraqis from 
operating beyond Soviet ambitions. As Syria’s Hafiz al-Assad summarized to the Americans, 
when he was generalizing about Arab states and their independence, “there is no reason for the 
Arabs to be in the role of the beggar.”73  
 
 Iraqi Communist Party 
The relationship between the Baʿth and the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) was a key 
source of contention between Iraq and the Soviet Union.  The Baʿthists and ICP had a long and 
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tumultuous history, one that dated back before Saddam’s reign. Whether it be differences over 
ideology or over foreign support, the tension between these two parties ultimately boiled down to 
who had the power and who was the threat. 74 After the 1968 coup, the Baʿthists moved to purge 
the Communists from the government and the military, placing the ICP under constant 
surveillance, with many ICP members arrested and tortured. However, by 1972-73, the Baʿthists 
invited the ICP to join the National Patriotic Front, which was posed as an attempt to establish 
cooperation among the ICP, Baʿthists, and Kurds; two ICP members were even given posts 
within the government, although these positions were limited in power. However, this program 
was really nothing but a ploy for the Baʿth Party to use to consolidate their power even more so. 
For one thing, the Front split the ICP, with some factions refusing to join, allowing the Baʿthists 
to divide and conquer. By bringing in the ICP, the Front also helped the new regime to 
“[ingratiate]” itself with the U.S.S.R., a prospect Moscow certainly welcomed.75  Nevertheless, 
despite the agreement, the Baʿthists began moving on the Communists, arresting and forcing 
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members into exile; Communist members were even executed in 1978, accused of treason. The 
Baʿth Party even ordered the death penalty for any Baʿthist who joined the ICP.76  
Connections between the ICP and Moscow confirmed Baʿth suspicions of Moscow’s 
intent to meddle in Iraqi internal affairs. Iraqi intelligence sources within the ICP informed the 
Baʿthists that various ICP leaders were in communication with Moscow and had plans to travel 
to the Soviet Union, if they were able to leave Iraq unmolested.77 Those ICP members who had 
connections with Moscow were subject to surveillance and arrest, while Iraqi authorities also 
closed Soviet-linked civil societies including cultural centers and newspapers.78 The Baʿth Party 
always remained cautious of Soviet intentions with the ICP. As American officials in Baghdad 
noted, “for [the Baʿth Party’s] most feared domestic enemy are the Communists,” and the 
granting of two ministerial positions within the Front to Communists was done at the urging of 
the Soviets.79 
Soviet criticism of the treatment of communists in Iraq predated the 1968 Baʿthist coup. 
Moscow called the 1963 anti-communist purges, for example, a “bloody terror” and labeled 
‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif’s government a “fascist” regime.80 The Baʿthists of the 1968 coup learned 
from their 1963 predecessors; and, in order to avoid Soviet wrath, they did not move to 
 
76 Telegram from the Interests Section in Baghdad to the Department of State and the Embassy in Iran, 6 November 
1976, “Iraqi-Soviet Relations,” Document 319, FRUSA, 1969-1976 Volume XXVII; Iran; Iraq, 1973-1976. 
77 This source also indicated that the ICP was in talks with the Syrian Communist Party, including Iraqis living in 
exile. “Information,” sent on 21 April 1988, to the Directorate of General Security, CRRC SH‐PDWN‐D‐000‐678, 
Various Memoranda Relating to the Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons against Halabja and other Kurdish Villages, 
1988. 
78 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, 12 April 1976, “Saudi Query about 
Soviets in Iraq,” Document 305, FRUSA, 1969-1976 Volume XXVII; Iran; Iraq, 1973-1976. 
79 Telegram from the Interests Section in Baghdad to the Department of State, 31 March 1973, “Country Assessment 
for Iraq,” Document 208, FRUSA, 1969-1976 Volume XXVII; Iran; Iraq, 1973-1976. 
80 Shemesh, Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1968-1988: in the Shadow of the Iraq-Iran Conflict,  6.  
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exterminate the ICP. This, however, did not stop the Baʿthists from moving on the ICP by other 
means.81   Soviet voicing  of support for the ICP became ever  hollower throughout the decade, 
even as  the Baʿth Party increasingly moved on the ICP.  Whereas communist states such as East 
Germany would alter their policies in response to Iraq’s anti-ICP campaign, the Soviets remained 
ambivalent towards the plight of the ICP.82 Moscow even signed the 1972 Treaty knowing that 
the Baʿthists were at best non-committal about resolving the ICP issue. Throughout the Cold 
War, the Soviets would protest the ICP’s ill-treatment, but serious retaliation against the Baʿth 
rarely materialized. Moscow’s geopolitical interests in Iraq outweighed its interests in the fate of 
Communist elements in the country.  
 
 Technology and the West 
A factor contributing to  the divisions between the Soviets and Iraqis was the quality of 
Soviet hardware and training. In particular, apart from the ZSU system and SA-7’s, the Iraqis 
believed that most Soviet air defense equipment was ineffective.83 As the U.S. government 
noted, because of “quality, reliability and maintenance problems of equipment, and the adequacy 
of supplies,” the Iraqis were vocal in diplomatic channels in their criticisms of what the Soviets 
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91843, William Burns Files, RRPL. 
34 
provided.84 Seeking better equipment, the Iraqis turned the West and East Europe for arms and 
other supplies. They also sought foreign investment  from France, Japan, West Germany, Great 
Britain, Italy, and even the United States.85 In one case the Iraqis refused to purchase Soviet 
made Tu-154s and instead opted to purchase American-made Boeing aircraft.86  The French sold 
Iraq helicopters, armored personnel carriers, and light tanks.87  
By March 1973, Iraq reached a settlement agreement with the Iraqi Petroleum 
Company.88  Compensation included around $300 million USD from the company whereas Iraq 
would pay about $70 million as repayment for previous loans.  Since the French-controlled 
Compagnie Francaise des Pétroles (CFP) was the lead mediator on this deal, the CFP also 
secured new contracts and access to low-cost oil. As the U.S. government noted, this mediation 
“[removed] a major irritant to Iraqi relations with the West, and may open the door to increased 
western commercial activity as well as development of Iraq’s large undeveloped oil reserves.”89 
After the 1973 IPC settlement, Western companies, including Shell, CFP (known today as 
Total), and Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI) rushed to invest in Iraqi oil and agriculture 
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projects.90 At the same time that Soviet media praised the settlements, calling Iraq’s 
nationalization “a complete victory,” the Soviets attempted to pressure Iraq against accepting 
Western investments, to no avail.91 Although the Soviets welcomed Iraqi control over its own 
oil, Moscow did not have the capacity to replace all Western companies if the West was to 
embargo Iraq in retaliation for Baghdad’s nationalization of the IPC. But Moscow was now 
worried that Western companies would be welcomed back into Iraq with open arms, lessening 
the Kremlin’s sway over Baghdad. 92 As oil prices continued to rise, the cooperation between 
Westerners and Iraqis in the oil industry continued to frustrate Soviet ambitions in Baghdad.  
The quantity of arms sent to Baghdad from Moscow fluctuated as tensions between the 
two ebbed and flowed.  Moscow was aware of Iraq’s pursuit of Western arms, and it was 
concerned, knowing that acquiring Western arms  weakened Iraq’s dependence on the Soviet 
Union. But the Kremlin was patient.  It did not rush to fulfil all Iraqi orders or inundate Iraq with 
more material—in some cases, delays were implemented on agreements and orders coming from 
Baghdad as means to punish Iraq and as a way  to avoid being manipulated by the Baʿthists. 
When the Kurds rebelled in 1974, the Iraqis desperately turned to Moscow for aid, and Moscow  
was willing to give it, provided that certain political conditions were met  in return. But when 
Moscow delayed its response to Iraqi requests,  Iraq  concluded  that it could not depend on just 
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one state for its economic and military needs. 93 However, despite being trapped in this perpetual 
cycle of tension—of give and get—neither party walked away entirely from the other, and  the 
U.S.S.R. remained the major supplier of weapons to Iraq throughout the Cold War.  Neither 
could walk away without hurting itself economically and without risking damage to what U.S. 
officials in Baghdad called the “prestige of [its] great power relationship.”94 
 
 Embassy Organizations and the Office of Organizations Outside the Region 
The Office of Organizations Outside the Region (OOR) was  important  among the 
foreign and domestic apparatuses of the Baʿth Party. Originally named the Bureau Office of 
Arabs Outside the Homeland, it underwent organizational restructuring, including a name 
change, in 1982. 95  But the structure and missions remained largely intact. The OOR was the 
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umbrella institution for all Embassy Organizations (EO) housed in the Iraqi embassies abroad.  
Iraqis were able to conduct specific diplomatic and political missions, such as the courting of 
local media, influential politicians, and soft-power groups such as women’s and student groups.  
These types of political operations were designed to influence foreign governments and non-state 
actors to support Iraqi causes across the globe. As the EOs ran operations to garner favor with 
officials in the government, the Iraqis were also seeking soft-power support in  countries where 
their embassies were located.  
By the end of the Cold War, the Iraqis had 69 EOs running out of various embassies.96 
Political and media personalities, political parties, elections, election systems, political 
movements, and important events were tracked and reported in depth by the EOs; these reports 
were then transmitted throughout the bureaucracy of the Baʿth Party, not through diplomatic 
Baʿth Party channels. These activities were conducted in many countries.  The BRCC dataset in 
the Hizb al-Baʿth records includes information on EO operations in Austria, Turkey, Indonesia, 
France, Pakistan, Malaysia, Belgium, Netherlands, Romania, Poland, Spain, East Germany, 
Kenya, Bangladesh, Cuba, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Sweden, Vietnam, 
Hungary, Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S.S.R.97 The BRCC dataset also shows the  
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complicated ways in which  the bureaucracy of the EOs functioned; debates over party 
membership, promotions, and policy were all recorded in  the documents. 98 The Baʿthist 
regime’s bureaucracy reigned supreme in Baghdad and abroad.  
Iraqi students were crucial in these operations.  Iraqi students were organized by the 
Baʿth into the “National Union of Students and Youth of Iraq.” In many cases, the student groups 
operated on foreign campuses, including a few in the United States, and they published their own 
newsletters and pamphlets.99 Many of the Iraqi students studying abroad were able to do so 
because of grants and scholarships from various ministries of the government. Failure to do well 
in school or failure to uphold their mission could result in termination of the grant and a forced 
return to Iraq.  The Baʿth organized Iraqi women into the “General Union of Iraqi Women,” 
which also had foreign chapters operating abroad.100  Supposedly, these groups operated 
independently from the Iraqi government as they collaborated with local groups to promote Iraqi 
interests within their respective countries. The truth, however, is that they were controlled by the 
party. 
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The EOs collected intelligence and information on any potential opposition to the 
Baʿthist regime such as dissidents and communists.101  Through their embassies and the EOs, 
they carried out surveillance operations against their own fellow citizens, political opponents, 
persons of interest, and just about anyone or anything the Iraqi state viewed as important.  They 
also organized kidnappings, committed assassinations, and employed other forms of violence to 
intimidate and terrorize both non-Iraqis and Iraqi citizens.102 Intelligence collected through the 
EO was used to control Iraqis abroad and at home. Intelligence collected at home was also sent 
to the respective EOs to force Iraqis abroad to be compliant.  
Saddam justified the use of the EOs as means to help Iraqis living outside Iraq. 
According to Samuel Helfont, Saddam believed that the EOs could “stop” the problems of Iraqis 
living abroad and be able “to find suitable solutions for them.”103  However, the truth of the 
matter ran much deeper. The EOs reflected the metastasis of the Baʿth Party’s bureaucracy 
abroad, with the internal bureaucracy of the party replicating itself abroad in the countries’ 
embassies. Using a combination of “carrots and sticks,” Saddam and the Baʿthists in Iraq were 
able to “[extend] their authoritarian system beyond its borders in an attempt to control Iraqis 
wherever they may reside.” However, the mere fact of Iraqis living abroad was dangerous for the 
Baʿthist regime. The Baʿth Party worried that this growing expatriate population created a poor 
image of Iraq abroad. As Helfont argues, the concern was that the high number of Iraqi 
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emigrants “reflected poorly on the conditions” created by the Baʿthist regime at home. In other 
words, if conditions were good at home, why were so many Iraqis leaving the country? Worse, 
these Iraqis could now access and even transmit dangerous information about the regime among 
themselves. Iraqis were also now capable of bringing in uncensored news from the outside world 
into Iraq.104 
 
 EO Moscow 
The Out of Country Organization Soviet Union was established in Moscow in 1976. EO 
Moscow was in charge of Iraqis in Moscow and Leningrad, but it also served as the hub for 
Iraq’s operations in the rest of the Soviet republics as well.  There were external liaison centers 
operating in Baku, Tashkent, Odessa, and Kiev.105 Iraqi students, civilian and military, were 
placed throughout the Soviet Union including Moscow, Baku, Astrakhan (a city located 
southeast of Volgograd), and many others.106 EO Moscow was able to relay intelligence back to 
Baghdad from foreign sources, such as dissidents or those with pro-Iraq sentiments. For 
example, in 1983, in Kiev, Ukraine, a Libyan student passed along information to Iraqi 
intelligence, suggesting that Libyan students were standing with Iraq in its war with Iran. He also 
passed along intelligence that certain members of the Libyan armed forces, including Air Force 
commanders and other officers, had been exiled or executed for their pro-Iraqi stances. The 
information the student offered does not appear to have been well vetted.  He claimed that he 
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could not make this claim publicly, since doing so would cost him employment opportunities 
back home. Nonetheless, EO Moscow recommended passing along his information to Iraqi 
intelligence services in hopes of making contact with other Libyan officers who also held pro-
Iraqi sentiments.107  
EO Moscow’s satellite operations in the Soviet republics were also crucial for 
intelligence purposes, and they often confirmed Iraqi suspicions of  self-contradiction in Soviet 
policy. During the Iran-Iraq War, for example, Iraqi intelligence picked up news—the alleged 
source was an Azerbaijani customs agent—that the U.S.S.R. was allowing the “passage of goods, 
food and weapons sent to Iran from North Korea and socialist countries to pass through [the 
Republic of Azerbaijan].”108 
The Iraqi military received training from the Soviet Union and members of the Soviet 
bloc. By the end of 1971, over 1,825 Iraqis had received training at various command and staff 
schools in the U.S.S.R., according to C.I.A. estimates.109 In 1976, the C.I.A. also estimated that 
over 2,500 Soviet and East Europeans civilian technicians were working in Iraq, as well as about 
1,000 Soviet military advisors.110 Iraqi pilots received training on Tu-22 bombers that were 
delivered to Iraq after the 1972 Friendship Treaty and the 1973 IPC agreement.111  Although 
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members of the Iraqi military  trained in both the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc nations, 
the quality of their training was sometimes questionable.112 The substandard quality of Soviet 
equipment, as compared with what was produced by Western sources, frustrated the Iraqis as 
well. 113   
Documents captured by American forces in Kuwait following the withdrawal of Iraqi 
forces in February-March 1991 detail how much the Iraqis relied on Soviet technology and 
training throughout the 1980s and into the First Gulf War.   For example, technical manuals with 
details for building and running mobile chemical factories were captured as part of what is now 
the Kuwaiti dataset of the Iraqi Baʿthist records housed at the Hoover Institution. Although the 
manual was published in Russia, handwritten Arabic translations are included. The manual 
details the truck’s purpose—to serve as a mobile chemical factory that could also be used to 
carry equipment for determining chemical concentrations and levels of nuclear radiation —and it 
also provides detailed graphics and illustrations showing  the truck’s construction.114 Other 
records include Soviet artillery instructions, manuals, firing tables, and handbooks for weapons 
including 122mm gun howitzers, 120 mm M-75 Yugoslav-Soviet mortars, 120mm M-38 Russian 
mortars, as well as student notebooks containing notes on how to maneuver Soviet tanks.115  
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Four volumes of The Military Anthologies Journal—a military publication compiled  
predominantly  from articles in Soviet and French military magazines—were also collected in 
Kuwait.116  
Documents captured in northern Iraq also show the reliance of the Iraqis on Soviet 
training and technology.  Police units in and around Sulaymānīyah were issued Soviet 
armaments, including Soviet-made pistols.117  Soviet and Yugoslav instructors taught Iraqi 
officers on various types of nuclear and chemical weapons, how to wear gas masks, and how to 
behave properly as officers, especially around civilian workers.118  To the frustration of Baʿthist 
officials, Russian weapons such as Kalashnikovs also ended up in the hands of the Peshmerga, 
the Kurdish-controlled security forces operating in northern Iraq. This was because they were 
either stolen or neglected by the officers to whom they had been issued or else because the 
Soviets, and their Iranian allies, were also occasionally supplying the Kurds.119  
 Many Iraqi officers, including engineers, colonels, brigadier generals and major 
generals, studied in Moscow, taking engineering and science courses.120 Military education 
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abroad often centered on technical support elements, such as chemical engineering, mechanical 
engineering, and other scientific training.121 One student’s diploma indicates that he attended 
Mikhailovskaya Kalinin Military Artillery Academy in Leningrad, graduating with his Master of 
Science in Engineering. He also received “excellent marks” on his diploma project, “Design of a 
Stationary Ordnance Repair Shop.” 122 Not all Iraqis had training this extensive. Sometimes 
courses and instruction in vocational training centers and engineering centers only lasted 15 
days.123 Some courses focused only on equipment repairs such as tank repairs. Officers could 
petition for further studies in the Soviet Union, often in post-graduate courses or other 
curriculum.124 The same officer who graduated with his Master in Engineering in 1977 returned 
to the U.S.S.R. for specialization training in 1984.125  
Military officers could also enhance their career prospects by studying in the U.S.S.R. 
One officer who studied in the U.S.S.R. under a military grant rose through the ranks, becoming 
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a military attaché and then a party administrator.126 Former military officers found themselves 
working for the embassy in Moscow and then back in Baghdad, transferred between the two 
offices; with their enhanced resumes, these officers also found their way through the Baʿth 
Party’s bureaucracy, acquiring party membership and then working as military attachés.127 In 
other instances, officers who worked with EOs as military officers returned to assume leadership 
of the military office within an EO as civilians later in their careers.128 Some study grants were 
awarded as political prizes as well. For example, one officer was awarded a military grant to 
study in the U.S.S.R. because of his courage during the Iran-Iraq War.129 
The Iraqis, through their EOs, monitored and kept intelligence reports on both the status 
of their students and the operational practices of the schools in the Soviet Union.130 Everything—
absences, late arrivals, disciplinary actions, curriculum, library facilities, tutoring, teacher 
quality, and grade levels—was monitored and reported back to Baghdad.131 Students’ “partisan” 
and “union” activities were also tracked.132 Some students were expelled for poor academic 
performance; these decisions were made by either Soviet or Iraqi authorities, depending on the 
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circumstances.133 Iraqi students were always under some sort of surveillance. The Soviets often 
vetted and monitored the students sent to Moscow, while Iraqi authorities remained suspicious of 
their students abroad. In some cases, ICP members were suspected of working with the Soviets, 
possibly in conflict with Baʿthist interests—some of these accusations led to these students being 
recalled to Iraq, their passports being seized upon their return. 134 
A paradox existed in Iraq’s wanting to send students abroad. Although they were 
important for soft-power influence and intelligence purposes, they also were dangerous in that 
they might also be corrupted by foreign manipulation. Worse, their performance and behavior 
could tarnish the image that Baghdad wanted their citizens and party members to project abroad.  
After completing his studies in Moscow, one student was accused of having engaged in activity 
deemed hostile towards Iraq. Another student began operating in the black market in the Soviet 
Union, which frustrated both the Iraqis and his Soviet hosts.  A third student, based in Baku, 
Azerbaijan, physically attacked another colleague and was acting like a “playboy.” For their 
actions, all three had their passports revoked by Baʿthist authorities.  Nonetheless,  after 
investigations and promises of future good behavior, all three had their passports returned. In the 
case of the student in Baku, the consulate was none too pleased with his passport being reinstated 
and with his return to Baku.  The unhappiness in the consulate is yet another revelation of the 
bureaucracy and infighting between Baghdad and its satellite operations.135 
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Paranoia within the Baʿth Party existed both in Baghdad and abroad. Party members 
constantly looked for collaborators, provocateurs, and saboteurs within the party organization 
and party memberships.136 The Baʿthist security apparatus relied on an excessive amount of 
bureaucracy. As Martin K. Dimitrov and Joseph Sassoon illustrate, streamlined printed forms 
served as the crucial means to “document, administer, and control” the Iraqi population. The 
apparatus relied on the Iraqi public to inform on one another.  Informants and collaborators came 
from all socio-economic backgrounds and conditions—some did it for pay, some did it to save 
their own skins or the lives of their family members, while others were desperate for social 
privilege or elevation, such as licenses or permits.  Information was often short on specifics and 
heavy emphasis and credence were given to rumors.  Failing to report activity, even if the 
activity itself was not viewed as suspicious by the observers, was deemed suspicious in itself, 
thus continuing a cycle of family members, neighbors, colleagues, and others reporting on one 
another.  All of this made repression less discriminate amongst the Iraqi populace, given the 
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quality of information against alleged targets.137 Intelligence studies and reports were conducted 
on members of the Baʿth Party, including those working within the EO.  Often, investigations 
were carried out against members who had family members outside of Iraq or were eligible to 
obtain citizenship elsewhere —ties to Syria and Iran were considered the most dangerous. For 
example, an eleven-page security report on a Baʿthist comrade working in Jordan who also had 
family members in Syria can be found within the BRCC dataset, and there were many others.138  
 Students of Iranian and Syrian descent were especially problematic for the Baʿthist 
regime, given the tensions Iraq had with both countries. These students were often viewed with 
even more suspicion, and Iraqi authorities often waited for their “inevitable” treachery. Two 
students were expelled from the Public Institute of Fish by Soviet authorities, prompting the 
Iraqis to cry foul.139  EO Moscow reported that “the facts contradict with the Soviet Union 
commitment to failing students as the Union has deported a number of failing students out of the 
country. This contradicts with the communist nature of the Soviet Union.” Ironically, though, the 
first student, who was also Iranian, left the U.S.S.R. and probably headed to Iran after his family 
was forced out of Iraq. The second student was failing his classes and left for Syria; he did return 
to the U.S.S.R. on a Syrian passport to complete his studies.140  The fact that these students were 
connected to Syria and Iran, respectively, more than likely confirmed Iraqi suspicions of their 
supposed subterfuge.  
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In another instance, a student of Iranian descent, with his family based in Najaf, did not 
return to the U.S.S.R. after he was ordered  by Baʿthist officials to do so in the early 1980s. Iraqi 
intelligence tracked his family’s travels to Iran; and, when he neither completed his studies nor 
returned to Iraq, his passport was revoked, and his teaching fellowship was terminated.141  This 
student had traveled to the U.S.S.R. in 1976, when he was awarded a five-year grant to complete 
his studies including learning Russian.  When the Ministry of Education urged that he return to 
Iraq, he refused, citing his wife’s health. Iraqi intelligence further alleged that his brother, who 
was in Iraq, sent him a letter warning him not to return home.142 A year later the former student 
was tracked down to Syria, where he had settled after his defection and was working as a private 
citizen. Most likely raising even more alarm bells in Baghdad was the fact that Syrian 
intelligence agents allegedly had begun feeding Iraqi Baʿthists some information on this former 
student. The Baʿthists were confused—was this information true or a ploy to lead the Iraqis on a 
wild goose chase? Although some Baʿthist authorities believed this to be a plot to “create some 
kind of suspicion within the ranks of our party,” they also viewed these accusations as having  
some credibility because of the student’s family ties and defection.143  
 Interactions with foreigners also worried the Baʿthists, especially those who had military 
connections with Syria and Iran. 144 One case in particular saw EO Moscow alerting Baghdad 
that a Syrian colonel was studying at the same military academy where Iraqi officers were 
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studying. However, in this case, the Syrian was willing to cooperate with the Iraqis as he 
“[complained]” about the current situation in Syria.” The Syrian even offered to help locate 
“Syrian infiltrators within our party.” EO Moscow was able to coordinate a meeting with the 
Syrian, who informed them that there were more officers like him who were willing to assist 
Iraq. He also confirmed that Iranians were being trained in Syria, and some training focused on 
preparation for operations along Iraq’s borders. The Syrian offered to coordinate future meetings, 
and he also confirmed Iraq’s worst fear. According to Baʿth Party reports, “the relationship 
between the Syrian regime and the Soviet Union is very strong and such strength was 
demonstrated with the camouflage of the just Iraqi war against the Persians.”145  
 
 EOs in the Soviet Bloc 
The states of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe welcomed a relationship with Iraq as 
much as the Soviet Union did. This was partly  because it satisfied their overlords in Moscow.  
Soviet leaders wanted Iraq’s relationships with these satellite states to further Soviet legitimacy. 
But officials in the Eastern bloc nations also had their own ambitions. This created an interesting 
paradox for the Soviets: Although they approved of Iraqi dependency on the Soviet Union, they 
would later wrestle with their bloc states’ initiatives to arrange separate deals with countries in 
the Arab world apart from what Moscow described.146  When the Iraqis grew frustrated with the 
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quality of Soviet technology, they turned to both the West and to Eastern European states 
instead, and the latter were often more than  willing to fill the  void. In some periods, especially 
in the mid-1970s, more contracts were going to Eastern European than to the Soviets.147  
The Soviets were pleased when in 1969, Iraq became the first Arab and the first non-
communist country to recognize East Germany’s legitimacy. East Germany had been looking, 
separately from the Soviet Union, for recognition among Third World countries.148 Iraq’s 
recognition of East Germany was predicated on the Baʿthists’ desire for allies to stabilize their 
regime both internally and externally. In 1969, Iraq was embroiled in disputes over the territorial 
waters—the Shatt al’Arab waterway—with Iran. East Germany repaid Iraq’s generosity not only 
by openly supporting Iraq’s claims to the Shatt al-Ara waterway but also by sending East 
German intelligence agents, from the Stasi, to help the Iraqis develop their security apparatus.149 
A September 1969 Stasi report illustrated the difficulties ahead:    
The Iraqi security apparatus is in no way up to the challenges and tasks of the 
new regime. So far the security apparatus was exclusively content with 
monitoring political parties in the country, like the Baʿth Party and the Iraqi 
Communist Party. There was no department within the security directorate 
concerned with espionage and diversionary activities by imperialist countries 
against Iraq. 150 
 
As the Iraqis became more dependent on the Stasi’s assistance and requested more, such 
as bugging devices and training on how to run secret operations, the East Germans ran into the 
same difficulties that the Soviets had faced earlier.  The East Germans were sympathetic towards 
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the ICP, the very group on which the Baʿthists were so keen to unleash their new capabilities. 
The East Germans were also not pleased with the May 1978 execution of 21 ICP members who 
had been accused of plotting treason. The Stasi began holding back on sharing some intelligence 
techniques; and, by the 1980s, citing the constraints and conditions of the time, the Stasi began 
“[engaging] in delaying tactics” as means to avoid explicitly rejecting Iraq’s requests.151  
Beyond having effects on Iraq’s diplomatic relations and internal security, the Soviet bloc 
was also critically important for Iraqi trade, investments, and commodity exchanges. By 1976, 
the C.I.A. estimated, over 60% of Iraq’s foreign exchange holdings were deposited in the 
U.S.S.R., Hungary, East Germany, and Poland.152  East Europeans also contributed to Iraqi 
industry; for example, the Poles had sugar refineries in Mosul, while the East Germans owned a 
shipyard in Basra.153 The Eastern bloc also served as an important arms conduit for the Iraqis as 
well. 154   
It is no surprise then that the Soviet bloc also received attention from the Iraqis. By 1980, 
there were over 950 Iraqi students studying in 33 Soviet cities. Scholars estimate that just over 
half of these students were affiliated with the Iraqi Communist Party, while the other half were 
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affiliated with the Baʿth Party. 155 Through the EOs, the Iraqis, continued to make inroads in 
diplomatic relations with members of the Soviet bloc. In part, this was meant to strengthen their  
influence in the Soviet sphere, but it also helped to  secure  support from  individual members of 
the Soviet bloc, most notably East Germany and Czechoslovakia, both of which had their own 
diplomatic and political ambitions in spite of Moscow’s agenda.156 
However, this mutual understanding—of trying to bypass Soviet control—did not prevent 
tensions arising between Baghdad and the Eastern bloc.  When Baghdad began pursuing Western 
goods and technology, especially in the aftermath of the 1972-1973 Iraqi Petroleum Company 
nationalization, many East Europeans were furious, even going so far as to complain to the 
French ambassador about Paris’ involvement with Iraq.157 But the tensions were most notable 
within the borders of the Soviet bloc.  Often, the Iraqis ran afoul of the host nations by 
attempting to carry out Iraqi domestic policy—the targeting and eliminating of communists and 
other undesirable political elements—abroad.  The Iraqi regime, especially Saddam, saw the 
communists—both foreign and domestic—as tools of foreign intervention. As Saddam came 
closer to ascending to the presidency, he was convinced that there was a communist plot to 
overthrow him and the Baʿthist regime.158 In May 1978, 21 ICP members were arrested and 
quickly executed, accused of plotting and organizing subversive activities among the Iraqi 
military.  Those killed  included three Iraqis who had prior experience working in the Soviet 
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bloc; they were the former heads of the Iraqi missions to the Soviet Union, East Germany, and 
Hungary.159 The Iraqis believed that the Soviets also had a hand in the affair, leading to even 
more tension between the two countries.160   
In December 1979, five Iraqi students were killed in Sofia, Bulgaria, when clashes 
between Iraqi communists and Baʿthists broke out. In another example, in Tashkent (in what was 
then the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic) in March 1980, fights broke out between Iraqi 
communists and Baʿthist students in the streets. Attacks were also carried out by Iraqi students in 
East Germany—there were over 108 Iraqi students in the country—who also targeted Iraqi 
communists and dissidents. In the summer of 1981, Iraqi “diplomats” with cars bearing 
diplomatic plates tried to kidnap an Iraqi dissident off the street; the dissident was only saved 
when a passerby intervened.161 
Both Bulgarian and East German security and intelligence services believed these attacks 
were sanctioned by the Iraqi embassy, and this belief  prompted them to provide  protection for 
Iraqi students, dissidents, and even Kurds.162 But even this state-sponsored protection did not 
stop the Iraqi state from pursuing its domestic agenda abroad. Attacks often coincided with 
Baghdad’s displeasure with the state of relations. In 1985, for example, Iraqi students attacked 
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Iraqi communists in Dresden, after prompting from the Iraqi embassy to exert more pressure on 
East Germany.163 
These types of attacks also occurred in Czechoslovakia, another member of the Soviet 
bloc in which the Iraqis sought better  economic relations and enhancement of the weapons 
trade.164 In 1978, the Iraqi embassy initiated meetings with the Vice Prime Minister of 
Czechoslovakia in Prague to “help economic relations [and to] fill an economic gap.” 165 The 
embassy’s initiative was supported by the Foreign Ministry in Baghdad, illustrating the way in 
which embassies and EOs were granted considerable leeway by Baghdad to carry out missions 
that the embassy deemed appropriate.  
Following incidents of Iraqi students clashing with Iraqi communists and dissidents in 
Czechoslovakia, the  reactions from the country’s news agencies coupled with outrage in the 
Czech government  over the violence spurred Iraqi Minister of the Interior Saadun Shakir to visit 
the country in March 1980.  His visit was barely mentioned in the Czech press, which focused  
instead on a visit by Afghan officials. According to British intelligence, the Iraqis essentially 
invited themselves to the country and Prague had agreed only “reluctantly.” Even after Skahir 
left, the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) assessed that the “Czechoslovak 
response was none too enthusiastic in the aftermath of the fairly sticky talks about the Iraqi 
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emigres.”166 The Iraqis tried again, this time with Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, the Vice Chairman of 
the Revolutionary Command Council, who visited the country in May 1980 to discuss oil and 
refinery deals. The British FCO believed that Iraq was also concerned to maintain good relations 
with other members of the Soviet bloc and was therefore “anxious to mend fences with 
Czechoslovakia.” 167 Despite this concern, however, Saddam himself did not journey to Prague, a 
visit the latter very much wanted; instead he sent al-Douri as a compromise.168   
Just as they did in other Soviet bloc states, the Iraqis  continued attacks in 
Czechoslovakia. In 1983, for example, students associated with the Iraqi Communist Party held 
celebrations in Prague to commemorate the July 14 Revolution—when the Iraqi monarchy was 
overthrown in 1958.  EO Prague and the Iraqi embassy mobilized to label the ICP as 
provocateurs, alerting the Czech authorities that “an attack” was coming. The Iraqis even asked 
the Czechs to help end this celebration out of “respect [for the] relations between the two 
countries,” according to Baʿth Party reports. When Czech authorities refused to block the 
celebration, EO Prague deployed their own forces, including students and other agents, to attack 
the communists. In the words of the embassy, there was a “shocked confrontation” and several 
communists and other Iraqis  wounded. The police arrested one of the EO’s men and allowed the 
communists to hold their ceremony under the supervision if the police. In the end, the Iraqis were 
able to track down the Communist members who had participated in the riots, around 34 
individuals, while members of the EO were congratulated by Baghdad for their participation.169 
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Saddam was informed of the events, and he even personally authorized the hospital treatment of 
Baʿth members who were injured in the skirmish.170  
Throughout the decade, the Iraqis continued to monitor and attack members of the ICP.  
Party members were sent to represent the Baʿth Arab Socialist Party at the 16th Communist Party 
of Czechoslovakia conference in 1986, for example. This attendance was merely for the sake of 
appearances, as the Baʿthists were more interested in who was attending rather than in the 
conference program.171 Frustrations between the two states only continued to fester, especially 
after the end of the Iran-Iraq War.  In a visit to Iraq, the Vice Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia 
pressured Iraq on its evasion of repayment of loans due to Prague.  The Iraqis pressed the Czechs 
to agree to joint committee discussions about current debts and future economic relations, 
seeking to avoid a stall in relations because of Iraq’s unpaid debts. 172 
 
 China 
The Iraqis did not focus only on the Soviet Union. Iraq actively sought relations with 
China, another communist superpower, to offset the influence of the U.S.S.R. Although Ahmed 
Hassan al-Bakr declared in Iraqi media that the U.S.S.R. occupied “'first place’ in Iraq’s foreign 
policy,” the Baʿthists also began looking to China as well.173 Baghdad sought economic ties with 
Beijing, hoping the two states could work together in agricultural and industrial projects. As they 
did in the U.S.S.R., the Baʿth Party created similar party organizations in China including an EO, 
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the Iraqi-Chinese Friendship Society, and other soft-power associations.174  Since the ICP had 
supported the U.S.S.R. in its ideological battle against China in the 1960s, the Iraqis had little 
reason to worry about potential Sino-ICP cooperation, but their concern over ICP cooperation 
with the Soviet Union had been constant.175 Iraqi-Chinese relations started slowly, largely due to 
issues outside Baghdad’s and Beijing’s control. In the 1960s, amid the internal turmoil caused by 
the Cultural Revolution, most Chinese ambassadors were recalled from the Arab world. The 
Chinese did not send a new ambassador to Iraq until December 1970.176 At the same time that 
economic and trade relations were re-established in 1971, cooperation was originally limited. In 
the words of the C.I.A., the Chinese viewed the Baʿth Party to be “bourgeois/fascist” and 
Baʿthist leadership to be “Soviet lackeys.”177 
 However, the relationship between the Chinese and Iraqis continued to develop 
throughout the 1970s for a variety of reasons. For one thing, the Iraqis were already frustrated 
with Soviet interference and with the relatively poor quality of Soviet technology. Second, the 
Syrians were also seeking assistance from the Chinese.  The Syrians had been seeking Chinese 
aid since 1969, and they continued  to do so especially in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War 
(October War) in 1973. 178 Iraqi intelligence reported that the Soviets had refused the Syrians’ 
request for more weapons and other military aid unless they “enter in discussions with the 
 
174 Iraqi-Soviet and Iraqi-Chinese Friendship Societies, 1977/6/12, 0183, BRCC 024-4-4, HB, HIA. Invitation, 
1977/10/23, 0416, BRCC 3119-0001, HB, HIA. 
175 Shemesh, Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1968-1988: in the Shadow of the Iraq-Iran Conflict, 8.  
176 The United Arab Republic was the sole exception to this mass recall. Shemesh, Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1968-
1988: in the Shadow of the Iraq-Iran Conflict,  48n39.  
177 Research Study Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, November 1976, Document 317, “Iraq Under Baʿth 
Rule, 1968-1976,” FRUSA, 1969-1976 Volume XXVII; Iran; Iraq, 1973-1976. 
178 Weekly Review: Soviet relations with the Baʿthists in Iraq and Syria, June 1969, FOIA (C.I.A.), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000772106.pdf 
59 
Zionist enemy.” Furious, the Syrians instead went to the Chinese, raising alarm  bells in Iraq and 
in the U.S.S.R. 179 According to the U.S. State Department, the Chinese were also concerned 
with potential Soviet “encirclement” over the region; if the Soviets secured the Middle East and 
India (which it had supported in its war with Pakistan in 1971),  Moscow could control the 
Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. With Moscow’s control over Central Asia, China feared that 
the Soviets would continue encroaching on China’s geopolitical interests and borders as well.180 
In a meeting between Chinese and Iraqi officials in China in 1974, the Chinese expressed 
anger that the Soviets and the Americans were so active in Europe and accused the superpowers 
of conspiring against them, hoping to reverse the revolution in China.  They also attacked the 
U.S.S.R., criticizing it for its version of socialism and for its deployment of armed forces along 
its border with China. It saw the U.S. and U.S.S.R. as much the same, accusing both of having 
tried to prevent China from developing effectively.  Beijing cited the superpowers’ opposition to 
China’s acquisition of the atomic bomb in the 1960s, and it alleged that Soviets had even moved 
factories from northern China into the U.S.S.R. in the aftermath of World War II. 181  The aim 
was to keep China, in the words of the Baʿth Party, a “backward agricultural country.” In 
response, the Iraqis expressed sympathy and argued that they shared similar histories given their 
“socialist transformations,” including the nationalization of the IPC. The Chinese stated that they 
viewed the Soviet Union with more concern than they viewed the United States, and they argued 
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that any country’s efforts to repair its relationship with U.S.S.R. had to be seen as detrimental to 
Chinese interests.182 
Iraqi officials were visiting China in 1974, hoping to secure more military assistance, 
citing Baghdad’s need to protect itself from “conspiracies.”183  Although the Iraqis criticized the 
poor quality of airplanes that they had already received from the U.S.S.R., China put off making 
concrete promises to provide more military aid but did promise future talks.  The disappointment 
of the Iraqis may have redoubled when the Chinese informed them that they wanted good 
relations with both Iran and Iraq and that they hoped for peace between the two, peace which 
would prevent foreigners from interfering in the  affairs of both Iran and Iraq and in the affairs of 
the region more broadly. Iraq rejected these Chinese wishes for peace, arguing that Iran was 
“always trying to provoke and attack us unjustifiably, and the latest attack on our territory is only 
one of the series of aggressive Iranian plans against us.” However, the Chinese government did 
not change its view, instead countering that Iran was a friend and that China would not attack 
Iran merely for the sake of Iraq. 184 
This prompted the Iraqis to reply heatedly that since Iran had attacked Iraq—here Iraq 
was most likely arguing that Iran was “attacking” Iraq  by supporting Kurdish groups in the 
northern part of Iraq, as well as by making claims for the Shatt al-Arab waterway—China should 
at least denounce Iran. 185 China responded that they could handle all different nationalities 
within their borders and questioned  why Iraq was having so much trouble with just the Kurds.  
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The Iraqis interpreted this response to be a cheap shot. They shot back, arguing that the Kurds 
did have legal rights and that it was merely Mullah Mustafa Barzani of the Kurdish Democratic 
Party who was causing the trouble, not the Kurdish people as a whole. 186 In their fight with the 
Kurds, the Iraqis were frustrated to find that the Chinese would not support them with the 
military hardware they requested in this meeting; however, there was some solace in the fact that 
the Chinese did not provide military assistance to the Kurds, either.187  
Although the Soviets had the upper hand over the Chinese in the region, Moscow would 
struggle in the 1970s and 1980s to ensure that it remained that way, always fearful that China 
could usurp its position. China was content remaining in the shadows, willing to wait for Arab 
states to come to them, whenever they were frustrated or disillusioned with the Soviets. As 
shown above, the fact that Syria sought Chinese assistance following its disaffection over Soviet 
terms for weapons trade, the threat was there.  Despite the American embargo on weapons and 
goods imposed on Tehran following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Chinese and Soviets, in the 
words of the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office, were “[vying] with each other for 
influence in Tehran by ensuring arms get through despite an embargo….”188 As the British 
government saw it, even in the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq War, “the Russians are unlikely to 
leave the field to [the Chinese].”189  
 
186 Report on visit to China, 1974/2/16, 0078-0089, BRCC 3378-000, HB, HIA.  
187 The C.I.A. did believe, however, that China might have provided some under the table financial assistance to the 
Kurds. Research Study Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, November 1976, “Iraq Under Baʿth Rule, 1968-
1976,” FRUSA, 1969-1976 Volume XXVII; Iran; Iraq, 1973-1976, Document 317.  
188 The Superpowers in the Gulf and Arabia, 19 October 1987, FCO 8/6767, The Superpowers in the Gulf and 
Arabia, TNA. 
189 The Superpowers in the Gulf and Arabia, 19 October 1987, FCO 8/6767, The Superpowers in the Gulf and 
Arabia, TNA. 
62 
Even though the Chinese had not provided weapons to the Iraqis during their war with 
the Kurds, the Iraqis still sought Chinese arms and weapons. As the Iraqis grew more and more 
discontent with Soviet interference in Iraqi domestic affairs, the Iraqis moved closer to China by 
the end of the 1970s, continuing to buy weapons from them as well as from Yugoslavia, 
Romania, India, Vietnam, and Western European nations, most notably France. The C.I.A. 
interpreted the developing Sino-Iraqi relationship to be an attempt by Iraq to break away from 
Moscow and to instigate anger in Moscow as well.190   
After the talks with the Chinese back in 1974, Iraqi officials reported back to Baghdad 
that Iran was also aware of rivalry between the Chinese and Soviets, noting that the Shah had 
visited both the U.S.S.R. and China so that neither country would be upset. 191 Unfortunately for 
the Iraqis, the Chinese also had great interest in Iran’s economic and political potential. With the 
outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Iraq in September 1980, the Chinese attempted to remain 
“neutral,” just as the Soviets had, refusing to pick sides openly but still providing both countries 
with weapons and other military equipment. Part of this stemmed from China’s standing policy 
to avoid Soviet “encirclement” of the region, a fear that prompted the Chinese to support the 
now-deposed Shah in the 1970s. 192 Toward the end of this war, the Chinese continued to shower 
both Iranian and Iraqi delegations with equal pleasantries, not hinting at which side they 
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favored.193  As the war was near ending  in August 1988, the Chinese media even broadcast that 
China was seeking to “exploit new commercial/economic opportunities in both Iran and Iraq.”194 
The Chinese, with North Korea not far behind, were the largest foreign supplier of 
weapons to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, supplying around $3 billion USD worth military 
equipment, including 200 T-59/T-69 Tanks, 80 F-6/F-7 fighters, CSSC-2 Silkworm anti-ship 
missile batteries, surface-to-air missiles, and other equipment. The U.S.S.R. provided Iran only 
about $1.5 billion USD throughout the war. 195 Despite China’s official statements denying that it 
was assisting Iran, Iraqi intelligence, as is clear in the BRCC dataset, was well aware that 
Iranians and Chinese were working together.196  
China blamed the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for the region’s turmoil—at the U.N., the 
Chinese delegation argued that “the ambitious hegemonists, with a covetous eye on this 
strategically important region, are seeking every opening to sept up their infiltration and 
expansion there.” Yet the Chinese continued to furnish Iraq with weapons and supplies. 197 Still, 
China supplied Iraq with about $6 billion USD of military hardware, including 1,500 T-59/T-69 
tanks, 300 Type-59 towed field guns, 30 F-7 fighters, CSSC-2 Silkworm anti-ship missile 
batteries, surface-to-air missiles, and other equipment. They were third to the U.S.S.R. ($30-45 
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billion USD) and France ($17 billion USD).198 Meanwhile Iraq kept trying to work with the 
Chinese, sending high-level party delegations to China in hopes of securing future economic and 
military agreements. 199  Iraqi officials alleged that, while they were on a state visit to China in 
1987, the Chinese told the Iraqis that they were alarmed by the global support for Iran and by the 
portrayal of Chinese material support for Iran as its was being given in the global media.  Not 
buying this dodge, the Baʿth delegation reminded them that “we sincerely doubt the Chinese 
position.”200  
 
 The Kurds 
  Located in the northern part of Iraq, the Kurdish people had been in conflict with the 
Iraqi government since well before the Baʿthists staged their coup in 1968.201  After withstanding 
Ottoman domination, the Kurds were given numerous promises and assurances of self-
determination by the British. However, the British betrayed the Kurds and incorporated them 
into Iraq after World War I.202 Instead of self-determination, London saw the Kurds as a means 
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to bolster the strength of Britain’s control over Iraqi territory and to prevent Turkish 
encroachment into northern Iraq. According to David McDowall, the British used the idea of 
self-determination as a way to “[run] a quasi-colony without the expense.”203  And yet, the 
Kurds, who are not ethnically Arab, struggled under this new Arab dominated regime. They 
resisted the new regime’s centralization efforts (including the conscription of young Kurdish 
men into the Iraqi Army) and they resented the imbalance of power—in the favor of Sunni 
Arabs—in Baghdad.  In the words of Eugene Rogan, the Kurds “presented a particular challenge 
to the integrity and identity of the Iraqi state.”204  
Tensions between the Arabs and Kurds escalated after the overthrow of the British-
installed monarchy in 1958. Seeking autonomy from Baghdad, the Kurds rose in 1960 against 
the Iraqi government, then under Major-General Abdul Karim al-Qasim’s tenure, in a rebellion 
that ultimately stalled the Iraqi Army. The rebellion ultimately contributed to Qasim’s downfall 
and overthrow in 1963.  After years of fighting, in 1970, the Iraqis and Kurds reached a ceasefire 
agreement that granted Kurdistan some regional autonomy and limited self-governance. 
However, shortly after, the Baʿthists launched an Arabization campaign in the north, in which 
Baghdad attempted to alter the demographics of the region by force, moving Arabs to the north 
and displacing non-Arab ethnic groups such as the Kurds and the Yezidis.  By April 1974, the 
Kurds could take no more and launched their second major rebellion.205 
Tensions with the Kurds coincided with the burgeoning of the Iraqi-Soviet relationship. 
The Soviets used the buildup and eventual outbreak of hostilities with the Kurds to deepen 
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involvement with Baghdad and Kurdistan, manipulating both entities’ ambitions—stability and 
independence, respectively—for Moscow’s gain.  Aware of the Soviets’ pursuit of a new treaty 
with Iraq—what would come to be the 1972 Friendship and Cooperation Treaty—and Soviet 
pressure on the Kurds to cooperate with Baghdad, the SAVAK, the Iranian intelligence 
apparatus, told C.I.A. officials that Iraq was “falling increasing under Soviet domination.” These 
Soviet “inroads into Iraq” posed new concerns for the Shah’s regime, as he also sought 
domination over the Gulf region. 206   
Although the Soviets had supported the Kurds since 1946, having an affinity for their 
leftist and nationalistic elements, Moscow wanted the Kurds and Baghdad to cooperate by 
joining the National Pact as means to stabilize the Baʿthist regime.207 The Soviets also wanted 
the Kurds to allow Iraqi military troops into the region. The Soviets were double-crossing the 
Kurds in that Moscow was promoting communism within Kurdistan while also trying to push for 
Iraqi-Kurdish cooperation. Soviet delegations were dispatched to the region, including a visit in 
November 1973 by Boris Ponomarev, the Chairman of Foreign Relations Department of the 
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Soviet Central Committee, as means to keep ties strong.208 However, the Soviets wanted a 
stabilized Iraqi regime first, and so their support for Kurdish independence was sidelined. But 
even Baghdad was not able to have its cake and eat it too. According to Lebanese sources, the 
Iraqis ran to Moscow immediately after the Kurdish rebellion broke out, seeking weapons such 
as the MIG-23 fighter and Sukhoi-class aircraft along with other materiel. In return, the 
government in Baghdad professed to be willing to cooperate with Moscow-affiliated 
communists.209 In giving military assistance to the Iraqis, the Soviets actively jammed Kurdish 
radio  and assisted in Iraq’s air campaign.210  
Fearing that the Kurds were in danger and with the Soviet Union refusing to help them, 
Mustafa al-Barzani sought assistance from the Americans and the Israelis.211 The Americans 
would arm and supply the Kurds, under the guise of refugee relief, by diverting arms and 
finances through Iran.212 The National Security Council  saw the Kurdish rebellion as an 
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opportunity for the Soviet-Iraqi relationship to strengthen, arguing that “Baghdad and Moscow’s 
freedom of manoeuvre in the region will grow and the Iraqi regime, with Soviet backing, will be 
able to resume and expand its subversive activity in Iran, Kuwait, and other countries in the 
region.”213 The Americans supported the Kurds because they feared a dangerous and radical Iraq 
that could threaten Iran, their favored ally in the region, and that could help bring the Soviets 
deeper into the region. 
 In March 1975, the Iraqis and Iranians signed the Algiers Accord, an agreement that 
granted the latter control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway in return for ceasing to provide arms and 
other assistance to the Kurds. Each side rationalized that the course of the Kurdish rebellion 
would not alter any time soon—barring any drastic change in foreign support—and so both 
Baghdad and Tehran sought to come to an agreement that would at least give one another 
something to show for as a result of this conflict.214 In this sense, the Shah betrayed the Kurds in 
order to get  extended control over the deepest parts of the Shatt al-Arab. This betrayal prompted 
thousands of Kurdish refugees to flee to Iran and Turkey, and it all but crushed  the Kurdish 
rebellion. Even with Iranian support of the Kurds withdrawn, however, the Iraqi army still 
struggled in their campaign in the north, as the Kurds adopted guerilla-style tactics. By 1979, the 
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Iraqis had lost over 16,000 dead.215 When Saddam officially assumed the Presidency in 1979, he 
called for talks with the Kurds, thus ending this stage of rebellion.216  
For their part, the Soviets were not “enthusiastic” about the Algiers Accord as well, 
fearing that it created a stronger Iraq and a precedent for future Iraqi-Iranian cooperation.217  The 
Americans judged that, because of the Accord, the Soviets could no longer take their  
relationship with Iraq for granted and that the Iraqis were going to maneuver beyond the realm of 
the 1972 treaty.218 As the C.I.A. also argued, the Accord signaled the potential for “a different 
power balance in the Persian Gulf.”   For the Soviets this could “further limit [their] influence in 
the area.”219 The Syrians had a similar apprehension. At first, in late March, Hafiz al-Assad told 
the Americans that this agreement “has liberated a considerable portion of Iraq’s potential, and 
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even some of Iran’s potential as a Moslem country….  There are certain other things which still 
exist among the Arabs, but the fact is there are no longer any basic problems among the 
Arabs….” 220 But this sentiment was short-lived as the Syrians came to realize that they preferred  
Iraq to be embroiled in a Kurdish insurgency because freedom from its problems with the Kurds 
allowed Baghdad to resume its anti-Syrian propaganda and anti-Syrian agenda in the region.221  
After the Kurdish rebellion settled down, the north remained a key area of concern for 
Iraq. Its population—mostly Kurds—and its geographical location made the north a significant 
security risk for the Baʿthist regime.  Bordering on Syria, Turkey, and Iran, with Central Asia 
and Soviet Union within reach as well, the north was a prime zone for weapons, arms, and 
human smugglers. Iraqi intelligence reports reinforced fears of foreign entities using the porous 
borders to weaken the Iraqi regime. One of the great fears was that Communists and Kurds were 
using foreigners to boost their cause. Those ICP members who had survived the numerous 
Baʿthist purges were reported to have ties with the Soviets.222 Intelligence reported PUK founder 
Jalal al-Talabani’s ties with China, France, Syria, America, Israel, and Great Britain as he 
attempted to garner international support for the Kurdish independence movement; his Syrian 
connections were particularly alarming for the Baʿthist regime given the legacy of hatred 
between Syria and Iraq.223  
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 Throughout Iraq’s conflict with the Kurds, the Soviets supported Baghdad’s efforts to 
quell the rebellion as means to prop up and protect a regime it saw as important in the region.  In  
private, however, the Soviets were not thrilled by Baʿthist efforts to make peace with the Kurds. 
According to U.S. officials in Baghdad, Moscow saw the “benefits of keeping [the[ Kurdish 
revolt alive as means of pressure on Baghdad.”224 The more the Kurds threatened the Baʿthists, 
the more latter would lean on the Soviets, according to  the thinking in the Kremlin. To maintain 
influence, Moscow still maintained connections with Kurdish national and communist groups 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a relationship the Baʿthists thoroughly resented.  
In the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi forces again moved on Kurdish groups in 
the north, carrying out campaigns of extermination and genocide, including the massacre at 
Halabja which saw villages massacred with chemical gas.225 Iraqi intelligence detected that 
“turncoat” Jalal al-Talabani had corresponded with the ICP, relaying information about the Iraqi 
army’s use of poison gas to murder women, children, elderly, and Peshmerga. He asked the ICP 
to “implore the Socialist countries and the Communist Parties to condemn this heinous crime and 
request of the Soviet Union to protest and intervene to prohibit the Saddamite Gang from 
continuing its war of extermination against the Kurdish people, and ask them to stop the supply 
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of weapons to this criminal gang."226 Unfortunately for the Kurds, aid from Moscow, and the 
international community, was minimal at best.227 
 
 Syria 
 A key and constant source of tension between Moscow and Baghdad was Moscow’s 
relationship with Damascus.   The relationship between Iraq and Syria was already strained 
during the formation and development of the Baʿth Party in the 1950s. After regional tensions 
and personal ambitions led the party to split between 1963 and 1966, the rivalry and hatred for 
one another only intensified as Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad ascended to power in their 
respective countries. Their personalities and motivations clashed to the point that, allegedly, 
Saddam added Assad to his list of enemies.228  
  Wanting good relations with both Arab states, the Soviets had to draw a fine line, since 
neither Iraq nor Syria was happy with its patron also helping the enemy next door.  Following the 
Baʿthist coup in Iraq in 1968, the C.I.A. predicted that Moscow would need to take a “carrot and 
stick” approach with both states.  But since Baghdad and Damascus were so hostile towards one 
another, the agency continued, “it will behoove the Soviets not to take sides in their political 
struggles.” 229  At the same time that  the Soviets attempted to remain neutral, especially trying to 
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preserve ties after the 1972 agreement with Iraq, they did actively try to improve relations 
between the two. 230 Moscow’s pushes for reconciliation between Damascus and Baghdad were 
centered on protecting its bargaining power in the region.231 
In October 1973, during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, the Syrians and Egyptians 
launched a surprise attack on Israel. Caught off-guard at first, the Israelis were able to push back, 
and the fighting ended with a U.N. ceasefire on 25 October.232 This invasion did not catch the 
Soviets flat-footed.  Between 1967 and 1973, they had been actively involved in Egyptian 
military buildups and, according to Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, were “party to 
determining the date and operational outline” for the war to begin on 6 October.233 The Soviets 
so feared nuclear- armed Israel as  an extension of the American nuclear threat that Soviet policy 
became “containment, then reversal of the Israeli gains by military means.”234  New scholarship 
suggests that the Egyptian government’s expulsion of Soviet advisors—long characterized as the 
final nail in the coffin for the Egyptian-Soviet relationship—was merely a ruse to hide the 
number of Soviets within the country.235 But tensions over deployments, rising costs, blame over 
the course of the war, and the American push for peace ultimately led to the real “expulsion” of 
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the Soviets from Egypt. In the words of  Ginor and  Remez, “1972 was mostly a feint, after 1973 
it became a reality.”236 
The Syrians were humiliated in this war. The Israeli military pushed Syrian forces 
beyond their original starting positions and reached locations from which they could easily shell 
Damascus. The Israelis even occupied more territory on the Golan Heights after the war. Soviet 
advisors worked with the Syrians during this war, but tensions existed between Soviet officers 
and Syrian soldiers – the latter were frustrated with the former’s sense of superiority. This was 
especially hard to reconcile given just how ineffective Soviet training and arms were against the 
Israeli forces by the war’s end.  Following the ceasefire, Syria refused to participate in the peace 
talks in Geneva.  Iraqi intelligence picked up that the Soviets had refused Syrian requests for 
more weapons and other military aid unless they “enter in discussions with the Zionist enemy.” 
Furious, the Syrians instead went to the Chinese, raising alarms bells in Iraq and the U.S.S.R. 237 
Since the Yom Kippur War, the Americans had been pushing for a formalized peace deal 
among the Arabs and Israelis. The Soviets resented these initiatives led by the U.S. government  
to mediate peace, especially between Egypt and Israel—in what later culminated in  the Camp 
David Accords—viewing this as an American attempt to assume control over the Arab world.238 
In attempts to subvert the U.S. effort, the Soviets sought to encourage Iraqi-Syrian friendship, 
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angling for their unity to create a “united eastern front.” 239 Syrian and Iraqi military delegations 
were invited to the U.S.S.R., and the Soviets even arranged for a meeting between Assad and 
Saddam in Moscow. The Iraqis were also probing the chances for reconciliation, since they too 
sought the mantle of leadership within the Arab world.240 Given Syria’s frustrations with the war 
in Lebanon, the Golan Heights occupation, and tensions with Israel, some observers wagered that 
Damascus would pursue Baghdad as a partner in confronting these issues together. 241 
Unfortunately for the Soviets, things were not this simple. Around the same time, Iraq was also 
carrying out another round of anti-communist purges and was urging the Syrians to reject 
UNSCR 242.242  There were other concerns, too. The Soviets did not want an emboldened 
alliance of Syria and Iraq to increase tensions along the Israeli border, because the last thing the 
Soviets wanted was another Arab-Israeli war. 243  
The Americans all but rejoiced in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, since the war 
severely damaged the credibility of Soviet offers of military assistance and Soviet diplomacy.  
State Department officials in Damascus argued that “[the] future for the West and particularly 
the United States is bright because in the long run the main enemy of the Soviets in the Middle 
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East will be the Soviet system itself and the Arabs are well aware of this fact.”244  Despite high-
level visits, arms sales, economic assistance, and infrastructure projects along the Euphrates 
River, the Soviets could not control, pressure, or manipulate Assad into joining the Arab-Israeli 
negotiations.  As the Syrians relayed to the Americans, “We are masters in our own house and 
both the Soviets and the Americans should understand and believe this.”245   
Both the Syrians and the Iraqis began moving to keep their distance from Moscow. 
Soviet support for the Syrians, including Soviet “acquiescence in the Syrian intervention in [the 
Lebanese Civil War]” and Soviet refusal to side with Iraq in its dispute with Syria over dams 
along the Euphrates River, left Iraq feeling especially frustrated and disappointed with the 
progress of the relationship with Moscow.246  In fact, there was some speculation by U.S. 
officials in Baghdad that the Soviets were “tacitly supporting Syria in the Euphrates water 
conflict to show their disgruntlement with Iraq” when Iraq began opting for Western arms and 
supplies over what the Soviet Union offered.247 Nor did it help that the Soviets were selling Iraqi 
oil to Eastern and Western Europe for hard currency and doing so at prices higher than what the 
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Iraqis had sold it for, taking advantage of the oil crisis that followed the Yom Kippur War.248As  
U.S. officials in Baghdad noted, the “Iraqi regime has pushed hard for more Soviet support in its 
bitter dispute with the Syrian regime but has little to show for its efforts.” 249 There was little the 
Soviets could do because, if they decided to cut off assistance, they risked a loss of hard currency 
(generated through arms sales), access to oil, and influence in the region.  Baghdad was furious 
with Soviet overtures towards Damascus, viewing Moscow’s advances as evidence of double-
crossing. But Iraq did not compromise its ambitions in the region. Instead, it refused to yield to 
Soviet demands and to beg for more of Moscow’s attention because Baghdad knew that the 
Soviets would neither completely abandon Iraq nor remained satisfied with just Damascus in 
hand. By attempting to play off two rivals, the Soviets boxed themselves into a very difficult 
position, one from which they could not properly escape  without damaging relations with one or 
both rivals.   
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 Iran-Iraq War 
The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 in order to save the Soviet-backed 
communist regime, led by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, as it struggled to 
survive against the Islamic insurgency of the Mujahideen which was spreading throughout the 
country. The U.S. government was quick to condemn the invasion, moving to isolate the Soviets 
diplomatically while simultaneously arming and financing the Islamic fighters.250 To the Arab 
world, this invasion was shocking: the Soviets were friendly with the majority of Arab states, 
and a war against Muslims was too hard to stomach.251 
Before the invasion began,  Iraqi-Soviet relationship had reached a low point.  For one 
thing, Iraq was frustrated with Soviet ambitions in East Africa and South Yemen; in both places, 
Soviet aspirations were in opposition to Iraq’s interests.252 Second, according to Saddam, the 
ICP, with Soviet help, had tried to launch a pro-Soviet military coup. This came after the bloody 
Baʿthist campaign in 1978 to expel and exterminate all remaining communist elements within 
the country. Third, the Iraqis were frustrated with Soviet overtures towards Syria.253 Because of 
these incidents, Saddam had become more vocal in opposing Soviet policies, and according to 
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the U.S government, he made several public and “authoritative” statements against the Soviet 
Union.254  Iraq also likened Moscow’s “influence of domestic politics through military 
assistance” to what the U.S. government routinely did.255 
The year 1979 also saw the fall of the Shah’s regime in Iran.256 Although they embraced 
the revolution belatedly, waiting for the Shah to leave the country, the Soviets rejoiced that Iran 
was no longer a hub for U.S. control in the region.  James Clay Moltz and Dennis B. Ross argue 
that the Soviets believed that they could “rush into the vacuum created by the U.S. expulsion.”257  
The Iranians resisted Soviet overtures.   Eager to free themselves from all imperialism and 
Western influence, the new Iranian government effectively lumped the Soviets in with the 
Americans. Still, the removal of the Shah and the collapse of the U.S. strategic orientation in the 
region gave the Soviets hope that Iran, the long-awaited prize, might actually turn to Moscow. 
Despite the 1972 treaty with Iraq, the Soviets began tilting towards Iran, ready for Tehran to 
come around to Moscow.258   
Frustrated with Soviet endeavors, Saddam started pushing Iraq beyond the confines of the 
Soviet sphere of influence by increasingly relying on the West, primarily France, Italy, and Japan, 
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for industrial goods and finances. As Tariq Aziz would later argue, “Friendship can only take place 
among countries which are balanced in power, such as France and Iraq, as the great countries do 
not believe in friendship and aim to gain influence inside other countries, but when they find 
themselves unable to do so they attempt to create a certain relationship with the intended 
country.”259 At the same time, Saddam was attempting to assume for himself the mantle of 
leadership of the Arab world by advocating for a non-aligned movement among Arab nations in 
order create a “balanced posture between the superpowers.”260 Whether this Arab leadership role 
had anything to do with altruism remains to be debated, but, by trying to place Iraq at the forefront 
against Soviet ambitions in the region, Saddam sought to limit Soviet influence in the Middle. 
East. This new policy did not sit well in Moscow.  
According to the C.I.A., Saddam considered the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a “naked 
power play,” and he argued that the United Nations should call for the “immediate withdrawal of 
foreign troops from Afghanistan.” As the C.I.A. saw it, Moscow’s maneuver had “shaken Iraq’s 
belief that the U.S.S.R. is a safe ally with whom differences could be overlooked or contained 
because overall bilateral relations were beneficial to Iraq.” The Iraqis feared that, if the Soviets 
were successful in Afghanistan and if the Tudeh Party in Iran came to come, the Soviets would 
have a puppet government in Tehran and supreme leverage over the Gulf region. 261  
In September 1980, Iraq launched an unprovoked surprise invasion of Iran, hoping to 
capitalize on the internal chaos following the Iranian revolution. Historians debate the exact 
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motives of the invasion, but they range from Saddam’s personal hatred of Iran’s Supreme 
Leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini, to tensions between Arabs  and Persians, fear of Shiʿa uprisings 
within Iraq, opportunities to grab land, hopes of restoring Iraqi supremacy over the Shatt al-Arab 
waterway, improvement of regional stature, assumption of leadership in the Arab world, 
Saddam’s desire to protect his rule and to cement the  cult of personality centered on him.262  
Although both the Americans and Soviets had inklings that Iraq wanted conflict with 
Iran, the Iraqis did not inform the Soviets prior to their invasion, catching Moscow off guard.  
Part of the 1972 agreement between Iraq and the Soviet Union called for “the two High 
Contracting Parties [to] hold regular consultations with each other at various levels on all 
important international issues affecting the interests of the two countries and on questions 
concerning the further development of relations between them.”263  But it was not just the 
violation of a formality that angered the Soviets as the Iraqis, much as with the 1973 Samita 
incident, the Iraqis had tried to box the Soviets by making them look complicit in the invasion. 
As the Americans noted, the Iraqis had sent Tariq Aziz to Moscow just before the invasion 
began, “[calculating] that this visit would make the Soviets look like accomplices and keep 
Moscow from favoring Iran.” However, the Soviets read this encounter like a book, giving no 
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hint in their press coverage about their reception of the visit. Moscow also had the Soviet 
ambassador to Iran call on the President of Iran, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, the very day Aziz 
departed the U.S.S.R. 264 
The U.S.S.R. was incensed over how the Iraqis handled the outbreak of hostilities.  The 
Soviets cut off arms, military supplies, and other aid to Iraq.  When Iraq protested, arguing that 
Moscow was ignoring their agreement, the Soviets referred to the 1972 treaty as a “treaty of 
peace” and not of “war.” This, in turn, prompted the Iraqis to claim that “Iraq would not forget 
the bad attitude of those who do not honor commitments.”265 Seemingly in retaliation, the 
Soviets also moved closer to Syria, and despite what the C.I.A. called a “poisonous state of 
relations between Hussein and Syrian President Assad,” on 8 October 1980 the Syrians and 
Soviets signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.266  According to Saddam’s Presidential 
Advisor, in a move to “take up much closer ties with [Iraq’s regional adversary],” the Soviets 
had also offered more arms to Syria, which hit the Iraqis like a “bombshell.” 267 Iraqi officials 
vented to U.S. officials that the Soviets had proven themselves once again to be untrustworthy; 
they were greatly irritated by the Soviet-Syrian treaty. Not all was lost for the Iraqis in this 
regard, however, for the Soviets and Syrians still did not get along so well. Tensions between the 
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Soviet military leadership and the Syrian military continued persisted, making it impossible to 
realize the full potential of their relationship.268 
With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, the Soviets issued statements of neutrality and 
called for a cessation of hostilities. However, the Soviets also saw a grand opportunity in Iran, a 
country it so valued but to which it had had only limited access under the Shah’s reign. Iran 
remained the “main prize,” just as it had been in the 1970s. With the Shah gone, the Soviet 
leaders thought, a new pro-Soviet Iran could help remove the might of U.S. intelligence agencies 
from the country, dampen the threat of U.S. military action, and eventually drive Washington 
from southwestern Asia. Then, the U.S.S.R. could have even more influence and exert more 
pressure on Turkey and Pakistan.269 The Soviets still valued their relations with Iraq as they 
worried about the growing strength of Islamist forces in Iran. According to the C.I.A., Soviet 
proclamations of neutrality were part of a strategy to “buy time to preserve room for 
maneuver.”270  Moreover, despite their relationship, the Soviets did not have any interest in 
having Iraq emerge  as a more dominant power in the Gulf.271 
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At first, the United States government supported Iraq against Iran. Washington hoped that 
by supporting Iraq American could “teach Iran a lesson for behaving as an international 
anarchist.”272  They also considered “how to ensure Soviets take a hit with their relations with 
Iraq” and how to ensure that “we and/or our allies position ourselves to make gains in Iraq if the 
Soviets queer their pitch there.”273 The U.S. government was concerned that the war could lead 
to expansion of Soviet influence in the area. Washington feared limited access to oil in the region 
and a public relations nightmare for the U.S., especially if the Arab world rallied behind Iraq and 
the U.S. did not support Iraq.274  
The Soviets, furious over Iraq’s surprise invasion, did not support Iraq right away. The 
Soviets also were cautious about offering outright support to Iran, given the new regime’s 
campaign against leftist elements within Iran. In a sense, the Soviets wanted  to “test” Iran, and 
punish Iraq, showing Baghdad that it could not turn to anyone else.275 But as the tide turned in 
Iran’s favor around 1982, both the Americans and Soviets realized that they had nothing to gain 
by either side winning outright.276 Although the Soviets eventually forgave the Iraqis and began 
supporting Iraq, in the words of the British FCO, “to curry favor with the rest of the Arab 
world,” the Soviets remained hopeful that the Iranian regime would struggle. Moscow wanted 
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the Islamists out of Tehran, but they did not want the regime to be so weak that the Americans 
could swoop in. 277   
The Iraqis understood that both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. wanted to gain influence in Iran 
and Iraq before the war ran its course. To that end, as Saddam said in a meeting with his 
advisors, the superpowers were willing to delay the end of the war. Saddam argued that, “if one 
of them sees that lengthening the war is not to its own benefit, it will try its best to stop it.”278 
When evidence emerged that the U.S. and Iran were covertly working together—in what became 
known as the Iran-Contra Affair—the Iraqis saw this as evidence of the “American intention for 
lengthening the war, as the Americans think that this war will pave the way for them to gain 
more influence in the region.” 279  The real prize for Moscow remained Iran, and, no matter how 
much Moscow declared its neutrality, this “careful fence-sitting policy” did not sit well in 
Iraq.280 In fact, it only confirmed Iraqi theories that the Soviets continued  to “[conspire] against 
Iraq” and the belief of some Iraqis, especially Saddam’s cabinet, that the Soviets had long 
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wanted to “destroy the Iraqi regime.”  As Tariq Aziz claimed, the Soviets wanted “the socialists 
in Iraq to rise against us.”281 
The Iraqis knew that the Soviets favored Iran and that Iran could not completely turn 
away from Moscow, especially considering its economic situation and global standing.  The 
Soviet Union’s relationship with Iran was little better than its relationship with Iraq. In 
discussions with his close advisors, Saddam remarked that he believed America wanted a 
“mildly strong Iraq” as means for leverage against Iran. Saddam argued that, although the 
Soviets claimed they wanted the war to end, the Soviets were afraid that a victorious Iran would 
threaten Afghanistan and the Soviet republics. In other words, Saddam believed Moscow wanted 
to keep Iran preoccupied so as to prevent Tehran from moving on to other regional ambitions. 
Saddam confronted the Soviets with this argument, speaking directly with Yevgeny Primakov, 
who later served as the head of Soviet intelligence and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Russian 
Federation. Primakov, “the man who understands Arabs more than others,” according to 
Saddam, did not entirely deny Saddam’s argument, countering that the total costs of keeping the 
war going did not outweigh of its cessation. This non-denial, in Saddam’s mind, confirmed his 
belief that the Soviets were not truly on Iraq’s side.282 
However, Iraq was quite aware that the Soviets viewed this war with particular 
apprehension.  Tensions between Iran and the U.S.S.R. were growing.  Like a recurring 
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nightmare for Moscow, for example, the new Islamic regime was targeting leftist elements. The 
Soviet embassy in Tehran had been occupied twice by protestors, including some Afghans, and 
Moscow had shut down Soviet consulates in Iran in response. Not wanting to completely cut off 
Moscow, the Iranians did apologize for the occupation of the embassy, a move that Baghdad 
interpreted to be a chance for Moscow to “exploit Iran's dire political and economic 
situations…and to attempt to find a foothold in any shape in Iran.” 283 Iraqi officials wagered that 
the Soviet Union would be more inclined to “build trust with Iraq so they do not lose their 
connections in the region.”  These same officials believed it was time to “reactivate” the 
relationship with the Soviet Union, a relationship that was severely damaged when Moscow 
refused to sanction Iraq’s invasion of Iran. 284  
The Soviets took the opportunity to push the Iraqis toward reforming their positions on 
both the communists and the Kurds within the country as a precondition for the resumption of 
arms sales. As the Americans noted, Saddam was willing at least to “appear to satisfy minimal 
Soviet demands,” as evidenced by Baʿthist overtures to Kurdish and communist opposition 
groups. 285 But things did not significantly change between Baghdad and Moscow.  In an early 
1983 meeting with Soviet officials, after the exchanging of usual pleasantries—where the two 
parties confirmed their opposition to imperialism and Zionism— Iraqi officials tried to calm 
Soviet officials’ anger  over the treatment of communists within Iraq. Iraqi officials laid the 
blame squarely on the leadership of the ICP, arguing they did not comply with the “progressive 
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National Pact” and that they were also trying to form an armed organization.  The Baʿthists 
continued, arguing that the ICP was trying to ruin the Iraqi-Soviet relationship by creating 
problems and instability in the north.  Baghdad also accused Moscow of working with Libyan 
leader Muammar al-Gaddafi and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. The Iraqis refused to 
apologize, essentially justifying their persecution of the ICP. As the Baʿthists saw it, the ICP was 
“constantly interfering in our internal affairs” and had their “infiltrators” commit “criminal 
actions…in Iraq before the [war with Iran.]” The Baʿthists questioned the motives behind the 
visit of Iranian officials to Moscow “after the ascension of the ‘antichrist’ Khomeini.” This was 
rebuffed by Soviet officials who argued that they would be maintaining alliances with both 
parties in question.286   
Although they hoped the Soviets would come around and resume arms sales, the Iraqis 
began prodding the Americans toward “clarifying U.S. and Iraqi positions.” 287  Iraqi overtures to 
the Americans had started well before the war began,  as part of the Iraqi re-orientation toward 
the West, with Iraqi officials—including the Foreign Minister—sending word back through 
private American citizens as well through the U.S. Interests Sections in Baghdad. 288 In this 
sense, the war and the Soviet refusal to back Iraq outright galvanized Iraq’s efforts to restore 
diplomatic relations with  the United States. In early 1982, Saddam’s half-brother, Barzan 
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Ibrahim al-Tikriti, then the head of Iraqi intelligence, approached the Americans through back-
channels, seeking Washington’s view of the war, and expressing suspicions of the U.S.S.R. and 
the IPC. 289 In September 1984, Tariq Aziz approached U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to 
establish “a basis for a joint announcement of a decision to resume U.S.-Iraqi diplomatic 
relations.”290 The State Department sought to move on this immediately—hoping to forestall 
possible Soviet counterreactions in light of it —and in November 1984, relations were officially 
restored.291 
Sadly for the Iraqis, their other friends remained questionably neutral. Many of them 
would supply Iran as well, including France, China, and various East European states.292  The 
Iraqis sought aid from the East Germans after the outbreak of war; but, as if they were predicting 
the future, according to a February 1981 report, the Stasi believed that “neither of the two sides 
has the potential to lead a decisive strike. In this situation a political solution is deemed not very 
likely.”293 The East Germans, just like the Soviets, were also none too pleased that, according to 
their spies in West Germany, the Iraqis were attempting to play the West and East against each 
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other. In one case, an Iraqi diplomat informed the West Germans that they were not “dependent 
on the Soviet Union” and recommended that the West Germans imitate the French-Iraqi 
relationship as a model for future diplomacy.294 
There was a clear shift in the East German-Iraqi dynamic by the 1980s.  East Germany 
began supporting “progressive” and communist states with more vigor. Therefore, Iraq’s 
continued targeting of communists within the Eastern bloc did not sit well with Berlin.  Iraq’s 
rapprochement with  the West also angered East Germany.  The Stasi feared that improved Iraqi 
relations with Washington could lead to shared Iraqi-U.S. intelligence operations against East 
Germany.295  By the late 1980s, the East Germans were also more preoccupied with the changes 
coming from the U.S.S.R., including perestroika and glasnost. By November 1989, East 
Germany ceased to exist.  
The Iraqis also eyed Western European states for help during the war. When the Soviets 
balked at supporting Iraq, the French supported Iraq by supplying them with over $17 billion 
USD in assistance, including Mirages, Super Étendards, Exocets, helicopters, artillery pieces, 
advisors, technicians, credits, and more. 296 Iraqi-European cooperation had already caught 
America’s attention before the war began, especially when the French and the Italians began 
helping Iraq with its nuclear program. 297  According to a former supervisor of the Iraqi nuclear 
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program, Saddam was so dissatisfied with Soviet technology that he ordered the leaders of the 
program to pursue the French instead.298 The burgeoning nuclear program worried the Israelis so 
much that they bombed the facility, just south of Baghdad, in June 1981, destroying the Osirak 
nuclear reactor; in the attack, an Italian technician was also killed.299  
The Italians and the Iraqis were also later implicated in a banking scandal in which an 
Italian bank, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL), granted Iraq more than $3 billion USD in 
fraudulent loans.  Although Iraq later claimed it was the victim, the Iraqis did use $600 million 
USD of the credits to buy military and dual-use technology “through various companies and 
legitimate firms in Western Europe.” The C.I.A. also believed that Iraqi intelligence was directly 
involved in this, including possessing and operating “holding companies funneling technology to 
Iraq.”300 Baghdad also repeatedly approached the European Economic Community to “enlist the 
support of Western states” and to find a “peace formula” to end the war with Iran numerous 
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times.301 However, because the European community was sharply divided and because many 
European states were making money by selling arms and weapons to both belligerents, a peace 
agreement was hard to imagine. 302 
The Iraqis took the fact that their “allies” were arming and selling weapons to Iran 
particularly hard. The Iraqis were obsessed with monitoring Iranian actions, whether real or 
imagined, long believing that Iran was in cahoots with outsiders to bring down the Baʿthist 
regime. Intelligence reports from northern Iraq detailed information about possible weapons 
agreements among the Kurds, Syria, and China—one report suggested that “saboteurs” would 
gain use of these weapons smuggled through Iran.303 Worse yet, the Iranians were smuggling 
weapons—including aircraft spare parts, tanks, and 175mm caliber anti-aircraft guns—imported 
from the West, including West Germany and Austria, into the Kurdish region.304 One particular 
Iraqi intelligence report specifically documented that the Iranians had received 120 missiles from 
China and North Korea in 1986.305 Furthermore, another report suggested that gas masks, spare 
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parts, engineers, and technical experts for F-5 and F-14 fighter planes arrived from Argentina, 
China, and North Korea.306   
 
 Conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War 
The war between Iran and Iraq ended in August 1988 with things returning for the most 
part to how they had been  before September 1980. A war that saw chemical weapons deployed 
against soldiers and civilians, child soldiers sent to the front line, international tankers targeted, 
even a civilian airliner downed came to an end  largely because both warring states had 
exhausted their financial and military capabilities and because the rest of the world could no 
longer tolerate the attacks on oil tankers within the Persian Gulf. 307  There were fears that a 
continuation of the war, which had already gone on for eight years, risked severe damage to the 
global economy. The Americans and Soviets were also concerned about the increasing 
probability for  incidents between outside players, whether accidental or not.  
Iran’s political and economic overtures to Western and non-Western countries following 
the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War troubled the Iraqis.  Oil and energy representatives from 
German, French, North Korean, and Chinese companies were known to be in Iran for 
consultation and to repair oil refineries and arms factories damaged during the war. The Iranians 
and French were also in negotiations for economic assistance and investment in Iran’s oil fields 
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and in its nuclear potential.308 This is not to say that Iranian relations with all these countries  
were  trouble-free, but to the Iraqis they were  signs of betrayal by their supposed allies.309 
The Iranians and the Soviets were also improving their relationship. Despite their mutual 
distrust and hostility, the Iranians and the Soviets still cooperated with each other through 
military and economic deals. This hatred was noticed in Iraq, as Iraqi intelligence  saw that “the 
Persian regime's hatred of the Soviet Union is countered by the Soviet Union's supply of two 
hundred tanks to Iran, [while] Iran is paying the Soviets back with oil and gas exports by the end 
of the current year.” 310 Intelligence sources in  northern Iraq confirmed and reinforced fears of a 
continued covert and improving Soviet-Iranian relationship.  This relationship included political 
and military cooperation. Iraqi intelligence reported that “the criminal [then presidential 
candidate and eventual winner Akbar Hashemi] Rafsanjani will run away with the presidential 
election, and there is a very high probability of him becoming the President of the Republic. 
When Rafsanjani returned from a visit to the Soviet Union [the trip occurred in June 1989], 
Iranian television broadcast footage of this visit, [using it as] propaganda.”311  
The military relationship prospered as well. Special contracts were signed between the 
two for military equipment. This included aircraft, tanks, surface-to-surface missiles, radars, 
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surveillance equipment and devices, and wireless devices.312  There were also deliveries of 
twenty MiG-29s, as well as the arrival of Soviet pilots to train Iranian pilots.313 The Soviets were 
also helping  the Iranians to build  a chemical factory in the city of Damghan. Iraqi intelligence 
reported that Syrian and Iranian experts were working together on the factory. According to their 
report, the Iranians ran into trouble, requiring  “a number of engineers from the Soviet Union [to 
come] to the rescue.”314 A source at the factory told Iraqi intelligence agents that three Soviet 
officials had toured the factory, escorted by Iranian officials of the Ministry of Industry, to “look 
at the nature of the work and the quality of the production” while the director of the factory 
explained the work still needed. 315 
 Although the relationship was tenuous, the Soviets and the Iraqis continued probing one 
another throughout the war, seeing what was acceptable and what had changed.  Visits continued 
through the decade, including a September 1987 Soviet visit to Baghdad in which the two parties 
tried “patch up recent strained relations.” Talks were centered on oil, heavy industry, and 
military affairs, and both sides published positive talks about the visit and meetings. In this 
instance, as in many others, the meetings did not occur at the upper levels.  For example, the 
Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations and his delegation did 
not meet Tariq Aziz or Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadhan, let alone Saddam.316    
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 By the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Soviets were clearly moving closer to Iran, arranging 
for new arms and economic deals, and so too were Western and non-Western states.  The 1970s 
and 1980s, therefore, not only severely weakened the Iraqi-Soviet relationship, but they also 
brought essential lessons for Iraq. First, Baghdad needed to balance relations with both 
superpowers, because relying solely on the Soviets had not produced a reliable, consistent ally.  
The Soviets had merely picked moments to support Iraq when it best fit the Kremlin’s own 
interests.  But the second lesson was that even superpowers were not enough.  Outside powers, 
including the French, proved to be more loyal than either superpower. In this sense, the Iraqis 
were looking to avoid being trapped by their reliance on  outside weapons and support. 317  The 
third, and final, lesson was that no matter their frustration with Moscow, the Baʿthist regime 
could not completely cut off the Soviets. Instead, Iraq needed to be more realistic, and, as 
Saddam eventually came to understand, in the words of Pierre Razoux, he could “no longer truly 
count on the Kremlin.”318 
  
 
317 The Iraqis also made outreaches to Egypt and Jordan in attempts to bolster “its regional credibility and to provide 
stability” against Iran. Untitled Iraq-Soviet study, circa February 1986, Iran-Iraq War [February 1986] (5) Box 
90192, OA 91834, 01840, 91843, William Burns Files, RRPL. 
318 Razoux, The Iran-Iraq War, 479.  
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Chapter 3 - Iraqi Intervention in the Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990 
Much of what has been written about Iraq in the years prior to its seizure of Kuwait and 
the subsequent Gulf War (August 1990-February 1991) is focused on Iraqi policy towards Iran, 
the Kurds, and Israel. Iraq’s involvement in Lebanon between 1975 and 1990, however, has 
drawn little attention from scholars despite its importance.319 In Lebanon, the Iraqis acted neither 
to do the bidding of their Soviet client-masters nor to antagonize them. Similarly, the Iraqis were 
not agents of the Americans either.  Moving into Lebanon was a product of Iraq’s own agency, 
its own hopes, fears, and goals in the Levant.  Its foreign policy, moreover, was driven just as 
much by their domestic concerns as it was by their regional issues.  
Iraqi intervention in the Lebanese Civil War was framed by the Baʿthist regime as its 
national mission.  This framework served two purposes. In terms of foreign policy, Iraq used the 
civil war as an opportunity to counter Syrian and Iranian influence in the Levant using rhetoric 
and force.  Simultaneously, it was an attempt  to bolster credibility with the Palestinian cause as 
a way  to enhance Iraq’s stature in the Arab world. However, Iraqi accomplishments often fell 
short of achieving these goals.  Intervention in Lebanon provided another way for the Baʿthists to 
exert control over the Iraqi population; this desire for control grew more prominent as Saddam 
Hussein’s power and influence strengthened in the 1970s.320 In this case, foreign intervention by 
 
319 See Pesach Malovany, Wars of Modern Babylon: a History of the Iraqi Army from 1921 to 2003. (Lexington: 
The University Press of Kentucky, 2017); Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991. 
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2004); Fred H. Lawson, "Syria's Intervention in the Lebanese Civil 
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320  For the rise of Saddam, see Charles Tripp. A History of Iraq. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007) and 
Joseph Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Baʿth Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). 
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Iraq allowed the Baʿthist elite—Saddam, in reality—to grow in strength and to control party 
members, both within the Baʿth Party and in the Popular Army.   
 An examination of the national mission provides another way in which historians can 
assess the strength and inner workings of the Baʿthist state. Iraqi efforts in Lebanon revealed yet 
again the tedious bureaucracy of the Baʿthist state, the overall power dynamic between state and 
citizen, and the tendency for Saddam to overstate his power. In other instances, this examination 
shows the complicated nature of the intervention and the inner workings of the Baʿthist party 
apparatus abroad, including foreign fighters, intelligence networks, and the like.321  More 
importantly, while the intervention may not have proven decisive or even consequential for the 
Levant, it reveals  how Iraqi foreign and domestic interests often intertwined and influenced one 
another.  
 
 Lebanon Collapses into Civil War 
Lebanon was created by the French in 1920, selectively carved out of the Syrian mandate 
to ensure that a Christian majority ruled rather than be outnumbered by Muslims.  But the 
Christian population, dominated by the Maronite sect, was  not  alone. This new state was home 
not only to Christians but also to Sunni, Shiʿa, and Druze.  In 1943, Lebanon was granted 
independence from France; and, soon after, the Muslim and Christian communities embarked on 
creating an independent government that could represent all religious sects. In what became 
known as the National Pact, a Maronite Christian would serve as president while a Sunni Muslim 
 
321 Here, this analysis of the Iraqi intervention in Lebanon supports other scholarship which illustrates the ability and 
limitations of Baʿthist bureaucracy to operate both at home at abroad. See Samuel Helfont, “Authoritarianism 
Beyond Borders: The Iraqi Baʿth Party as a Transnational Actor,” The Middle East Journal 72. No 2. (2018): 229-
245.   
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would serve as prime minister.  The National Pact created a government that was 
consociationalist in structure—using the 1932 census, representation within the Lebanese 
government was also divided between Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims  in a 6:5 ratio for  
allocation if seats in the chamber of deputies.322 Lebanon’s sectarian composition and its power-
sharing accord have  led some scholars to proclaim that the country was “born schizophrenic.”323  
The use of the 1932 census would ultimately prove extremely contentious, especially by 
the 1970s.   The Maronites in Lebanon refused to allow another census to be conducted, fearing 
that the results would confirm suspicions that the Maronites had become the minority in 
Lebanon, which would cost them some of their power within the government.324 After years of 
political corruption, including  Maronite President Camille Chamoun’s attempts to take an illegal 
second term for himself, a revolt broke out in Lebanon in 1958.   Chamoun called for assistance, 
feigning that he was defending Lebanon from communism and from Egyptian President Gamal 
Nasser’s intent to interfere in Lebanese affairs.  The Americans responded, deploying over 
15,000 American Marines to Beirut.325  The perceived Maronite preference for the West, and not 
for their fellow Arabs, did nothing to reduce internal tensions.   
 
322 William L. Cleveland, and Martin Bunton. A History of the Modern Middle East. 5th ed. (Boulder, CO: 
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323 Cleveland and Bunton. A History of the Modern Middle East, 209. 
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Cleveland and Bunton. A History of the Modern Middle East, 310-312. For more on the Maronites, see Kamal S. 
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325 For more on the American prospective of this, see Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: the Eisenhower 
Doctrine and the Middle East. (Chapel-Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005).  
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In June 1967, the Israelis took preemptive action against neighboring Arab states in the 
Six-Day War.  The Israelis won a time of greater security, but Arab states lost much.  Lebanon, 
for example, was badly troubled by a flood of Palestinian refugees pouring over the country’s 
border with Israel. As a consequence, these refugees added even more pressure on the fragile 
National Pact.  Palestinian liberation and terrorist groups, including the umbrella organization the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), also began using Lebanon as a base of operations 
against Israel and Jordan, prompting the former to retaliate, catching many Shiʿa living in 
southern Lebanon in the crosshairs.326 Disenfranchised Lebanese Sunni and Shiʿa began joining 
forces with Palestinians when the Maronites refused to undertake a new census.327  Fearing a 
Muslim majority and refusing to accept any proposed changes within the National Pact, the 
Maronites began arming and empowering their own militias.   This prompted Muslim politicians 
to prop up their own militias as well.  Fighting began between the two main groups—on one 
side, the “rightist” or “status quo” the Christians, and, on the other side, the “leftist” or 
“revisionist”  Lebanese Sunnis, Shiʿa, and Druze along with the PLO—when a Christian militia 
element attacked and killed 27 Palestinian bus passengers in late April 1975. After a brief 
ceasefire, fighting resumed in August 1975.328 
 
326 Besides drawing Jordan into the Israel-PLO standoff and violence, the PLO began targeting the Jordanian 
government, including trying to assassinate King Hussein twice. As a result, the Jordanians moved to expel the PLO 
and the Palestinians from Jordan by force. In what became known as Black September, in 1970, the Jordanian army 
moved against the Palestinians, forcing many of them to flee to Lebanon.  For more, see Craig Daigle, "Crisis on the 
Suez, June–September 1970," in The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict, 1969-1973, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 113-54. 
327 Cleveland and Bunton. A History of the Modern Middle East, 380-381. 
328 Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991, 514. Cleveland and Bunton. A History of the Modern 
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As the civil war intensified, Lebanon’s geography and its internal composition—drawn 
from Shiʿa, Sunni, Maronite Christian, Druze, and Palestinian factions—created a power vacuum 
in the Levant, triggering an influx of regional and international players into the conflict.329  This 
war occurred at a time of uncertainty: Hafez al-Assad was consolidating power in Syria, Saddam 
Hussein was gearing up to assume official leadership of Iraq, and  Iran was heading  toward  
Islamic revolution, all while Israel and Egypt were in the midst of peace negotiations.  Arab 
states, as well as the United States and the U.S.S.R., could all sense that there was power to be 
had in Lebanon. Fundamentally, these actors saw the Lebanese Civil War as an opportunity to 
advance their own interests in the Middle East. But they also believed that, even if their interests 
could not be achieved, they could at least thwart the interests of their competitors and enemies.  
By the mid-1970s, as part of the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, the 
major policy focus for the United States government regarding the Middle East was the 
prevention of another war between the Arabs and the Israelis.  This was no easy task.  Tensions 
ran high among all parties including the Israelis and the Americans. In mid-March 1975,  the 
relationship between Israel and the United States reached a new low after failed American 
attempts to secure Israeli withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula.  The Israelis informed Kissinger 
 
329  The rise of the Shiʿa groups, which cannot be overstated, sadly does not fit in the purview of this chapter. 
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Station Chief and Hezbollah’s War against America and the West. (NY, NY: Berkley, an imprint of Penguin 
Random House, 2018) offers a more popular history of the Shiʿa-Iran alliance during the war in Lebanon.  For more 
a more recent discussion on the rise of Shiʿa politics, and its regional and global implications, see Frederic M. 
Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings. (New York: Columbia University 
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that they wanted Egypt “not to resort to the use of force and to resolve all disputes between them 
by negotiations and other peaceful means. They will refrain from permitting, encouraging, 
assisting, or participating in any military, paramilitary or hostile actions, from any warlike or 
hostile acts and any other form of warfare or hostile activity against the other party anywhere.”330 
This demand forced Sadat into a corner—in Egypt’s view, signing any treaty like this while the 
Sinai was in Israel’s possession would be seen as capitulation to Israel.  
Kissinger was irate at Israel for this seemingly antagonizing demand.  In one 
conversation with other U.S. government officials, he reasoned: “I am Jewish. How can I want 
this? I have never seen such cold-blooded playing with the American national interest. Every 
Arab was looking to us; we had moved the Soviet Union out of the Middle East; even Iraq was 
being moved. What they have done is destroy this.”331 After freezing F-15 arms deliveries to 
Israel, from then until late in summer 1975, the relationship between the U.S. and Israel was 
under “reassessment.” It was not until the U.S. Senate intervened that the State Department 
ended on its standoff with Israel.332 
But the Israelis were not the only players in the region, as the conflict drew in many 
regional and international actors.  Many of the Christian militias received aid and arms from 
Israel—which the Americans did not oppose  because this support maintained the status quo in 
the conflict—while “radical groups,” including prominent anti-Syrian politician Kamal 
 
330 Kissinger Reports on U.S.S.R., China, and Middle East Discussions (Box 3, March 7-22, 1975—Kissinger’s 
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Jumblatt’s element and other Palestinian factions, were largely supported by Libya and Iraq.333  
Syria’s role in the war was much more complicated. The U.S. government believed that Syria 
was trying to “preserve the existing system,” and this therefore explained as to why the Syrians 
supported the Christian elements and other moderate Muslims rather than the side of the radicals.  
The war could “open the floodgates of radicalism in Lebanon….  [Assad] did not relish the idea 
of finding himself sandwiched between radical Iraq…and radical Lebanon.”334 Generally 
speaking, the Assad regime wanted to ensure two outcomes in Lebanon. One of Syria’s largest 
fears was that, if Lebanon turned radical, it could draw further Soviet support and could “find 
itself squeezed between Lebanon and Iran.” Seeking to avoid this outcome, the Syrians also 
wanted to control the PLO, replace PLO leader Yasser Arafat with their own puppet, and to 
“increase [their] power in the Arab world.”335  
Although the U.S. government  was inclined to favor Syrian objectives, calling Syria’s 
role “very constructive and [serving] our interests,” they worried that Syrian intervention could 
have dramatic and detrimental long-term consequences to American interests in the region. 336  
 
333 Dilip Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers: a History of the Lebanese Civil War. (New York: St. Martin, 1993), 14.  
334 Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers: a History of the Lebanese Civil War, 36. 
335 Jordan supported Syria’s intervention, finding common cause in Syria’s goal to root out radical PLO factions, 
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opposing the radicals.” Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, April 7, 1976, FRUSA, 1969-1976, Volume 
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There were concerns that Assad, after years of consolidating power successfully in Syria, could 
extend his reach and power by dominating Lebanon,  thus potentially paving  the way for entry 
into Jordan as well. This alone could pose a major threat to the balance in the modern Levant and 
the Middle East more broadly. However, Syria’s invasion into Lebanon stoked fear  of a possible 
new Arab-Israeli war, a fear which trumped all other concerns for the U.S. government.  The 
Americans worried that Israel, under the pretense of a chaotic Lebanese civil war, would be 
“sorely tempted to try to go in to clean out the PLO” within Lebanon.  According to the U.S. 
State Department, this would have  “disastrous consequences.”  Washington also worried over  
just how far Syrian penetration into Lebanon would extend, fearing that, the deeper Syria entered 
Lebanon, “the danger of Israeli action [would increase].”337 
According to the Israeli government,  Assad was working to “restore Soviet prestige in 
the Middle East” by “[vassalizing] Lebanon” and thus prompting the Soviets to back Syrian 
objectives.  From Assad’s point of view, wagered the Israelis, neither the radicals nor the PLO 
and their allies could defeat the Christians and unify the country.  From Tel Aviv’s point of view,  
all of this spelled trouble for the Egyptians, a view the Americans would come to share as 
well.338  For if Syria were to be defeated in Lebanon, Israel contended that Assad likely would be 
“sandwiched between two radical states,” with the PLO controlling Lebanon and Assad 
eventually being overthrown.  According to Kissinger, “[t]his would be of no benefit to Sadat.”  
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According to a belief shared by the Israelis and the U.S. government, Sadat held no concrete 
policy regarding Lebanon besides preventing Assad from assuming the mantle of leadership 
within the Arab world. Protecting Egypt was viewed as the essential component of any deal with 
the Syrians, PLO, and whomever else. Kissinger succinctly described U.S. government policy 
goals in relation to Lebanon: “We have no illusion about Assad but we want to keep Syria split 
from Libya and Iraq and the U.S.S.R. If a radical crescent involving Iraq, Syria, a PLO-
controlled Lebanon and Libya comes into being—following the overthrow of Assad—it will be 
very bad for Egypt.”339 
The Soviets, for their part, largely supported the Lebanese Communist Party, but they 
also supported Jumblatt. However, the Soviets neither wanted Lebanon to fall into chaos nor for 
Syrian armed forces to be ravaged once again, fearing that another Soviet-armed Arab defeat 
could devastate Soviet credibility and diplomatic standing in the region.  The Soviets often 
criticized Assad’s move in Lebanon because they themselves were not eager for another war, and 
so they cautioned Syria not to move too far. However, they could not entirely abandon Syria, 
especially since they had just lost another important Arab ally in the years before—Egypt.340  As 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger argued, although the Soviets supported certain elements 
within the war, “overall [the Soviets] are a factor of restraint.” Kissinger continued that “they 
want to have their cake and eat it, too. The Soviets are not looking for trouble but they will be 
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forced to move rather than lose all their assets in the Middle East, should another war come.”341 
Washington, however, noticed the distrust between the Soviets and the Syrians. Kissinger noted 
that the “[the] Syrians are highly nationalistic. They may not be willing to take Soviet forces. 
They don’t like the Russians.” Other American officials chimed in, stating that the Syrians 
“don’t like anybody” and that Assad was “trying to keep his independence.”342  
Despite apprehension about Soviet intentions, the Carter administration did try to work 
with the Soviets to achieve a ceasefire. The Soviets agreed with the Carter’s initiatives, calling 
for an end to hostilities; and the two superpowers worked together through the U.N. to try and 
secure a permanent peace.343  However, the Americans and the Soviets were not able to achieve 
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this peace, each viewing the other with suspicion. At the same time,  U.S. diplomats, such as  
Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State Philip Habib, did not view all future peace prospects as 
“bleak,” but they did “[come] away with the distinct feeling that the Soviets are not inclined to 
be helpful, although to what extent they may have stimulated the Syrian and PLO reaction is 
unclear.”344 
As the U.S. and U.S.S.R. sought to curtail the civil war, Iraq saw Lebanon in an entirely 
different light. In the early 1970s, Iraq began to flex its regional might, with the first signs of 
Baʿthist regime’s eagerness to use its military power to undertake its foreign affairs materializing 
during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.345  The invasion of Israeli territory led by the Syrians and 
Egyptians that began on 6 October 1973 caught the Iraqis by surprise—they had been left out of 
the conspiracy entirely. Nevertheless, the Iraqis quickly mobilized, with President Hassan al-
Bakr calling both Presidents Anwar Sadat and Assad to inform them of impending Iraqi 
participation.  The Iraqis lost 835 soldiers fighting on  the Golan Heights—according to Kenneth 
Pollack, Iraqi artillery “caused more casualties to their own troops and their Jordanian and 
Syrians allies than to their Israeli foes”—but as Pesach Malovany argues, the Iraqi Army 
“acquired the greatest amount of battle experience since its foundation.”346  
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Important Iraqi rhetoric was born out of this conflict as well. This included the Iraqi 
legend that Iraq “saved” Damascus from an Israeli advance and occupation.347 The “saving of 
Damascus” was proof, according to the Iraqis, that Iraq would aid its Arab brothers. (The Iraqis 
would later argue that Syria betrayed this favor by siding with Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.) 
Iraq would also criticize Syrian and Egyptian capitulation, while simultaneously arguing that it 
would always resist the “Zionist” enemy, no matter the cost.348 Iraqi newspapers and radio 
programs chastised Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt for accepting the ceasefire when the Palestinians 
still had not been allowed to return home. Iraqi media argued that the Arab world was only using 
the Palestinians “when [it] suits their interests,” and they went further to suggest that they were 
actively preventing the Palestinians from “recovering their rights.”349 After the war, Iraq 
escalated its anti-Israeli rhetoric and action, including maintaining its boycott of the United 
States long after other Arab states moved on.  Highlighting its participation in the 1973 war 
through government publications and declarations, Iraq began attempting to assert itself in a 
region previously dominated by Syria, setting the stage for Iraq’s later interventions in the 
region.   
Iraq’s growing strength in the Levant and its maneuvering in the region did not go 
unnoticed. According to the Jordanians, the Iraqis had built a nine-division army by 1978 thanks 
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to assistance from the Soviets and $3 billion USD worth of American arms.350 The King of 
Jordan also expressed concern about Iraqi action in the region directly to the Americans. King 
Hussein told Philip Habib, a career  U.S. diplomat, that Iraq was “unstable and unpredictable and 
had resources enough to do damage in the region and particularly to Syria.”351 To bolster its 
mission in Lebanon and to combat Syrian influence, Iraqi intelligence was carrying out “blatant 
operations” in Jordan as well. King Hussein  likened Iraq to Libya, citing their utilization of 
students to carry out terrorist attacks abroad. Iraq, as he saw it,  was an “expansionist” state, 
creating problems and disputes with some of its neighbors.352 
 
 Civil War Intensifies 
 As Maronite Christian forces were losing the upper hand in Lebanon, Syrian forces 
invaded on 1 June 1976.353 This Syrian invasion prompted the Iraqis to respond by deploying 
their own forces to Lebanon as well. Overall, this Iraqi intervention was not well sustained in 
terms of troop movements.  Iraqi troops were deployed, recalled, and then re-deployed, often 
mirroring Syrian actions. For example, 500 Iraqi fighters  whose government called them 
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“volunteers” were deployed to Beirut, Tyre, and Sidon between September and October 1976. 
There, while coordinating with the Syrians, these troops also helped break an Israeli-imposed 
blockade and smuggled weapons to Lebanese fighters. When Syria returned to Lebanon in 1977, 
these troops were redeployed; some even had to escape through  Cyprus and Egypt.354   
 The reaction to Syria’s invasion was a product of Baghdad’s rivalry with Damascus.  
While both capitals were ruled by Baʿthists, all of whom were descended  from the original 
Baʿth party, the Syrian and Iraqi branches split in 1966 because of competing regional and 
personal ambitions.355  The party had been formed in Damascus in 1947 by Michel ‘Aflaq and 
Salah al-Din Bitar, a Syrian Orthodox Christian and a Syrian Sunni Muslim, respectively; both 
were educated in France and were greatly influenced by socialism and communism.  At its first  
congress, the party was named the Hizb al-Baʿth al’Arabi, literally the Party of Arab 
Renaissance, but in 1953 the name was changed to Hizb al-Baʿth al’Arabi al’ Ishtiraki, the Arab 
Socialist Baʿth Party.  Influenced by socialism and a product of the post-colonial era, ‘Aflaq and 
Bitar called for the liberation of the Arab people from Western imperialist and capitalist forces, 
the return and redistribution of land and property to the Arab people, and the modernization of 
the Arab world.356 The party’s constitution called for the unification of all Arabs under the 
banner of one single state. According to the constitution, this would eventually encompass the 
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entire “Arab fatherland (watan) [which] is the part of the globe inhabited by the Arab nation 
which stretches from the Tauras Mountain, the Pushti-i-Kuh mountains, the Gulf of Basra, the 
Arab Ocean, the Ethiopian mountains, the Sahara, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Mediterranean.”357  
 Although the party was headquartered in Damascus, party organizations were set up in 
Transjordan (modern day Jordan) in 1947; in Lebanon in 1949; in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and 
Yemen in 1952; and in Libya in 1954.358 In 1954, largely due to the geographic expansion of the 
party, party organizations outside Syria were classified as “regions.”  These were run by regional 
commands, with the National Command, seated in Damascus, serving as the executive body to 
all regional commands.  But in the early 1960s, tensions arose between the regional command in 
Iraq and the national command in Syria.  The two regional commands had tried to unify in 1963, 
hoping to then unify the countries, but the 1963 Iraqi coup ended this chance. Disputes within the 
Syrian wing of the Baʿth Party spilled over into a coup in 1966, in which the wing dominated by 
the military overthrew Syria’s old guard. Michael ‘Aflaq would eventually flee Syria and settle 
in Iraq—an exile whom  Iraq would use to further support its Baʿthist credentials.   
 Between 1963 and 1968, the two countries competed for the affections of Egypt, then the 
most prominent Arab state under President Gamal Abdel Nasser.  But the turmoil in Iraq, as well 
as Nasser’s failure to unify Syria and Egypt within the United Arab Republic, signaled the 
beginning of the end of rapprochement between Iraq and Syria. Debates soon arose, both in 
Damascus and Baghdad, over the nature of Baʿthism.  The governments also quarreled over 
 
357 Baʿth Party Constitution, General Principles 2, 6, 7 as cited in Kienle, Baʿth v. Baʿth: the Conflict between Syria 
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which regional command exemplified the true nature of the ideology.  But this was not entirely 
ideological.  Oil pipelines and water boundary disputes along the Euphrates River also fueled the 
rivalry.  Each state attempted to use the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 as evidence for their 
claims that it was the true center of Arabism. Syria maintained that it was continuing to lead the 
fight against Israeli state, while Iraq accused Syria of supporting the “Zionist entity” for agreeing 
to a ceasefire backed by the United Nations.359  Ideology could not override nationalism in this 
case.  
The rivalry between the Iraqi and Syrian Baʿthist regional commands continued thanks in 
part to the growing personal rivalry between Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein.360 Each man  
would support attempts to subvert the other in the domestic sphere, including Saddam supporting  
Syrian Islamists in their quest to overthrow Assad in the early 1980s. The antagonism itself 
intensified as both men sought to exert their influence in the region. Their battle for regional 
supremacy drew in both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as well. The Cold War superpowers often 
used this division for their own benefit. For the U.S., a split Arab world meant that Arabs could 
not focus solely on destroying Israel. As for the Soviets, they pushed cooperation between the 
two but not the kind of complete reconciliation that could undercut the need for Moscow’s 
bargaining power in the region.361 Friends of Iraq and Syria tried to navigate the growing tense 
schism, often to little avail. In one example, even Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu, a 
friend of both leaders, tried to bridge the gap between Iraq and Syria, but he was unsuccessful as 
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361 Kienle, Baʿth v. Baʿth: the Conflict between Syria and Iraq, 1968-1989, 151.  
113 
well. 362 The rivalry and hatred reached the point at which Saddam added al-Assad to his enemies 
list when the latter supported Iran during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).363   
The Iraqis believed that the Syrians intervened in the Lebanese Civil War in order to 
control both the country and the Palestinian population along with it, seeking to end any chance 
for a future independent Palestinian state. This, as Iraqi leaders saw it, would give Syria 
unprecedented control over the region, an arrangement Iraq could not accept. Even American 
officials in Baghdad noted Iraqi panic over Syrian action in Lebanon, especially as Iraqis 
expressed themselves in the state media.  As the U.S. Interests Section in Baghdad noted, “[the] 
Lebanese situation remains the major preoccupation of Iraqi press. Coverage of Syrian role in 
Lebanon is near-hysterical as [Government of Iraq] does its best to stir up internal problems for 
the Syrian regime. For example, July 12 papers carried stories of Syrian atrocities in Lebanon, 
mutinies in several Syrian Army units, resignations of Syrian Army officers, bomb blasts in 
Damascus, protests sweeping Syria, and wild celebrations in western Beirut following rumors of 
a coup in Damascus.”364 The tension between the two had escalated in 1975 because the Syrians 
were building a large dam in northeastern Syria on the Euphrates River. Since the dam  would 
control  how much water flowed  through Syria into  Iraq, the Syrians preemptively transferred 
troops to the region to keep  Iraqi troops from crossing the border. 365  
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 On 9 June 1976, while ordering Iraqi troops into the “Arab arena,” Saddam stated in an 
interview published by state media that the fight was not against Syria but against what he called 
the “Zionist” enemy.366  Iraq’s mission in Lebanon, according to Saddam, was for the good of 
the entire Arab nation. Iraq even went so far as to arrange for Libya, Algeria, and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) to consent to Iraq “liberating” the Golan Heights through Syria—
although it remains to be seen if Saddam truly believed that these states could contribute in a 
meaningful way or if he was merely seeking their endorsement.  On 11 June, however, Syria 
declined Iraq’s offer to help rescue the Golan Heights.  This denial stemmed in part from Syria’s 
having been excluded  from discussion of the very arrangement that Iraq had put together with 
pretended generosity.    It also stemmed from Syria’s own goals and ambitions for expanding 
influence in Lebanon. They saw no need for the agreement in the first place. As part of a public 
rebuke, Syria carried out aerial reconnaissance sorties into Iraq near northeastern Syria. To 
retaliate, Iraq took a Syrian pilot who had defected during one of these sorties and paraded him 
around the state-run media, through which he criticized the Syrian regime.367   
  Yet, although Iraq’s anti-Israel campaign remained consistent, there was some flexibility 
towards Syria regarding force coordination.  In 1978, 500 fighters of the 32nd Special Forces 
Brigade were deployed to Lebanon to fight the Israelis after the latter moved into southern 
Lebanon.  Although it had barred the movement of Iraqi troops across Syrian territory in June 
1976, the Syrian government allowed it this time and even accepted assistance from  Iraqi forces 
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as they crossed into Lebanon.368 It appears that, when Israeli forces crossed certain thresholds, 
the Syrians and Iraqis were at least willing to work together, albeit for a short while, against their 
common enemy. 369  This convenient reconciliation raised alarms in Israel, who feared any future 
collaboration against them and their interests in the region. News of Egypt’s peace negotiations 
with Israel also lead to a brief détente between the two Baʿthist parts between late 1977 and early 
1978. The U.S. was also told by the Israeli ambassador that the Israelis were concerned about the 
two Baʿthist regimes “being naughty” together.370  Elements of the United States government 
shared similar concerns, noting the possibility that on-going peace discussion between Egypt and 
Israel could well “quicken the pace of Syrian-Iraqi reconciliation, particularly in the area of 
foreign policy and military cooperation.”371 
 These moments were few and far between, however.  The Baʿthist parties ended their 
détente soon after Iraq began maneuvering to replace Egypt as the leader of the Arab world and 
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when Syria openly supported Iran in its war against Iraq beginning in 1980.  Both regimes would 
continue to claim the mantle of Arab legitimacy while attempting to undermine one another in 
their own homelands .  By October 1980, Iraq and Syria broke off diplomatic relations. Assad 
later accused Iraq of being anti-Arab, since it was attacking another Muslim nation, a nation 
which would otherwise have focused its strength on destroying Israel rather than Iraq. In a 
speech broadcast on Radio Damascus in March 1982, Assad laid out his argument against Iraq:  
When the revolution in Iran said: We are with you, Arabs, the Iraqi ruler 
invaded it. He now demands that all Arabs go and fight with him against the 
Iranians in their country as a punishment for them because of their support for 
us in or battle against Zionism and because they say that the cause of Jerusalem 
is their own cause.372 
 
If anything, there was more grandstanding between Syria and Iraq throughout 1976-1989 than 
there was cooperation or reconciliation.  One instance in July 1976 saw Iraq calling up reserves 
and deploying troops to the Syrian border within the Arab Security Forces—a military entity 
within the Arab League.  Although the intention was to intimidate Syria, the Syrians were less 
than impressed and failed to see any cause for concern regarding a possible  Iraqi invasion.373  
Despite the shared enemy, the ultimate goal for Iraqi intervention in Lebanon—to contain, 
harass, and weaken the Syrian regime and its interests—remained constant. 
Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations and the eventual signing of the Camp David Accords 
in September 1978 created new opportunities for Iraq.374  Iraq had long moved against Egyptian-
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Israeli peace overtures.  In December 1977, Arab opponents of the peace process, organized by 
the PLO, formed the Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front (or “Steadfastness Front”) at 
the Arab League meeting in Tripoli, Libya. Member states included Algeria, Iraq, Libya, the 
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, Syria, and the PLO. The Steadfastness Front produced 
a formal charter and a “proclamation calling for the Front’s member states to break political and 
economic relations with Egypt and for the transfer of Arab League headquarters from Cairo.”375  
Hostile to the peace process, the Iraqi delegation took the opportunity to protest Egypt’s 
perceived betrayal and at one point angrily walked out of the meeting to call for greater 
punishment for Egypt from their fellow Arab states.376 
 Iraqi rhetoric worried the peace participants. In conversation with American government 
officials, the Egyptians expressed concerns that Iraq would continue the call to arms against 
Israel after Saddam Hussein stated in 1978 interviews that, “even if there were peace, Iraq would 
not accept Israel. There would always be war.”377 According to the Egyptian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Muhammad Ibrahim Kamel, the Israelis believed in “the honesty of the Egyptians, but 
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they also think that Iraq means what it says.”378 Other Egyptians also shared concerns about Iraq. 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat relayed one instance of Iraqi intransigence to Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance, describing Vice President Hosni Mubarak’s visit to Iraq during his tour of Arab 
countries. According to Mubarak, after being met by Saddam at the airport in Baghdad, the two 
men got into the limousine sent to take them into the capital, when Saddam “pulled a pistol out 
and put it on the seat between them. Sadat thought that story was the best commentary he could 
make on the internal situation in Iraq.” When Vance asked Sadat about the chance that the Iraqis 
would block any peace agreement, Sadat replied by noting that “there were two ‘elements’ in the 
Arab world which would  never accept a settlement: Iraq and Libya. He said that they were not 
important. He differentiated between the two, noting that the Iraqis were much more rational and 
are willing to discuss their differences and at least, in effect, agree to disagree. Gadhafi is 
demented.” However, notes of his conversation with Gadhafi report Sadat’s belief that neither 
Libya nor Iraq could “change the balance in the Arab world.”379 
Egypt’s peace treaty with and recognition of Israel—formalized by the signing of accords 
at Camp David in September 1978—shocked the Arab world, leading to accusations of Egyptian 
betrayal and deceit. Iraq quickly arranged for a conference of Arab leaders “to condemn the 
Peace Treaty, the U.S. role in its negotiation, and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat.” In late 
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March 1979, eighteen Arab foreign ministers and leaders of the PLO gathered in Baghdad to 
“consider the implementation of sanctions censuring Egypt’s negotiation with Israel passed at the 
Baghdad Summit in November 1978.”  The United States Interests Section in Baghdad reported 
the “harsh rhetoric” used by leaders of the conference: Saddam Hussein, PLO leader Yasser 
Arafat, and Iraqi Foreign Minister Saddoun Hammadi. In his speech, Saddam equated any Arab 
who supported the treaty with  “an ally of Sadat and thus an ally of the Zionist enemy.” Arafat 
called for Arabs to boycott the United States, but Hammadi echoed Saddam when he argued that 
it was a “nationalist responsibility of Arabs to check Zionist imperialist conspiracy through an 
increase of awareness and sacrifices.”380 
 In outlining the six objectives of the conference, Hammadi laid the groundwork for Iraq’s 
claims to lead the Arab world. The six objectives were: 
1. to expel Egypt from the Arab League and to isolate it both from Arab world and 
within the international community; 
2. transfer the Arab League headquarters from Cairo, along with all of the League’s 
associated institutions;  
3. stop all Arab economic, financial, and technical assistance programs for Egypt;  
4. withdraw all official and private Arab deposits from Egyptian financial institutions; 
5. “freeze” Egyptian membership in all economic, cultural, and other groups;  
6. call upon the Egyptian people to shoulder their responsibility by supporting collective 
Arab efforts to confront Zionist, imperialist plots which have turned the Egyptian 
regime into their executive tool.381 
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But not all Hammadi’s objectives were met, and the conference was not without controversy. For 
one, as argued by the C.I.A., not all Arab states were amenable to an “unqualified condemnation 
of the treaty and President Sadat.”382 The C.I.A. also viewed Iraq along with Syria and Libya as 
the “hardliners” leading this push.  Agreeing to recall its ambassador from Cairo, Jordan was 
nonetheless reluctant to cut off all ties with Egypt.  According to the C.I.A., the Saudis agreed 
only to “minimum sanctions” against Egypt. 383 In response, Arafat launched attacks on Saudi 
Arabia, accusing the kingdom of being weak for refusing to challenge the United States and 
Egypt. This in turn prompted a “heated exchange” between Arafat and the Saudi delegation, 
which itself prompted the Syrian, Libyan, and PLO delegations to walk out of the conference 
room. The Saudis, greatly disturbed by the PLO’s attacks, immediately informed the Americans 
that Arafat’s attack was “most serious and completely unexpected.” Furthermore, Arafat’s verbal 
attack caught Riyadh so off guard that the U.S.  Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, John C. West, 
wrote to the U.S. State Department that Arafat’s attack had “upset all plans and calculations.” 
Fearing something was afoot, the Saudis withdrew their commitment to implement the sanctions 
discussed at the conference.384  
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Despite the difficulties, the conference ended with a unanimous Arab diplomatic and 
economic boycott of Egypt,  the suspension of Egypt’s membership in the Arab League,  and the 
movement of the League’s headquarters from Cairo to Tunis. All other economic and technical 
affiliations were to cease.385  In March 1979, U.S. State Department officials noted that “during 
the last six months Iraq has become active diplomatically in an effort to improve its standing in 
the Arab world. Iraq’s adept management of the Baghdad Summit Conference, its present 
intention to push for prompt action to implement Summit sanctions against [Egyptian President 
Anwar] Sadat once a treaty has been signed, and its mediatory efforts in Yemen are examples of 
this effort….  Iraq’s persistence and the apparently genuine nature of at least some aspects of the 
Iraqi/Syrian rapprochement cannot escape the attention of other Arab states….”386 A June 1979 
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) argued that the Iraqi regime was seeking “to play a leading 
role in the region[;] and a concern about unsettled conditions in Iran will, in the near term, push 
it toward non-confrontational relations with many other Arab states. Although muting their 
policy of subversion, Iraqi Baʿth leaders will continue to support the development of party 
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organizations in other Arab states and spread Baʿthist socialist doctrine throughout the 
region.”387  
But Iraq’s celebration over Egypt’s diplomatic isolation was short-lived.  Early in 1979, 
the Shah of Iran, an American ally, was overthrown by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who 
instituted a Shiʿa theocratic regime.  Although Saddam detested the Shah and his American 
backers, the Shah and Saddam had established an uneasy truce after the 1975 Algiers 
Agreement;  the Shah had agreed to cease assistance to the Kurds, allowing Saddam to focus on 
the rebellion in the north, in exchange for territory in the Shatt al-Arab waterway.388 Iraq wanted 
that territory back eventually, and, with the Shah gone, all bets were off.  
The Iraqis had three pressing concerns with consequences of the Iranian Revolution. For 
one, the revolution had replaced the Shah’s rule and ushered in an Islamic theocracy. The 
overwhelming success of the revolution, in that it had removed an American puppet and had 
even taken over the American embassy, galvanized other Islamists.  Although the Baʿth Party 
had created nationalistic narratives coated with Islamic tenets to justify its rule, Iraqi leaders also 
feared that Islamists could create their own narratives to challenge the legitimacy of the state.389 
As Tariq Aziz, who had become Saddam’s Foreign Minister in 1983, argued, “all Islamist 
groups, with few exceptions, look at the regime in Iran as a power and an example to 
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follow…but once the Islamic state is established in Iran, this experience may repeat what 
happened to communism. When communism was established in the Soviet Union, communism 
around the world supported it and said, ‘In this case, communism is possible.’”390   Moreover, 
since the new theocratic regime was based in Shiʿism, the Sunni-dominated Iraqi Baʿth party was 
extremely worried. Iraq’s population consisted of majority Shiʿa, but the government was by in 
large controlled by Sunnis. The Baʿth Party had long targeted the Iraqi Shiʿa, pushing them to the 
margins of society. As COL Joel Rayburn argues, this disenfranchisement created a “fertile 
ground for a religious awakening,” and Shiʿa political groups, such as the Dawa Party and the 
Sadrists, began mobilizing against the Baʿth.391  Respected Iraqi Shiʿa called for Iraqi society to 
return to Islam and for the Iraqi government to transform into an Islamic government.  This was 
a clear threat to secular mentality of the  Baʿthist regime.  As Saddam argued, “By God, I do not 
like them, I do not like those who work politics under the guise of religion. My trust in them is 
not good.”392 
The Baʿth had long gone to great lengths to suppress  this religious resistance by 
arresting, exiling, torturing, and even executing Shiʿa political leaders in the 1960s-1970s.  The 
news and success of the Iranian Revolution galvanized the Iraqi Shiʿa community and inspired 
hopes that perhaps an Islamic revolution would also soon transpire in Iraq. Many notable Iraqi 
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Shiʿa, such as Muhammad Baqir Sadr, supported the new regime in Tehran, pledging support to 
Ayatollah Khomeini. In June 1979, fearing a Shiʿa revolt, the Baʿth arrested prominent Iraq 
Shiʿa, forced many to flee Iraq, banned the Islamic Dawa Party, and even executed Sadr by 
driving a spike into his head after he was forced to watch the rape of his sister by his Baʿthist 
captors.393 Despite the violent clampdown, the Baʿth party remained fearful that the Iraqi Shiʿa 
and Iranian Shiʿa would join forces to bring down the regime. 
Along with Shiʿism, the Iraqis feared cooperation between Syria and Iran, since both 
government apparatuses in Damascus and Tehran were dominated and controlled by Shiʿa 
elements.394 While Sunni populations dominated Syria, Assad’s regime, including the military 
and state security apparatuses, was formed from members of the Alawite sect of Shiʿism.395  
Religious connections were equally as important as geopolitical concerns, and both regimes 
sought  to create a front against Iraq.  Islamic fundamentalism, as espoused by the new regime in 
Tehran, was not welcomed in Damascus, especially in the light of Islamist-inspired rebellions in 
Syria between 1980 and 1982.396 No matter these ideological differences, as Iraqi Foreign 
Minister Tariq Aziz would argue when discussing the Islamist rebellions against Assad in Syria 
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in the early 1980s, “I mean Hafez Al-Assad is Khomeini's ally. The Alawi is the [Shiʿa’s] 
ally….”397 
The Iraqis also believed the new Iranian regime would work together with Israel, “the 
Zionists,” to undermine Iraq’s internal security as well as its interests in the region.  Saddam 
stated to his inner circle: “…the Iranians are satanic turbans, and they know how to conspire and 
know how to plan a sedition, and they know how to communicate with the world…it is Zionism 
that is guiding [the Iranians]. Zionism is taking the Iranians by hand and introducing them to 
each party one by one, channel by channel.”398 Taken together, the Iraqi Baʿthists believed that 
the new regime in Tehran and a Shiʿa ally in the region would forever alter the balance of power 
in the Middle East.  
Therefore, American assessments in the June 1979 NIE were incorrect in that the goal for 
Iraqi expansion was neither the spreading of Baʿthist socialist doctrine nor the repairing of the 
relationship with Syria to counter Iran.  Iraqi extension into Lebanon was indeed predicated on 
preventing the spread of a combination of Iranian and Syrian influence in the region.  In a 
recorded conversation in November 1979, Saddam and his advisers discussed Iranian diplomatic 
efforts and their influence in the Gulf.  One of Saddam’s advisers remarked that “it seems that 
Iran is discovering these points and believes Iraq is playing a role bigger than its size, the role of 
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policeman, the protector.”399  The adviser continued his description of the Iranian thrust into the 
region, noting that the goal of the Iranian deputy prime minister’s visit to Lebanon was not only 
to assure “Gulf States that there is no real threat from Iran” towards them but also to isolate and 
sabotage Iraqi diplomatic efforts in the region. Worse yet, Iranian and Western media, according 
to the advisor, had picked up on Iraq’s worries and “[on its attempts] to acquire a leading role” in 
the region. The advisor concluded by arguing that “we should be observant of all political 
activities that affect us whether they relate to the Palestinian problem, the Lebanon problem, the 
Gulf problems, and Iran’s objectives in the region.”400  
Iraqi intervention in Lebanon, therefore, rested on two major enemies: the Zionists 
(Israel) and the Persians.  It is interesting to note the emphasis within the BRCC documents on 
the choice of Persian, rather than Shiʿa, as the enemy. Ethnic tensions certainly mattered in the 
region, with Arab-Persian conflicts dating back well before Islam emerged in the Middle East.401  
Throughout his tenure, Saddam consistently referred to the Iranians as Persians and he often 
highlighted the historical struggles between the Arabs and the Persians, as well as the Arab 
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triumphs over the Persians.402 Documents related to Lebanon and the national mission rarely, if 
at all, mentioned Syria and Iran’s shared-Shiʿa connection. According to Ofra Bengio, “the 
[Baʿthist] regime had enacted a ‘conspiracy’ of silence around the issue of the [Shiʿa], lest they 
might have to share power with them.”403  In this regard, the Baʿthists considered the Syrian-
Iranian relationship as “elements of the Persian enemy.”404  
The civil war in Lebanon was a paradox for Iraq: it gave the Iraqi state another avenue in 
which to confront Syria and Hafez al-Assad; but the war also created a power vacuum and thus 
gave Syria and Iran an opportunity to influence events counter to Iraq’s ambitions. In this sense, 
the national mission was a race against the clock to prevent Syria, and later Iran with Syria, from 
taking hold in Lebanon.  U.S. officials in Baghdad noted that the Iraqis were frustrated over 
Syria’s increasing role in the conflict, but noted that “ [apart] from stepping up efforts to subvert 
the Syrian regime internally, which would have run the  risk of encouraging corresponding acts 
by Syrians in northern Iraq, it is difficult to see what the Iraqi regime could have done to reverse 
the course of events.405 
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The second enemy, the Israelis, offered a common and unifying enemy for all Muslims.  
Much like Syrian actions, Iraqi troop movements often mirrored Israeli action within Lebanon. 
As noted above, Iraqi special forces and volunteers were deployed to southern Lebanon to train 
and arm Lebanese and Palestinian groups in March 1978. Again, the deployment was short as 
Iraqi troops returned home by July 1978.  However, the “Zionist enemy” also gave the Baʿthists 
a scapegoat—if Iraq was fighting against the Israelis, then Baghdad could claim that Iraqi action 
was necessary. Often, Iraqi rhetoric took any  Syrian influence as evidence of a Zionist 
conspiracy. The real enemy for Saddam and Iraq was the “Persian enemy,” and, by attacking the 
Israelis, Iraq was striking a blow against Persians and “Zionist” machinations. Baghdad’s logic 
was that if Damascus was acting in ways conflicting with Iraqi policies, then the Syrians must be 
colluding with the Israelis. On top of that, by attacking the Israelis and therefore protecting 
Lebanon, Saddam proclaimed Iraq – with him as its embodiment –  as the true protector of the 
Palestinians and the Arab world.    
This framework also allowed Saddam to criticize not only Hafez al-Assad in Damascus 
and the ayatollahs in Tehran but also Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. Arafat was born in Cairo, 
and his father was a Palestinian refugee from Gaza.  Arafat founded Fatah, a political party 
advocating Palestinian nationalism, and he served as PLO Chairman until his death in 2004.406  
In the early 1970s, the Baʿthist regime began serving as a makeshift safe haven for PLO and 
Arab terrorists, including the infamous Abu Nidal and his organization, the Abu Nidal 
Organization (ANO), as well as elements of the Palestine Liberation Front (under Palestinian 
terrorist and later politician Abu Abbas), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and 
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the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.407 Using Iraq as a base, some of these 
groups  affiliated  with the PLO would carry out attacks against targets both within Lebanon and 
in Israel. 408  
Arafat and Saddam cultivated a relationship based on their mutual interest in liberating 
Palestine and on their shared hatred of Israel and the United States. The two met in April 1990, 
to discuss potential terrorist operations against the United States.  Saddam even suggested  that 
“we can send a lot of people to Washington just like the old days. For instance, the person with 
an explosive belt around him would throw himself on [President George H.W.] Bush’s car.” 
Saddam would also tell Arafat that “we did not forget Palestine and our Palestinian brothers. 
They call us the invaders while Israel occupies Palestine, rapes the Palestinian women, and kills 
the kids daily!” To this Arafat responded: “Together until victory.” 409  
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Arafat even supported Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, citing his 
opposition to the  coalition led by the Americans and calling for a settlement of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict before Iraqi troops withdrew from Kuwait.  Opinions vary about  why Arafat 
supported the Arab-on-Arab invasion, including his concern for the fate of over 400,000 
Palestinians who were living in Kuwait at the time of the invasion.  He was also frustrated with 
the Americans over negotiating a settlement. The move severely damaged Arafat’s legacy and 
credibility, both within the PLO and in the Arab world in general. 410 
 But in the context of Lebanon, Arafat was a competitor in this realm of leadership. In a 
discussion recorded in 1978, Saddam disparaged Arafat by claiming that he was “not a true 
representative of the Palestinian revolution; you can tell when he talks about the revolution that 
he is reluctant and not confident.”411 In reality, Saddam considered Arafat a threat, someone who 
challenged  Saddam’s claim to be protector of the Arab world.  The national mission in Lebanon, 
therefore, could expose Arafat as a charlatan and a traitor to the Palestinian and Arab cause. 
According to Saddam, Arafat “did not move a whisker and was not the least shaken” when 
Syrians massacred innocent Palestinian refugees in 1976. Saddam argued that these actions 
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“[show] the people the treason of Yasser Arafat….”412  Even then, as alleged by Saddam, Arafat, 
with “his evil brain,” had a plan “for people in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and everywhere 
else to execute attacks against us.”413  Arafat, argued Saddam, was thus engaging in a conspiracy 
against the Palestinians, Iraqis, and the Arab world.  It is ironic that Arafat was willing to stake, 
and arguably ruin, his reputation by supporting Saddam’s ill-conceived invasion of Kuwait while 
Saddam viewed Arafat as a competitor for the mantle of leadership in the Arab world.  
 
 Domestic Implications 
 Beyond geopolitical goals, the national mission also served as a way to enhance domestic 
control of the state.   Following a pattern often repeated, the Baʿthist regime used war as an 
excuse to purge rivals within the ranks of the party and among the military leadership.  Major 
General Walid Mahmud Sirat of 1st Corps, for example, was executed at the end of the 1970s.414 
Coinciding with the outbreak of hostilities in Lebanon, in the late 1970s, Iraq also underwent a 
change in command. President Hasan al-Bakr stepped down to make room for Saddam Hussein, 
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who was then his vice president.415 Saddam was always afraid of coups, especially originating 
from the military, and thus Saddam used the Lebanese crisis as yet another opportunity to 
terrorize his own party and the military leadership as a way  to protect his own power.  
 The Baʿthist party used the civil war in Lebanon as justification to enlarge the 
composition of the Popular Army, an entity which was created by the party in 1970  to protect 
the regime from countercoups and internal power struggles. Given the number of coups and 
countercoups between 1958 and 1968, with the Baʿth in and out of power, the Popular Army was 
created solely to protect the Baʿthists. In 1976, Saddam was given the rank of general by al-Bakr.  
At the same time, the Popular Army was doubled in size and control was given to Saddam’s 
protégé, Taha Yasin Ramadan al-Jazrawi.  According to historian Charles Tripp, this move 
“effectively [deterred] any other faction in the party from challenging Saddam Hussein’s own 
leadership.”416 
 Deemed the “army of the party” by the regular Iraqi military, the Popular Army was 
armed mainly with light weapons and deployed to major towns and cities to protect key 
infrastructure and government buildings.417  Controlled by the Baʿth party, the Popular Army ran 
parallel to the Iraqi Army and answered to Saddam and the Baʿth elites. As Aaron Faust argues, 
the Popular Army “acted as a rural security force, guarded the frontier, and stayed in and around 
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Baghdad to protect the Baʿthist leadership.”418 The Popular Army was quick to try to equate 
itself with other vital federal-level components of the Iraqi state—in one instance Popular Army 
Commander Taha Yasin Ramadan al-Jazrawi sent a report to nearly all ministries and security 
agencies to organize a celebration that “befits such an army on the national level” for the 16th 
anniversary of the Popular Army.419 However, this was not a polished and well organized force. 
Historians Joseph Sassoon and Aaron Faust have shown the lack of discipline that  plagued the 
Popular Army, especially in units in northern Iraq. Problems ranged from theft—so much so that 
the military camps were forced to move outside cities to lower the crime rate—to forged military 
cards and to soldiers taking advantage of black markets.420 
 The Baʿthists categorized Iraqis who joined the Popular Army to fight in Lebanon as 
“volunteers.” Whereas a volunteer force, especially in the United States, carries connotations of 
individual patriotism and a sense of civic duty, those who joined in the Popular Army had little 
choice in the matter.  Some Iraqis did indeed volunteer of their own accord, and such cases 
continued to arise  throughout the war.421 However, many of these “volunteers” did not join the 
Popular Army out of a sense of loyalty to country but rather out of a sense to save their own 
skins. Baʿthist party members were expected to carry out their duties in the Popular Army; those 
who did not risked losing their membership and faced expulsion. Since the Baʿth party was so 
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ingrained in Iraqi society—with membership in  it being tied  to eligibility for jobs, education, or 
other avenues to social mobility—expulsion from the party carried severe consequences.422 
Under the pretense of foreign intervention, the Iraqi regime used the chaos in Lebanon as means 
to control both the Popular Army and the Baʿthist party itself.   
True to the Baʿthist bureaucratic disposition, lists were compiled of those fighters who 
were dismissed from the party because of their failure to carry out the national mission in 
Lebanon.423 Everything from birth dates, recruiting departments, and dates of enlistment were 
collected. Examining one particular list offers great insight into Baʿthist motives and fears. 
Those on this list who were dismissed from the party were born between 1942 and 1958, putting  
them in the 18-34 year-old range; these men came  from all parts of Iraq, not just from urban 
centers. To be sure, these men were of fighting age, and as Joseph Sassoon argues, the regime 
“needed to co-opt large segments of the population to strengthen its power base.”424  However, 
for the Baʿthist regime and Saddam, these men posed the biggest risk in terms of internal 
security.  Many of Saddam’s decisions—whether they were  within the party or in the military—
were predicated on coup-proofing his regime.  Iraqi males 18-34 years old  in the 1970s would 
have been well aware of Iraq’s many coups between 1958 and 1968.425   
Therefore, by encouraging Baʿth party members and Iraqi citizens from all parts of the 
country to “volunteer” to serve in the Popular Army, Saddam fulfilled two aims: he enlarged the 
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ranks of the Popular Army—his own separate, but  parallel army—but he also found yet another 
way to coup-proof, and thus protect, both his party and the regime. Iraqi intervention in other 
countries, therefore, served as another way in which to check and maintain control over both the 
Iraqi state and Iraqi society.  As historian Joseph Sassoon argues, “the durability of the regime 
can be explained by the determination of the leadership to eradicate all opposition, whether 
military or civilian; its willingness to use violence and fear to control the population; its 
comprehensive system of rewards; its success in recruiting large numbers of supporters even 
though many were not fully active…and finally, Saddam Hussein’s own shrewdness and ability 
to outmaneuver his opponents and competitors….”426 
Fighters who did not “perform their national mission” in 1976 could volunteer for combat 
in Lebanon at a later date in hopes of regaining entry into the Baʿthist party—which many did.427 
One fighter wrote to party officials in 1989, conceding that he had been dismissed from the Baʿth  
Party in 1976 for his lack of good conduct.  He mentions his participation in the Popular Army 
from 1983 to the time when he was writing, claiming that he had fought in twelve battles, many 
of them against the “brutal Persian enemy.” To back this up, the fighter includes a list of awards 
he received for his service.  After six years of service, the fighter was asking for his release from 
the Popular Army now that “the war [is] over and Iraq won, led by the great leader Saddam.”428 
Again, the Baʿthists maintained lists of those who had not “[fought] against the Persian enemy in 
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1976” and who had therefore been expelled from the party but had redeemed themselves by 
fighting, as Baʿthists insisted, on the front lines at a later date.429 
Many of these volunteers sent to Lebanon had prior experience fighting in the region. 
Others had family or other connections in the country including various Lebanese, Jordanian, 
and Palestinian groups such as the Arab Liberation Front, Fatah, and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization.430  To assist these volunteers and to coordinate efforts in Lebanon, the Baʿthists, 
under the behest Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, created the Office of the Arab Liberation 
Front. According to Baʿthist documents, the aim was to assist and support Arab and Palestinian 
liberation movements, “especially for [the] political and military struggle to achieve their 
national rights, [and to] regain their occupied lands, build their desired state, and deepen the 
spirit, ideas, principles and policies of the Arab Baʿth Socialist Party and the revolution in 
Iraq.”431 
Bureaucracy and local connections helped the Iraqis develop intricate intelligence 
networks because the Iraqis seemed to have well-placed agents within the Arab Liberation Front, 
as well as agents within many Syrian jails.432  Baʿth Party records in the Hoover Archives 
include numerous lists of information on Iraqi-allied detainees in Lebanon or Syrian jails. These 
 
429 Untitled, dated 1987/3/2, BRCC, 0181, 078-2-7. Separated from Party, National mission in Lebanon, dated 
1986/12/25, BRCC, 0111, 078-2-7, HB, HIA. Circulation, 1981/11/10, BRCC 0181, 078-2-7, HB, HIA. 
430 The Arab Liberation Front, for example, was small faction within the Palestinian Liberation Organization, 
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432 In one instance, an Iraqi operative was transferred from Iraqi intelligence to the Arab Liberation Front as a “part-
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include the names of Syrian, Jordanian, Palestinian, and even Yemeni fighters along with their 
places of arrest, dates and length of imprisonment, political affiliations, and notes about the 
torture inflicted upon them by their captors. One example is a series of reports on Yemeni 
detainees. After their capture by Syrian-backed troops, many of these unfortunate Yemeni 
fighters were subjected to unspeakable torture.  One Yemeni’s “hand was shot from the fingers 
to the elbow so that the muscles and bones appeared.”433  Even female detainees were tortured.  
One woman was reported as “bleeding from the uterus from being beaten by metal whips on her 
womb,” while another detainee, likely suffering from poor medical treatment, was recorded with 
a blood sugar level above 400, resulting in her fainting. Another detainee suffered “beating from 
metal whips and electrical torture.”434 
 These lists themselves reflect the bureaucratic temperament of the Baʿthist regime. 
Regional offices had to routinely request permission from Baghdad to process fighters and 
Baʿthist members leaving or returning home—these requests were then relayed through 
numerous channels for debates and red tape wrangling.435 Navigating the red tape often meant 
getting the approval of the President’s Office—Saddam Hussein’s office, that is.  Saddam 
meddled in the smallest affairs.  Even field reports had to be cleared by him before they could be 
distributed to the appropriate offices in Iraq and in Lebanon. Historians can often find Saddam’s 
initials, signature, and comments within the margins of even the minor documents.436 
 
433 List of detainees, dated 1989/3/21(?), BRCC, 0155-0160, 026-5-5, HB, HIA. 
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List of detainees, dated 1989/3/21 (?), BRCC, 0168, 026-5-5, HB, HIA. 
435 Basra Branch proposal, 1988/11/5, BRCC 0048, 078-2-7, HB, HIA. 
436 Report, 1989/12/17, BRCC, 0014, 025-3-3, HB, HIA. See Faust, The Baʿthification of Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s 
Totalitarianism, 73-80. The bureaucracy of the Baʿthist state only expanded after the First Gulf War. See 
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Red tape could displace human suffering quite easily.  In the middle of reporting on the 
torture of Yemeni detainees, one memorandum was sent back and forth between two separate 
Baʿth  Party offices in Lebanon. In the exchange, the former “branch office of the unit” and the 
new “Lebanese affairs office” discussed the transfer of office furniture “without allowance after 
obtaining the approval of party affairs.” 437 After the matter  was settled, the report resumed  
discussing the torture of Yemeni detainees.  It appears that bureaucracy persisted throughout the 
Baʿthist regime, both in domestic and foreign offices.  
 
 The Lebanese Civil War in the 1980s 
 By the early 1980s, the Israelis were fed up with the constant attacks, raids, and shelling 
coming from Palestinians within Lebanon. Especially sparked by Defense Minister and future 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s right-wing cabinet 
decided, in the words of historian Kenneth Pollack, to “solve the Lebanese problem.” 438  On 6 
June 1982, the Israelis launched an invasion of southern Lebanon. This invasion arguably 
became Israeli’s most controversial war.  Clear goals were to destroy PLO elements in Lebanon, 
force the withdrawal of Syrian troops, and secure the Maronite faction’s predominance in 
Lebanon.  But the Begin government also viewed this war as an opportunity to isolate the PLO in 
the West Bank, thereby further justifying Israeli annexation of the territory. However, the Israeli 
effort was disrupted by civilian massacres at Sabra and Shatila—where over 1,000 Palestinian 
men, women, and children refugees were slaughtered by the Phalange, an Israeli-backed 
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Christian militia, while Israel Defense Forces (IDF) forces stood by.  The massacres drew 
domestic and international condemnation, prompting the Israelis to withdraw and pressuring 
Ariel Sharon to resign; Begin resigned shortly after as well.439 
The Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in June 1982 coincided with the recovery of 
nearly all territory lost by the Iranians early in  the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).   By April-May 
1982, the Iranians turned the tide of the war, advancing into and liberating Khorramshahr (an 
Iranian city just southeast of Basra that  had been captured by the Iraqis in November 1980 after 
a violent and bloody siege).  The Iranians in Khorramshahr forced the Iraqis to retreat across the 
border by the end of May 1982. 440 As if worrying about the Iranians in Khorramshahr was not 
enough for the Iraqis, they also had to contend with the fact that the June 1982 Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon had disrupted access to oil in the region. Since 1976, the beginning of the national 
mission, the Iraqis had ceased pumping oil from Kirkuk through Lebanon’s port at Tripoli.  The 
timing of this Israeli invasion in 1982 could not have been worse for the Iraqis, since oil-
pumping activities had only resumed in late December 1981.441  Yet another paradox emerged —
stress came with  opportunity. What the Israelis did was almost a gift to the Iraqis, and Saddam 
took this invasion as another chance to claim that he was the defender of the Arab world. Iraq 
 
439 Israeli strikes on Syrian air defenses and positions prompted Assad to run straight to Moscow for assistance. He 
literally secreted himself out of Syria and went straight to Moscow. This drove Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to 
contact U.S President Ronald Reagan, who then in turn sent a special peacemaking mission under U.S. special 
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not have been able to influence or control. Hiro, Lebanon: Fire and Embers: a History of the Lebanese Civil War, 
386-389.  
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War. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2015). 
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proposed a ceasefire with Iran and withdrawal to the internationally recognized border between 
Iraq and Iran if Iran agreed to end all military activities. Saddam even suggested that he was 
willing to withdraw Iraqi troops so they could be transferred to southern Lebanon as means to 
assist in the fight against the Israelis.   
Saddam’s claim to protect the Palestinians and Arabs from the “Zionist” invasion, 
however,  according to Pesach Malovany, was “no more than lip service directed at the 
Palestinian public opinion, since apart from the denunciations of [the invasion], the Iraqi 
leadership did nothing to aid the Palestinians.”442  Little aid, even symbolically, was sent to 
Lebanon largely because the Iraqi military was still reeling from its defeat at Khorramshahr—
this arguably was the real reason for Saddam’s offer to cease hostilities.  Iran rejected the 
ceasefire. 443 This symbolic aid continued even until 1988 when Baʿthist government officials 
argued that “we have not yet determined to employ all the fighting capabilities that we possess 
because of this mainly due to the general security situation surrounding the Baʿthists 
movement….  The areas surrounding the enemy's security belt inside the Lebanese territory are 
under the control of the three parties hostile to the party. The Syrian regime is called the eastern 
sector. The Amal Movement in particular and Hezbollah are located in the middle and central 
sectors.”444  
 
442 Malovany, Wars of Modern Babylon: a History of the Iraqi Army from 1921 to 2003, 231. 
443 Malovany also argues this urge to assist Lebanon was more in response to Iranian parliament head Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani’s declaration that he wanted to send troops to Lebanon; the Iranians did send a small number of 
troops to Lebanon. See footnote 15. Malovany, Wars of Modern Babylon: a History of the Iraqi Army from 1921 to 
2003, 196-197. 
444 Report on Lebanese Country Organization, dated 1988/5/2, BRCC, 0035-0036, 3358-0000, HB, HIA. The full 
report goes from 0030-0043.  
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 An examination of the national mission permits historians to consider the regional impact  
of the Iran-Iraq War—arguably, Saddam may even have seen opportunities in a possible two-
front war— it also continues to show the domestic implications of this intervention.  It cannot be 
said with certainty just how many were transferred in total, but the documents within the Hizb al-
Baʿth al-Arabi al’Ishtiraki records show that there were troop transfers between the Lebanese 
and Iranian fronts.445 The Israeli invasion provided yet another opportunity for Saddam to test 
Baʿth Party and Popular Army members. Misbehavior or poor performance could have resulted 
in an increased risk of being transferred, or actual transfer, to the Iranian front, where the 
chances of injury or death increased exponentially.  Fighters who were specifically cited for 
“failing to perform their mission” often faced this punishment; in an assessment of personnel 
after their transfers had gone into effect, the Baʿthists even argued that these troops had 
“benefited from the educational lesson and the great opportunity that had been given to them.”446  
 The civil war in Lebanon ended with the signing of the Taif Agreement in 1989; the 
agreement saw the withdrawal of Syrian forces and Israel’s abandonment of the land it held in 
southern Lebanon.  The agreement also reduced the power of the Maronite president in favor of 
the Muslim prime minister while altering the previous 6:5 ratio to 6:9 (three of the nine were 
allocated to the Shiʿa community). Syria was given a virtual fiefdom over Lebanon as the 
agreement acknowledged the “special relationship” between the two countries, going as far as 
using Syrian troops to implement the details outlined in the agreement. This arrangement , 
however, did not end all fighting.  General Michel Aoun, a Maronite, rejected the agreement 
about a new government in favor of rebellion. His forces were defeated in October 1990;  Aoun 
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fled  to France, and over 1,000 lives were lost.  Aoun’s blatant disregard for life, including those 
of his fellow Maronites, managed to unite a majority of Lebanon against him.447 
 The ending of the Iraq-Iran War in August 1988 allowed Saddam to seek revenge against 
Assad for having supported the Iranians. Iraqi media broadcast Saddam’s statements supporting 
Aoun in which Saddam declared that “Assad was implementing an evil conspiracy in Lebanon 
that is aimed at dividing up the Arab world and sowing discord among its people.”448 Despite not 
deploying troops in response to Aoun’s rebellion, the Iraqis did conduct “massive weapons 
transfers to Lebanon's Christian forces” in order to, as the national security adviser to Vice 
President Dick Cheney argued, “[buttress] the ill-considered belligerency of General Aoun.”  
These weapons were ultimately supplied by the Soviets, who themselves were arming Syria.449  
Nonetheless, Iraq feared oversupplying Lebanese governmental forces and so began supplying 
Aoun’s factions as well, hoping to draw  Assad further into the conflict. 450  
 In June 1989, the Syrians discovered that Iraq was sending Aoun Soviet-made Frog-7 
surface-to-surface missiles aboard freighters and that they were to be delivered through the 
Jordanian port of Aqaba. After gaining little help from the Egyptians, Jordanians, and 
Americans, the Syrians declared that they would sink the freighter, prompting the Soviets to 
intervene. Vice President Dick Cheney’s National Security Adviser, John Hannah, ironically 
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pointed out that “the carnage in Beirut is being carried out almost entirely on behalf of parties 
that are, in one form or another, allied with and armed by the Soviet Union.”451   The Iraqis were 
closely monitoring the Syrian-Soviet relationship as well, with a June 1989 political report 
arguing that “relations with Moscow are no longer the same as [they were] in the past.”452 This 
was  attributed partly to Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev’s new policies regarding the Third 
World, but the report’s authors also suggested that Moscow was frustrated with the conduct of 
Damascus  in Lebanon.  In addition,  Assad refused to make amends with Arafat.453  The report 
also noted that the Syrians were not happy that the Iraqis were meddling in Lebanon once 
again.454 No matter the Soviet dilemma, the Americans in Baghdad also reacted by asking the 
Iraqis to reconsider sending the freighter, suggesting that any potential attack could draw Israel 
into the conflict and thereby risk engulfing the region in war. By July, facing Soviet and 
American pressure, Saddam announced that he was recalling the freighter.455   
 However, the United Nations imposed sanctions on the Iraqi regime on 6 August 1990 as 
punishment for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.456 As a result, Iraqi aid to Aoun was 
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severely curtailed. The Lebanese government was also left reeling from the loss of both Kuwait 
and Iraq, two of its most important trading partners.457  Despite being preoccupied with events in 
Kuwait, Saddam was disappointed to learn of Aoun’s surrender in October 1990 as he had 
enjoyed watching Syria struggle to contain Aoun and his Christian forces.458 As for Syria, in 
what can be attributed to revenge and the continuing legacy of this bitter relationship, Assad sent 
his troops to join the coalition effort against Iraq in the First Gulf War.459  
 The legacy of the national mission illustrates some important themes. Similar to what 
American society faced following the Vietnam War, Iraq faced a serious domestic consequence 
from its  long-term foreign intervention: There was a rising number of veterans who were 
counting on state support following their military service. In one instance, an Iraqi citizen wrote 
to his local Baʿth office pleading for relief from his debts, which were increasing as his family 
grew.   The veteran cites his withdrawal from school to travel to Lebanon to “to perform the 
national mission” between 1978 and 1979.  He returned to Lebanon in 1982 to work with 
Palestinian students and the PLO, and he cited the  credentials given to him by the PLO. Even 
though he was  grateful for all the benefits and privileges he had received as compensation for 
his participation in the national mission, and despite his earning 120 Iraqi dinars from his army 
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pension, the veteran argued that this was not enough for him and his family.460 He, therefore, 
suggested that the Baʿth Party “consider a truly legitimate civil service [for] a radical solution to 
the needs of the living or the poor.”461  
 As Israeli strikes were carried out against Hezbollah targets in Lebanon in 1996, Saddam 
issued a quintessential anti-Zionist diatribe.  He said of Israel:  “[for] nearly ten days, it has been 
waging a war of genocide against Lebanon…[cultivating] terrorism….[using] targeted killing, 
destruction, displacement, and striking all aspects of life from electricity, water, roads, 
transportation, homes, and plantations.”462 The flight of the Palestinians was also stressed: “Once 
again, the Zionist entity is committing an aggression that kills, destroys and displaces a whole 
people, as it did before against the people of Palestine.”463  Restating conspiracy theories, he 
claimed that “the renewed aggression on Lebanon is one of a series of plans that targeted our 
Arab nation, the most comprehensive of which was the aggression of the Zionist-Atlantic 
aggression on Iraq, which aimed to extinguish the candle and flame of the high light in our Arab 
nation.”464  Again, themes of Iraq as the center, promoter, and protector of the Arab nation 
against the “Zionists” remained the same.  However, Saddam did not offer any concrete promises 
of materiel or deployment of Iraqi soldiers.  Only symbolic aid was promised, “[our] people in 
Lebanon, to you from the Arab Baʿth Socialist Party, with its leadership and its support, all the 
work to mobilize the energies of the masses until the aggression stops.”465  
 
460 120 Iraqi dinars was around $386 USD in 1986. 
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 Saddam Hussein’s hatred of Assad continued. In literature produced and distributed by the 
Baʿth  Party after the First Gulf War (1991), Saddam charged that, because of its “special 
influence on its neighbors,” Syria had been exploiting  what he called “the system,” the 
Palestinians, and the Arab world. Using “effective political and media centers” while increasing 
its control over PLO activity, Syria was also gaining influence in Jordan, thus extending Syria’s 
“Arab military front.”  The Palestinians,  according to the Baʿthists, recognized that “Syria is the 
bottleneck that controls the Palestinian armed action,” especially after the PLO’s expulsion from 
Jordan in 1971.466  Yet there was nothing the Palestinians could do about  this Syrian 
guardianship. The same piece of literature alleged that the Palestinians chose to remain silent on 
this issue, somewhat content with Syrian control and interference in their own local affairs. This 
was despite being “stabbed in the back by the Syrians” over and over again.467  The Iraqis 
remained somewhat sympathetic toward  the Palestinians, alleging that the Palestinians had 
limited options; the Baʿth Party said of the Palestinians, “whenever they are stabbed…they have 
no choice but to act as if swallowing the knife.”468 
The Iraqis continued to attack Syria abroad as well. In one instance, an Iraqi delegation 
was sent to Geneva, Switzerland for a conference organized by Syrian opposition elements to be 
held between 21 and 23 March 1989.  According to the Iraqi delegation’s report,  some 250 
participants “representing human rights organizations and representatives of Arab and 
international parties and organizations” attended the conference, in which Palestinians, 
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Lebanese, and Syrians formerly held as prisoners detailed their torture and “repression” during 
their imprisonment under the Assad regime. 469  The conference, according to Baʿth Party 
documents, was a “global trial of the Syrian regime and the brutal brutality,” and it published the 
details of Syria’s “terrorism” and acts of “genocide, executions, political assassinations, physical 
assassinations, hostage-taking, arbitrary detention and the most brutal practices. The types of 
torture are brutal against the detainees psychologically and physically.” 470  The Iraqi delegation 
was happy to report that the conference participants discussed the “Iraqi victory” against Syria, 
praising Iraqi leadership within the Arab world.  Reports about the conference that were 
circulated in the Baʿth  Party again touched on themes of the national mission: “Lebanon did not 
suffer alone from Syrian [actions], but rather Lebanon’s struggle was indicative of the entire 
Arab struggle and Palestinian crisis.” 471 
 The differences between Iraq’s geopolitical ambitions and its accomplishments remained. 
The Israeli, Syrian, and Iranian regimes remained intact, and they were very much a part of 
Lebanese politics; now Syria arguably even had “guardianship” of Lebanon as part of the Taif 
Agreement.472 Yasser Arafat survived, both personally and politically, as well. The only thing 
remaining for Saddam to claim, therefore, was his defense and supposed leadership of the Arab 
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nation and Arab world.  Yet this, too, was grossly exaggerated and had run its course within the 
Arab world.  Ironically, at the 1989 Arab People's Congress, Libya, a one-time supporter of 
Iraq’s national mission, blamed Iraq for the destruction and devastation in Lebanon, arguing that 
“the Iraqi regime has strengthened its supply of weapons to the strong, which helps in the further 
killing and destruction of Lebanon and its people, and the blood of all factions of the Arab 
Liberation Movement, which is fighting for freedom, democracy, and human rights in different 
parts of the Arab world.”473  
 
 The 1990’s 
Saddam’s actions in Kuwait between August 1990 and February 1991 certainly did not 
help his claims to be the leader of the Arab world.  Contending that Kuwait was Iraq’s 
(allegedly) stolen 19th province, Saddam invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. In reality, Saddam 
wanted to control Kuwaiti oil fields, to expand Iraq’s shoreline in the Persian Gulf, and to find a 
quick solution to Iraq’s deteriorating financial situation. Invading Kuwait, therefore, was meant 
to provide Iraq immediate economic relief. But it also allowed Saddam to rally his people around 
the flag. In the aftermath of the war with Iran, Saddam feared losing face, both at home and 
abroad. These fears were well grounded. Arab leaders had rejected his pleas for economic 
assistance, and  he feared looking weak within his own party and before the Iraqi military.474  
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Kuwait quickly fell to Iraq, as was to be expected.  Kuwait’s armed force was small, and  its 
leaders were caught completely off-guard by the Iraqi invasion.475 
By 5 August 1990, Iraqi units, including the Republican Guard, began withdrawing from 
Kuwait, leaving the Popular Army to maintain control in Kuwait.  It had been disbanded between 
1988 and 1989 after operations concluded in Iran and Lebanon. However, after Iraq seized 
Kuwait, the Popular Army was quickly reconstituted as means to help secure Iraq’s new 
territory.476  Volunteers were sought out, both at home and abroad. Some recruits from Jordan 
and Palestine joined; the Iraqi embassy in Amman, Jordan even sought permission to accept the 
volunteers arriving at their doorstep.  Some of these volunteers just as they were given orders 
just as before, but this time  to Kuwait, both to assist in combat and to “lead volunteers after 
training.”477  When units of the Popular Army returned to Baghdad in October 1990, they gave a 
parade of more than a million fighters, including volunteers from Palestine, Egypt, Sudan, 
Jordan, and even a contingent of Syrians.478 
Even the general improvement in the quality of volunteers along with needed 
organizational changes was not enough to improve the performance of the Popular Army, 
however.  In the occupation of Kuwait, it helped to loot and pillage the country; but as had been 
the case in its experiences in the national mission in Lebanon, the Popular Army was more show 
than force. It was quickly withdrawn from the country when U.S.-led coalition forces began their 
counter-invasion to liberate Kuwait in late February 1991.  Iraqi Army leaders and officials, as 
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they had prior to the invasion of Kuwait, scorned the claims of productivity and even the 
existence of this parallel force. The Popular Army’s fate was sealed after performing dismally in 
the Iraqi Intifada of 1991—in the wake of Saddam’s defeat in Kuwait, the Shiʿa population in 
southern Iraq rose up against the regime.  The Popular Army failed to crush the rebellion in its 
early stages and proved itself completely ineffective. The Ministry of Defense was then given 
control over all the Popular Army’s assets and infrastructure.479  
But the idea of an alternative, parallel armed force did not die. Neither did Saddam’s fear 
of coups and conspiracies against him—General al-Hamdani told prominent specialist in the 
history of Iraq  Joseph Sassoon that “the fear of internal conspiracies eclipsed everything after 
1991, and that Saddam Hussein became obsessed with the possibility of a coup d’état or another 
intifada to an extent that made life unbearable for professional soldiers in their daily jobs.”480 
Saddam disbanded the Popular Army in 1991, establishing in its place  the Jerusalem (al-Quds) 
Army in early 2001. This came in response to the second Palestinian intifada in September 
2000.481  Much of this was merely a name change—the “volunteers” were encouraged to help 
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“liberate” Jerusalem, with Saddam even calling for people to enlist in jihad against the “Zionist 
entity” in Jerusalem.482 Iraqi propaganda alleged that over “seven million Iraqi volunteers 
answered the call.” There were massive parades held in Baghdad to celebrate this force, while 
propaganda pieces circulated the country, some portraying Saddam as the heir to Islamic heroes 
Caliph ‘Umar and Salah al-Din.483  
It remains unclear whether Saddam really intended to deploy this force to Israel—there is 
some evidence to suggest that Iraqis began coordinating with Hamas, which focused either on 
Palestinian liberation or else  on terrorism, depending on who was asked.   This group was based 
in Gaza, and there was even talk of possible Iraqi transfer of UAVs to Hamas, a Palestinian 
militant group. However, the force was rife with misconduct, and Iraqi military leadership 
continued to resent this parallel but uncoordinated force.484 It was  despised by military leaders.   
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After the 2003 U.S.  invasion under Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the Iraqi Minister of Defense, 
Sultan Hashim Ahmed, stated: “The Quds [Jerusalem] force was a headache, they had no 
equipment for a serious war and their creation was a bad idea…but the Army had no control of 
them. Their instructions came from only the President’s office and not from normal military 
channels.”485 In reality, the al-Quds force diverted “the public’s attention from the regime’s 
internal difficulties and the pressure being exerted on it by the Coalition to a mission that was 
universally acceptable: aiding the Palestinians in their military efforts against Israel.”486 This 
transition from the Popular Army to the al-Quds Army also demonstrates both Saddam’s 
continued desire to create and deploy parallel forces abroad as priorities and missions changed as 
well as his need for a force parallel to the regular Iraqi Army.  
 In the spring of 2001, a request was filed from the President’s Office for information on a 
particular comrade of the Muthanna Branch. Why this information was requested is unknown—
the document itself, to the historian’s frustration, has been physically cut in half—but the 
information present is that the comrade participated in action in Lebanon and that he assisted in 
capturing fugitives and defectors. His willingness to die for Iraq was also specifically 
mentioned.487  Why Saddam wanted this information is unknown. It is possible this comrade 
maintained, saved, or re-earned his Baʿth Party membership by fighting in Lebanon. Perhaps he 
even earned Saddam’s esteem through these actions. This foray may have been considered 
inconsequential to many then, and even today, but as this document suggests, the national 
mission was still on Saddam Hussein’s mind in 2001. 
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 Iraq was ultimately able neither to shift the power dynamic nor  to secure any lasting 
influence in Lebanon.  The military deployments were short and ineffective, the Palestinian 
people were still left stateless, and the attempts to substantially weaken the Syrian regime proved 
fruitless. Iraqi claims to  the mantle of leadership in the Arab world were all but destroyed when 
Saddam decided to invade Kuwait in August 1990.  However, at home, the Iraqi national mission 
allowed the Baʿthists to expand their control within the party and over the Popular Army.  Party 
members who failed to volunteer or who failed to perform well at the battlefront risked losing 
their party membership, a loss that could severely damage their positions and chances of social 
mobility within Iraqi society.  Ever fearful of a potential coup d’état, Saddam used the 
intervention to further justify his culling of the Iraqi armed forces, removing any suspect  officers 
or party members who posed a potential threat to his reign.  If anything, further regime security 
was the only tangible success from this Iraqi intervention in Lebanon.  
.   
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Chapter 4 - Iraqi Foreign Policy in East Africa 
During the Cold War, Iraq crushed several Kurdish rebellions, intervened in Lebanon, 
competed with Syria, and waged war against Iran.  However, as this chapter will illustrate, Iraq’s 
foreign policy interests in the Cold War era extended beyond the Persian Gulf and the Middle 
East.  For that matter, these interests continued well into the 1990s even after the Iraqi defeat in 
Kuwait and the implementation of U.N. sanctions against the Baʿthist regime. One such area in 
which the Iraqis were involved was the Horn of Africa. Specifically, Baghdad was interested in 
the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict, a war that engulfed the region and drew Sudan, Djibouti, 
Somalia, and Libya in as well.   
Iraqi political and diplomatic operations in East Africa were complicated and spread 
throughout the region. Iraq used organizations housed in its embassies in the Horn to conduct 
political and intelligence operations in attempts to gain more influence; the Baʿth Party viewed 
local student and liberation groups as critical for these operations. And even though the Iraqis 
remained active and interested in East Africa into the 1990s, Iraqi documents do not suggest that 
many of these operations were successful. In many cases, Iraq was bogged down by factionalism 
and incompetence; these were either a product of Iraq’s meddling or of events beyond Baghdad’s 
control. 
For one, Iraq had geopolitical interests in the Horn of Africa. Iraq ultimately wanted to 
secure political alliances in hopes of obtaining better access to the region.  Iraq also desired 
friendly relations with states along the Red Sea. Reliable access to the Red Sea, and the Bab el 
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Mandeb straits, would have granted Iraq more security over its oil shipments in the region.488  On 
the other hand, the Baʿthists saw this region as one in which they were monitoring the activities 
of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the Cold War superpowers. Despite their client status, the Iraqis 
resented that the Soviets were pushing socialism in the Third World. The Iraqis had long resisted 
Soviet pressure and support for communist elements within Iraq, which had led to increased 
tension and resentment between Moscow and Baghdad.  But Baghdad also resented Soviet 
intentions to support and bolster socialist regimes in the Horn of Africa, convinced that the 
Soviets were trying to implement Marxist-Leninist regimes as means to expand their domination 
in this region.  Soviet maneuvers in South Yemen and Oman also heightened Baghdad’s fears.489  
In this sense, Iraqi leaders feared that the Soviets were angling to encircle and control both the 
Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa.490   
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However, not all Iraqi action in East Africa was driven by this anti-Soviet agenda. Iraq 
was interested to see what other global players, including the Americans and the Chinese, were 
doing in the Horn. The Baʿth also monitored other regional players such as Libya, Somalia, 
Sudan, and more. In the mid-1970s, Iraq began attempting to assume the mantle of leadership in 
the Arab world, and so the Baʿthists were concerned as to what other Arab states, such as Saudi 
Arabia, were doing in the region.  Iraqi activities in the Horn of Africa illustrate how pan-
Arabism and, to a lesser extent, non-alignment played important roles in the formulation of 
Iraq’s foreign policy. In the Horn of Africa, Baghdad sought to expand its influence in areas that 
it saw as ripe for exploitation and for its benefit—both geopolitical and ideological.  
 
 Iraq, Ethiopia, and Eritrea 
For most of their history, Ethiopia and Iraq had little connection, and their histories 
developed apart from one another until the middle of the 20th century.  Even then, it was not 
matters intrinsic to Ethiopia that were of special interest to Iraq. Ethiopia regained its 
independence in 1947 after the removal of Italian forces that had been present since they invaded 
in 1935.  From the late 1940s on, the Ethiopian monarchy faced two major separatist movements. 
One movement was centered in Ogaden, the Somali-dominated province of Ethiopia, which 
campaigned against Ethiopia for independence in two separate wars—the first in 1963-1964 and 
the second in 1977-1978.  In the first war, some ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia formed guerrilla 
groups, which were supported by the government of neighboring Somalia.  These rebel forces 
attacked Ethiopian military and police garrisons with initial success, only to be pushed back to 
the border. Although there was little international recognition for Somalia’s claims to Ogaden, 
heavily mechanized Somali forces drove deep into the region  in 1977, aided by the Somali 
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Liberation Front, a guerilla entity based in the contested area. However, the Americans did not 
come to the aid of Ethiopia in this new war because they had cut aid to  Ethiopia after Emperor 
Haile  Selassie was overthrown in 1974 by a communist-led military coup d’état, under a 
military committee known as the Derg. Instead, the Ethiopians were aided and backed by Soviet 
advisors, weapons, and air power, driving the Somalis out in  “blitzkrieg-style” operations.491   
The second independence movement pitted Ethiopia against the Eritreans in a problem 
that was deeply rooted.  To strengthen its control over East Africa, Italy had created new 
colonies by consolidating numerous kingdoms and sultanates in the late 1800s. Italian 
Somaliland was established 1888 with Italian Eritrea following suit in 1890. After the Italians 
were defeated in World War II, the British assumed control over Eritrea until 1952, when the 
United Nations granted Eritrea federal status within Ethiopia. However, Eritrea was formally 
annexed by Ethiopia in 1962, triggering a long and protracted war between them that pitted 
Eritrean resistance fighters against Ethiopian forces.  The conflict drew international forces into 
the region as well.  
Like other global liberation groups, the Eritrean resistance movement was a complex 
network of fighters, tactics, and ideals. However, like other global liberation groups, the Eritrean 
resistance movement was recurrently plagued by factionalism. Founded in 1960, the Eritrean 
Liberation Front (ELF) fell into infighting in 1970 and split in 1977, when the Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front (ELPF) emerged.492 The EPLF would grow and gain traction in the region, 
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consolidating into one of the larger and more dominant fighting groups in Eritrea; its 
combination of guerilla tactics and  conventional warfare made it a nightmare for Ethiopia for 
decades.  Inspired by the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria, as historian Richard J. 
Reid has observed, the EPLF “[extolled] the virtues of ‘self-reliance’ (much of its weaponry, 
including automatic rifles and artillery, was captured from the Ethiopians), advocated pragmatic 
Marxism and sought to mobilize rural communities in the name of ‘social revolution.’”493   
The Iraqi regime was involved in some way or another in the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict 
from 1970s through into the 1990s for several reasons.  First, the Iraqis viewed this region as 
another area of geopolitical maneuvering in which the Iraqis could operate free from alliances or 
other  prior entanglements.  In a 1979 conversation with other diplomats about why Iraq was 
interested in Eritrea, Iraqi diplomats explained that “because of the location… we have the right 
to be interested in this issue.”494 The Iraqis wanted to be part of Scramble for Africa, redux and 
to ensure that they had sway in a region they saw as geopolitically viable and crucial—the Horn 
of Africa served as the gateway into the Red Sea and Suez Canal. In August 1977, then Minister 
of Information Tariq Aziz (he would later become the Foreign Minister) declared that the Red 
Sea was an “Arab lake,” and therefore must remain as such.495 Whereas the American 
government did not see the Horn of Africa as part of its Near East policy, the Iraqi government 
viewed the Horn as an integral part of both the Arab struggle and Arab geopolitical interests.496   
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Second, the Iraqis wanted to bolster their own credibility among countries in the region 
by assisting Arabs in their fight against their oppressors. In a meeting with his advisors, Saddam 
argued: “Eritrea is a people who claim to be Arab... who struggle for particular rights.” Iraq 
claimed to support Eritrea on whatever path it decided to take. Saddam continued: “We do not 
instruct them on what they want and it is not our right to advise them on their choices, rather we 
support them in what they choose. If they choose integration or unity, we will not be against that. 
If they choose autonomy, we will not stand against it. Anything else, as long as they carry 
weapons, we will be with them. We will provide them with weapons, money, and support.”497   
Iraq’s desire to lead the Arab world was galvanized when Egypt signed the Camp David 
Accords with Israel in 1978. In retaliation for what was perceived as  betrayal of the united Arab 
front against Israel, Egypt was subsequently isolated both diplomatically and politically from the 
Arab world.  Iraq saw an opportunity to take advantage of Cairo’s isolation by “playing on the 
refusal of most moderate Arabs to support the U.S. peace process and on their doubts about U.S. 
reliability.” With turmoil in neighboring Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, Iraq sought to take 
advantage of this power vacuum to “organize the Persian Gulf under Iraqi leadership, establish 
Baghdad as the new pole for Arab politics, and create a nonaligned image.”498 
In the light of Egypt’s signing of the Camp David Accords, Saddam Hussein proposed a 
Pan-Arab Charter in April 1980, calling for the prohibition of all foreign military bases and 
facilities within Arab territories. Saddam also called for a boycott of Arab nations that refused to 
follow the Charter’s terms.  The Iraqis hoped  that their proposal would slow Soviet inroads 
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within Syria and South Yemen and, at the same time, stall American negotiations in Oman and 
Somalia.  After securing support from twelve Arab states and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization, the Iraqis also sought to bring  Sudan and Somalia under the Charter as well.  
Although the C.I.A. believed the Charter would not be sufficient to “[reverse] a superpower’s 
presence already in being,” they also argued that the  Charter should neither be ignored nor 
underestimated, citing it  as an example of Iraq “molding a formal consensus.”  Further, the 
C.I.A. warned that the “uncertainties generated by events in Iran and Afghanistan have so far 
pushed most area governments to seek protection in Arab unity, rather than to seek external 
alliances. The charter is consistent with that trend.” 499 The Iraqis were again using Arab unity, at 
least in their rhetoric, to shore up support for them as the leader of the Arab world and to secure 
their geopolitical interests in the region.500  
The Iraqis also saw and resented the hypocrisy of other Arabs with regard to Eritrea. 
Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Algeria, and others were depicted as “reactionary countries” which  
“did not want the Eritrean revolution to succeed.” According to Saddam’s cabinet, by attempting 
to assert their power, these countries had corrupted the Eritrean revolution. These Arab states 
meddled and conspired against Iraq’s intentions, poisoning the Eritrean mindset towards Iraq, so 
that “[Eritrea] will not adopt [Iraq’s] advice….” This, in the mind of Saddam, put them in league 
with the Americans.501 The Baʿthists also wanted to be the leader for negotiations between 
Ethiopia and the Eritrean factions and therefore viewed opposing Arab actions as a threat to this 
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desired  role. Iraqi diplomats alleged that Mengistu’s former secretary had informed them that 
the Ethiopian regime would “accept Iraq, and only Iraq, as mediator at the beginning of the 
situation in general, although there were no previous diplomatic relations between U.S.”502  
 
 Iraq and the Superpowers  
Iraq’s interest in the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict meant that Baghdad was attentive to the 
actions of the Soviet Union and the United States in East Africa. The Horn of Africa was another 
region in the Third World in which the Soviets and the Americans attempted to outmaneuver, 
out-influence, and out-dominate one another.  The Horn’s proximity to the Red Sea, the Arabian 
Peninsula, and the Persian Gulf meant that neither superpower could neglect it. Both had been 
making moves in the region since World War II amid the massive efforts at decolonization in 
both the Middle East and Africa, shoring up support for newly independent regimes. With the 
potential for oil and gas deposits and with the likelihood that the Soviet Union would “gain a 
preponderance of influence in the Horn with the resultant of control of Red Sea,” the Americans 
could not afford to completely ignore this region.503 Soviet policy differed from that of the 
Americans in that, while both sought to enhance their geopolitical positions, the Soviets’ strategic 
interests also included defending and enhancing their interests in the Indian Ocean and 
countering rising Chinese influence.504 
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Nonetheless, while both superpowers acknowledged the significance of this region—its 
potential for oil and gas, and its geographic proximity to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf— both 
wanted to avoid nuclear war, continue détente, and preserve their own national security interests. 
Despite their global competition, the superpowers did not want conflict in East Africa. The U.S. 
assessed that Soviet and American prospects for success—securing of alliances and natural 
resources—in East Africa “do not look too bright, at least without cooperation rather than 
competitive rivalry.”505 East Africa was not worth the potentially expensive or catastrophic 
showdown.  
American interests in the Horn rested on Ethiopia due to previously established American 
relations with Emperor Haile Selassie and because of the 1969 Marxist military coup in Somalia. 
The U.S. State Department also bet that Washington would “be very glad we decided to stay in 
Ethiopia” whenever the Suez Canal reopened.506 Most relief to Ethiopia from the United States 
was in the form of economic aid. This was deemed by the Nixon administration to be the “best 
vehicle for preserving our overall long-range interests in Ethiopia.” 507 The U.S. support of  
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Ethiopia meant less U.S. influence in Somalia. Although the U.S. did not want Somalia to be 
dominated by an “unfriendly power and [become] a disruptive influence in the Horn,” there was 
little interest in Somalia’s international relations other than that it maintain peaceful relations 
with Kenya and Ethiopia and that it might  offer future port or oil opportunities.508 
Soviet support for Somalia started in 1963, when the Soviets helped Somalia to build an 
army and small air force. This aid increased exponentially following a 1969 Marxist-military 
coup in Mogadishu which resulted in General Muhammad Siad Barre taking control of the 
country.  Soviet interest in the geopolitical value of Somalia continued to increase; and in 1974 
the two signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, giving the Soviets naval facilities at the 
Somali port of Berbera in return for increased Soviet military aid to Somalia. However, the 
Soviets had not cut off all contact with or aid for Ethiopia.  After the military coup in 1974, 
Ethiopia reached out to Moscow again, hoping for more Soviet aid. The Derg, which overthrew 
Emperor Selassie in September 1974, was slowly superseded by one of their own, Major 
Mengistu Haile  Mariam. Abolishing the monarchy, Mengistu then embarked on transforming 
Ethiopia into a Marxist state, going as far as to proclaim Marxist-Leninism as the official 
ideology of Ethiopia in September 1976.509   
Nonetheless, instead of rushing to fill the Ethiopian request, the Soviets remained 
cautious. Indeed, according to the U.S. National Security Council (NSC), the Soviets did not 
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“flatly [turn] down the Ethiopians,” an indication that “Moscow thinks it can have it both ways 
in East Africa—as long as it does not give the Ethiopians too much.”510 In this sense, the Soviets 
were double-crossing the Somalis since they were happy enjoying the tension between Somalia 
and Ethiopia, knowing that each of them resented Soviet overtures to the other. Just as they 
would during the Iran-Iraq War, the Soviets took advantage of this tension, avoided tipping the 
scales toward open hostilities, and stayed content with keeping both options open.511   
The U.S. State Department noted the that Somalis “widely disliked” the Soviets, despite 
the latter’s “ideological camouflage.” Within the Somali officer corps, officers  resented their 
Soviet mentors. Even Siad worried that the Soviets were conspiring to “[cultivate] a more pliant 
and ideologically pure candidate for a top position in the party and government of Somalia.”512 
Needless to say, the flirtation of convenience between the Soviets and Somalis was short-lived—
with the regime of Hallie Selassie ended and the imperial monarchy abolished, the Soviets 
viewed a relationship with Ethiopia and its new Marxist military dictatorship as worth more  than 
developing their relationship with Somalia.  Forsaking their relationship with Somalia, the 
Soviets viewed the new Marxist regime in Addis Ababa as the main prize.513   
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In July 1977, Somali forces invaded and occupied Ogaden.  The Somali invasion was part 
of a long-term gamble.  According to the NSC, the Somalis had been “extracting aid…from a 
wide range of countries who would like to see them draw away from their friendship with the 
Soviets during the very period when they were putting the finishing touches on their plans for 
invading Ethiopia and seizing nearly a third of its territory.”514  The NSC also believed that the 
“Somalis have played a wily game with everybody and, so far, have come out way ahead. They 
have built up a highly effective army with Soviet equipment and advice. They have put it to use 
against Soviet advice (at least so it seems) and are, in effect, blackmailing the Soviets into 
continuing military assistance to them. At least we have seen no evidence yet that the Soviets 
have cut off military aid to Somalia.”515  
For the Americans, the more pressing concern was the influx of Soviet and Cuban 
military advisors into the region.  U.S. intelligence reported that there were over 10,000 Cubans 
in Ethiopia, including a mechanized infantry brigade, and 40 pilots.516  Yet any U.S. strategy to 
confront the Soviets and Cubans over Ethiopia was deemed “misbegotten” by the DOD. Instead, 
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the DOD wagered that “Ethiopia will turn out to be a quagmire for the Soviets; in short, it may 
be in our interest to let them wallow.” Essentially, the Americans wondered how to jam the 
Soviets in the Horn. The Carter administration considered seeking support from Arab allies—
primarily assuming Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran in this case—to pressure Syria and Iraq to 
refuse Soviet overflight rights.517  
According to U.S. intelligence, Iraq “has made it clear that despite its close ties with 
Moscow and Havana, Baghdad would take a very dim view of a significant Soviet and Cuban 
combat role.” 518 However, the Iraqis did observe Ethiopian frustration with Soviet meddling. 
Following the 1977-1978 war between Ethiopia and Somalia, U.S. intelligence argued,  Baghdad 
believed that there “will be a disagreement sooner or later between the Ethiopian regime and the 
Socialist countries or the Soviet Union initially. This disagreement is about the party they want 
to form in Ethiopia. Moreover, there is no trust….” From Baghdad’s viewpoint, this  
disagreement opened up possibilities “to exploit this situation…so as to save the stance of the 
Eritreans through [Arab intervention].”519 
However, Iraq did not do much to help the Somalis. Despite its disdain for Soviet activity 
in the Horn, Iraq sat on the sidelines, refusing to seriously assist Somalia.520  Although the Iraqis 
continued to supply Eritrean fractions, going too far in helping Somalia would risk  prompting 
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even more backlash from the Soviets, who took Somalia’s deceitful gamble personally. Even 
Saudi Arabia and Iran—who were also usually active in the region—remained neutral. Somalia’s 
claims to Ogaden and its isolation within Africa resulted in little to no outside support to either 
side in the conflict. The Iraqis were eager to support the Eritrean factions, but they were not 
willing to challenge Moscow so openly.521  
As a result of the invasion, the Soviets did in fact cut off aid to Somalia, refusing the 
latter’s request for more arms, while simultaneously increasing their commitment to Ethiopia in 
its wars in Ogaden and Eritrea.  The Soviets had even discouraged Somalia from going to war 
with Ethiopia and even tried to confine Somali actions within the region where the Eritrean 
insurgency was present.522  Despite Somalia’s early successes, fighting against Cuban and 
Soviet-backed Ethiopian forces proved too much.  The Somalis were defeated in Ogaden in 
March 1978, forcing their withdrawal from the region.523  
The Eritrean independence movement posed a conundrum for the Soviets. For one, the 
EPLF generally adhered to Marxist ideals and was a “genuine national liberation movement.” 
But Ethiopia was a greater prize for the U.S.S.R., and they had to tread carefully. Moving against 
the Eritreans would have been extremely difficult to justify, especially in the light of Somali 
aggression against Ethiopia in Ogaden in 1977. U.S. intelligence noted that the Soviets were 
“committed to helping Mengistu resolve the Eritrean issue on terms acceptable to him,” but 
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Moscow also knew that moving against Eritrean would likely “antagonize a wider circle of Arab 
and possibly African states that view Eritrea as an internal affair.” The Soviets also wanted to 
avoid a quagmire, fully aware of the difficulties facing the Eritreans in achieving 
independence.524 
Soviet preference for the Ethiopian regime did not stop the Soviet dialogue with the 
Eritreans. This was especially evident when Moscow thought that meeting with the Eritreans 
would help create leverage with  Addis Ababa. The first meeting between the Soviets and the 
ELF occurred in June 1978. In February 1980, representatives of the ELF were invited to 
Moscow, a visit prompted by the U.S.S.R.’s fear of Ethiopia’s stability. Moscow had hoped to be 
able to take some of the pressure off Addis Ababa.  Even the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO) and Syria urged the ELF to accept the Soviet invitation. Using declassified documents 
from Soviet and East German archives, Michael Weldeghiorghis Tedla argues:  
[Moscow’s] objective... [was] to find an appropriate solution for Eritrea within 
the framework of the Ethiopian state... The policy of the CPSU [Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union] was... aimed at the unity of Ethiopia...[and] to 
convince Ahmed Nasser [Chairman of the ELF-RC] that the future development 
of the Eritrean people can only evolve in a unified Ethiopian state. 
 
Not to be left out of the diplomatic jostling, the East Germans, ever in competition with the 
Soviets for Third World clients in the Arab world, also invited the ELF to Berlin for their own 
talks, separate from the Soviets.525  Brezhnev and Castro separately pushed for Mengistu to 
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permit a form of autonomy for Eritrea, hoping that this would preserve Ethiopian sovereignty 
within the region.526 These interactions—by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries—with 
Eritrea, and in the Horn of Africa generally, alarmed the Iraqis.  
Baghdad wanted to push the boundaries of its relationship with the Soviets. By 
challenging the Soviets, Iraq could send two messages to Moscow and the world: Iraq was a true 
friend of the Arab nation, and Iraq had its own interests, patron desires be damned.527 The 1970s 
had proven to be a tumultuous time in Iraqi-Soviet relations.  Communists had been purged in 
Iraq, and the Soviet Union had backed the Kurds who sought freedom from Iraqi control. The 
Soviets were continuing to make overtures to the Iranians at the same time that Moscow was 
growing closer with Damascus.  Baghdad and Moscow also disagreed over the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. By the late 1970s, Soviet enthusiasm for Iraq had cooled. For their part, the  Iraqis were 
looking for an area in which they could challenge the Soviets. Baghdad believed Moscow had 
been consistently undermining Iraqi interests and security. In East Africa, the Iraqis were 
especially upset over Soviet support for Ethiopia against the Eritrean Liberation Front, and they 
had no qualms making several public statements against U.S.S.R.528 
To be sure, the Soviets did not ignore Iraqi interests, nor did they let Baghdad operate 
without challenge in Eritrea. For example, in 1978, the Soviets retaliated against the Iraqis for 
challenging Soviet policies in Eritrea and the Horn of Africa by suspending Soviet flights to 
Baghdad. Others noticed, too—including the Americans. The United States had noted that other 
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Soviet-allied Arab states, including Syria, Libya, and Algeria, had reduced aid to the Eritreans, 
refusing to risk upsetting their patron, the U.S.S.R. However, Iraq was viewed as an “exception,” 
and according to U.S. intelligence, Baghdad was “willing to oppose [Soviet blandishments] 
openly and to continue to provide support to the insurgents.”529 The Carter administration mused: 
“we might wish to take advantage of the present climate to let Iraqi leaders know informally that 
we have not lost interest in improved relations.” The State Department was instructed to send 
signals to the Shah of Iran, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and King Hussein of Jordan that the 
United States was looking to improve Iraqi-U.S. relations; Presidents Assad and Sadat of Syria 
and Egypt, respectively, were also to be notified.530  
Not oblivious to realities on the ground, the Iraqi government noted the difficulties 
Eritrea faced and believed that, “if the Eritrean revolution continued this way, it would never 
achieve anything.”531  The EPLF, despite making significant gains at times, including in 1977-
1978, was constantly factionalized, with various tribes, leaders, religious, political and 
ideological groups all vying for their own power.532 The two main groups—the ELF and the 
EPLF—at times fought each other while simultaneously fighting the Ethiopians. They were, at 
times, able to set aside their differences and form joint committees and coordinate operations. 
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However, according to U.S. intelligence, real political union remained a “long shot.”533  Efforts 
led by the Somalis, Libyans, and Iraqis to bridge this gap were unsuccessful. These fractures 
frustrated efforts to increase action against Ethiopia, giving Ethiopia time to make diplomatic 
headway in staving off foreign support for the EPLF.  In 1973, the Nixon administration noted 
that the EPLF consisted of fewer than 2,000 fighters and therefore was not a legitimate threat to 
Ethiopian control over the territory.  
On top of this, the EPLF lost support from Sudan after the Sudanese and Ethiopians 
settled their differences after war ended in Sudan in 1972.534  Along with cutting off aid, the 
agreement called for Sudan to cut off sanctuaries for the EPLF fighters, resulting in a “serious 
blow to [rebels].”535 However, the EPLF still received aid from Somalia.  The Americans judged 
that the EPLF, despite its small size and reliance on hit-and-run tactics, would remain active and 
that it would continue to be an “internal security problem” for Ethiopia. The Nixon 
administration also believed that Ethiopia “appears incapable” of ending the rebellion, and that, 
although the EPLF “may not jeopardize Ethiopia control over Eritrea…the movement is not dead 
and a future increase in insurgent activity seems probable.” 536  This assessment would eventually 
ring true, especially in in the 1980s.  
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Eritrean factionalism directly affected Iraqi diplomacy in the region, especially when the 
Iraqis were arming, training, and coordinating with various members of the ELF.  In some cases,  
Baghdad’s favored factions were sidelined by other leaders within the ELF.537 For example, in 
1979, when one of the Iraqi-preferred ELF factional leaders was increasingly targeted by his 
fellow ELF members, the Iraqis cut off monetary aid (up to $250,000), military training, and 
hardware.538  The U.S. State Department cast doubt on whether the Iraqis could surmount 
Eritrean factionalism. There was also a large Eritrean Christian population to contend with. If the 
Iraqis were to push for Eritrea to join the Arab League, the State Department argued that it would 
have to “be over the objections of the Christian population.”539  However, despite the 
factionalism and other difficulties, Iraq truly believed it could assist Eritrea, thus also asserting 
itself in another important region and challenging Soviet hegemony in the Third World. As 
Saddam told his comrades, “I want you to be reassured about your revolution more than the way 
it was one year ago, two years ago, one day ago, one week ago, or six years ago; more than at 
any time before. Be reassured that colonial powers will never be able to find any gap in this 
revolution, neither in its command, nor its services, nor its message.”540 
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 Iraqi Embassy Organizations in East Africa 
The Iraqis ran their political and diplomatic operations in East Africa through their 
Embassy Organizations (EOs). In particular, documents in the Baʿth Regional Command 
Collection (BRCC), which is housed at the Hoover Institution, illustrate  how the headquarters 
for these operations in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and elsewhere ran through EO Khartoum in Iraq’s 
embassy in Sudan. The Iraqis would also create other EOs throughout the decades in East Africa. 
EOs  coordinated with various local groups—students, politicians, media personalities, officers, 
refugees, dissidents, unionists, and the like—and relay reports back to Baghdad.  In the late 
1980s-early 1990s, as Iraq’s diaspora population grew, the EOs were renamed Organizations of 
Iraqis (OIs).541 Although the name change came along with  some structural changes, the mission 
of the OIs  was much the same as it had been for the EOs. 542 
The Baʿth Regional Command Collection (BRCC) shows the importance the Iraqis 
placed on foreign student groups—both those the Iraqis encountered abroad and those foreign 
students who visited Iraq—and their activities. Iraq hosted students from Eritrea and Somalia 
because these students were again seen as bringing vital political and cultural connections.  After 
confirming their educational backgrounds, Iraqi officials would determine the political value of 
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these students.543  These students were seen as important connections, assets, and potential 
agents who could be counted on in the future. Essentially, the students were seen as ripe for Iraqi 
manipulation.    
In April 1983, Eritrean officials met with Iraqi officials in Baghdad; members of Iraq’s 
EO Khartoum were also present.  The meeting concluded with a commitment for all parties to 
political and organizational action at national and party levels. Although some military affairs 
were discussed, much more emphasis was placed on political cooperation. A budget and other 
means of financing were agreed upon, with the Iraqis agreeing to transfer 3,074,000 Iraqi dinars 
for anything deemed necessary, including items related to politics, media, military, health, and 
foreign media. An additional 500,000 Iraqi dinars were earmarked for miscellaneous 
expenditures, including clothes, cars, and communication devices.544  Money and other resources 
were transferred from Baghdad to EO Khartoum; this money was meant to help develop political 
connections with the Eritrean revolutionary forces. In May 1983, the Iraqis sent 3,574,000 Iraqi 
dinars to Khartoum.545   
EO Khartoum also reported on the political ramifications of this conflict in both local and 
regional contexts.  The EO regularly sent reports back to Baghdad, filled with economic, 
political, and military details of the fighting between Ethiopia and Eritrea.  For example, a June 
1983 report detailed pockets of resistance in northern Ethiopia, but it noted that Ethiopian forces 
were making gains and were even massacring civilians and burning Eritrean villages.  This 
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incident was part of a larger Ethiopian campaign, which began after Mengistu assumed power in 
Ethiopia. In 1976, the Americans concluded that the Ethiopians had attempted their own “final 
solution” against the Eritreans, aiming to kill all Eritreans under the auspices of their anti-
insurgent campaign codenamed Operation Raza.546 In the 1980s, facing famine and insurgency, 
Ethiopia launched a campaign against civilians, removing people from the Tigray region in what 
Richard Reid described as “part of a brutal villagization program.”547 EO Khartoum also reported 
famine in several regions in Ethiopia, noting the massive influx of refugees into Sudan and even 
the number of Jewish Ethiopians fleeing to Israel, known as the “Zionist entity” within Iraqi 
documents.  In the south, Ethiopian forces faced fierce fighting and resistance from factions of 
the ELPF forces and the Tigray Liberation Front, another ethnic group fighting to break away 
from Addis Ababa’s rule.548 
In response to famine and insurgency, the Ethiopians were preparing to offer concessions 
including pockets of self-determination, as part of broader considerations for a “republican 
union.” EO Khartoum argued that Ethiopia was trying to replicate the U.S.S.R.’s model of 
governance. With Ethiopia assuming de facto control over contested territories without a peace 
settlement or a treaty and allowing a “government” to operate there, the EO countered that this 
“is just a mere imposition of status quo and limiting [of] the principle of self-determination.”549 
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The Iraqis believed that the Ethiopians would renege on this arrangement, just as they had on the 
U.N. agreement with Eritrea in the 1950s. 
Intelligence and political operations continued to run through EO Khartoum throughout 
the 1980s, only with its bureaucracy expanding.  When the war with Iran concluded by ceasefire 
on 20 August 1988, the Iraqi regime was free to refocus its attention on promoting liberation 
movements across the globe. Within the headquarters in Baghdad, a special office called the 
Bureau of Arab Affairs was dedicated to promoting liberation movements in Eritrea and other 
parts of Africa.  However, this office was more focused on intelligence operations than its 
mandate suggested. Did the Iraqi regime truly value these liberation movements or were they 
merely taking advantage of internal and local conflicts  to better their foreign relations?  As one 
Baʿth Party report emphasized, “the truth of the matter is that every office is [about] 
intelligence.”550 
 The sponsoring and subsequent surveillance of student organizations was a vital 
component of Iraqi foreign policy. The goal for these connections, or “alliances” as the Iraqis 
often characterized them, with the next generation was to help guide and influence other 
movements of “liberation” and revolution both in the Arab world and anywhere else where the 
forces of imperialism were being opposed.551 Essentially, relationships with these student groups 
were seen by the Baʿth  Party as propaganda tools and ways to cultivate influence with current 
and future political forces within those states. 552   
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 This Baʿthist policy of connecting with local student groups was used in East Africa. 553 
Throughout the 1980s, the Iraqis continued to meddle in the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict, using 
student groups as their main source of influence and intelligence.  Various factions of Eritreans, 
most often students, met with Iraqi officials for conferences and meetings with Baʿth party 
members; sometimes these meetings occurred in Sudan (through EO Khartoum) or in 
Baghdad.554 The Iraqis believed that, by bringing in various factions of Eritreans, they could 
transcend the increasingly factional nature of the conflict. Although the Eritreans were divided, 
with infighting increasing among them, the Iraqis felt that they could bypass Eritrean 
factionalism. However, hosting and promoting conferences did not translate easily into clear-cut 
leadership. Rather, it often translated into even more factionalism among the Eritreans and 
greater frustration for the Iraqis.  One conference in June 1987 illustrates this factionalism 
especially well. The Iraqis had hoped that their meetings and panels would foster cooperation 
among all groups. However, the Eritrean students had other ideas. To their dismay, the Baʿthists 
discovered that the students were coordinating among themselves, bypassing the Iraqis, and 
using the conference to form alliances among  themselves. The conference ended with 
ambiguous results.555  
The fact that the success of their efforts in Eritrea had been so limited did not deter the 
Iraqis from continuing to try. After Baʿth Party co-founder Michel Aflaq died in Paris on 23 June 
1989, he was buried in Baghdad. His funeral and burial ceremony made Baghdad the city at the 
center of the Arab world for the duration of the event. Iraqi intelligence recorded all the 
nationalities and political affiliations of guests, dignitaries, and foreigners who had come to pay 
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their respects. There were the expected Iraqi, Yemeni, Qatari, Lebanese, Egyptian, and Jordanian 
and Moroccan mourners, but there were also Sudanese, Libyan, Somalian, and Eritrean 
attendees.556  With the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea tapering off in the 1990s, Iraqi 
intelligence still kept vigil over Eritrean media outlets.557 
 
 Iraq & Sudan 
The year 1969 saw a military dictatorship succeed in Sudan, led by Jaafar Numayri.  
Since its independence from Great Britain in 1956, Sudan had been marred by conflict between 
those in the north and in the south—the northern tribal leaders and government officials had 
seized control of formerly British-controlled institutions and were moving to consolidate their 
power in the south.  Sudan was divided ethnically and religiously by its west-east axis, with the 
population in the north predominantly Arab and Muslim and the people of the south mostly 
African and Christian.  Fighting off Islamists, who wanted to transform Sudan into an Islamic 
republic, Numayri concluded peace negotiations with southern factional leaders in 1972, 
granting regional governors more autonomy.558 Numayri also created a new constitution, which 
proclaimed Sudan a secular state, granting freedom of worship for “people of the book” and for 
those practicing African religions. According to Martin Meredith, Numayri’s triumph “was a rare 
example in Africa of a negotiated end to a civil war.”559 
 
556 Names, nationalities, and party affiliations of those who attended the memorial service for Michel Aflaq, BRCC 
0288-0289, 3268-0002, HB, HIA. 
557 Media, 1998/8/16, BRCC, 0616, 3474-0000. HB, HIA. 
558 Raymond H. Anderson, “Sudan Appears at Peace After Long, Fierce War,” NYT, March 24, 1972, 
https://nyti.ms/1ijuSZ7 
559 Meredith, The Fate of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Independence, 346-347. 
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Both superpowers were interested in Sudan. Soviet support for Sudan began in 1960, but 
the Sudanese tried to walk a tightrope between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., joining the Non-
Aligned Movement. But the relationship with the Soviets was severely limited after Numayri’s 
accession, and especially after the failure of an attempted coup by communists in 1971, ending 
what the NSC called a “flirtation.” 560 However, the Soviets did not completely abandon Sudan. 
In 1976, nearly 100 Soviet advisors remained, as well as old Soviet jet fighters delivered as a 
“gift” for Sudan.561  
Arab countries also took interest in Sudan, especially the Egyptians and the Saudis.  
Saudi Arabia saw Sudan’s “immense agricultural potential,” viewing it as the future breadbasket 
of the Middle East and also as a buffer against hostile advances by Soviet-supported regimes 
such as Ethiopia and Libya.562 Iraq was also interested in Sudan, in part because of Khartoum’s 
support of the Eritrean independence movement; the Eritreans used Sudan as both a refuge and a 
base from which to launch guerilla operations into Ethiopia. But Iraq wanted more from Sudan 
than merely its support for Eritrea. Rather, Sudan’s tension with Libya, the rise of Islamist 
groups, and the arrival of Americans in Khartoum all meant that Iraq was very interested in 
keeping an eye on the region.  
Because of Sudan’s support for Eritrea, Iraq also invested a lot of time, money, and effort 
in  Sudan. The Sudanese favored the Eritrean cause, offering sanctuary for Eritrean fighters, 
 
560 Soviet support for the communists in Sudan, and their operatives behind the attack, did not help Sudanese-Soviet 
relations. Paper Prepared by the Policy Review Committee, undated, FRUSA, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Horn of 
Africa, Part 1, Document 10. 
561 National Intelligence Estimate 11-10-76,”: Soviet Military Policy in the Third World, October 21, 1976, 
FRUSA, Documents on Africa 1973-1976, Volume 1969-1976, E-6, Document 55. 
562 Paper Prepared by the Policy Review Committee, undated, FRUSA, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Horn of Africa, 
Part 1, Document 10. 
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political exiles, and refugees.  Numayri tried to place himself in the middle of the conflict 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, going as far as to ask the Washington for its blessing in pursuing 
negotiations between the warring parties. However, while trying to facilitate some sort of 
agreement with Ethiopia, the Sudanese struggled to bring all parties to the negotiating table.  In 
1975, the Sudanese failed to mediate a deal between the Eritrean factions and Ethiopia because 
Khartoum had overplayed its hand publicly. This prompted the Ethiopians and Eritreans to raise 
their demands and to arrive at the negotiating table with predetermined positions.563  Khartoum 
also grappled with Eritrean factionalism. In one instance, as EO Khartoum noted, the Sudanese 
government met with EPLF leaders in early 1983. According to EO Khartoum, the Sudanese 
tried to pressure the different factions into signing a joint agreement, but factional differences 
amongst the EPLF prevented this.564   
To further secure his regime, Numayri began co-opting another group of Sudanese who  
posed a threat to his regime—the Islamists. In 1977, he invited two prominent Islamist 
politicians to join the government: Sadiq al-Mahdi, who had tried to overthrow Numayri in a 
Libyan-backed coup in 1976, and Hassan al-Turbani of the National Islamic Front, a militant 
Islamist party. By 1983, Numayri openly welcomed Islamists into the fold, proclaiming that 
there was to be an Islamic revolution in Sudan with Islamic law replacing the secular 
constitution.565  However, the decline in foreign investment in Sudan left the regime with $12 
 
563 Memorandum of Conversation, May 7, 1975, FRUSA, Documents on Africa 1973-1976, Volume 1969-1976, E-
6, Document 229.  
564 Political Situation, BRCC, 0230-0232, 3471-0002 HB, HIA. 
565 The National Islamic Front would come to encompass other Islamist parties within Sudan, including the Umma 
Party, serving as a quasi-umbrella organization; its name changed to National Congress in 1990. For more on the 
inner workings of the National Islamic Front see Gilles Kepel, Jihad: On the Trail of Political Islam. (Cambridge: 
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billion in debt. Massive civil unrest followed. Numayri abrogated the 1972 peace treaty with the 
southern factions, thereby driving Sudan into civil war. Rebel groups in the south proliferated as 
a result.566 By April 1985, facing strikes, riots, protests, and rebellion in the South, Numayri 
could not hold back the Islamists, and he was overthrown by an Islamist-inspired military coup.  
The new regime, led by Sadiq al-Mahdi under the banner of the National Islamic Front, 
maintained the Sharia law code of 1983. But even al-Mahdi could not keep control, and, after 
making a peace deal with Garang’s rebels, he was overthrown in 1989 by his fellow Islamists. 
General Omar al-Bashir, the new leader, would declare that “Khartoum will never go back to 
being a secular capital.”567 
Ironically, al-Bashir’s mentor was Hassan al-Turabi, the founder of the National Islamic 
Front and head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan. Under his tutelage, al-Bashir would rule 
Sudan in a brutal Islamic dictatorship, using  punishments including stoning, crucifixion, and 
public hanging.  The country would also begin a program of “Arabization” in which the Arabic 
language and Arab culture were emphasized above all others.  Under al-Bashir, Sudan would 
become an important center for Pan-Islamic thought, as well as a center for terrorism—elements 
of al-Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden, would train in Sudan. Sudan was linked to the World 
Trade Center Bombing in 1993—Turabi’s friend Sheikh Omar was implicated in this – and to 
 
566 One of the more famous rebels was an officer named Colonel John Garang, who broke away from Khartoum and 
formed his own faction, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, known as the SPLA and sometimes as the Movement. 
He was supported by Uganda, Libya, and Ethiopia. The Iraqis struggled to understand Ugandan support for Garang, 
believing “if Uganda supports the Garang movement, the "Islamic Front" system supports a similar contradiction in 
Uganda.” They believed that because Ugandans strongly supported Islamist groups tied to Idi Amin’s tribe, support 
for Garang, who was anti-Islamist, was contradictory. The Iraqis were further confused because the Islamic Front 
was also supplying the Lord’s Resistance Army, a Christian militant group based in Uganda. Report on current state 
and events in southern Sudan, 1995/12/3, BRCC 0050, 2851-0001, HB, HIA. 
567 Meredith, The Fate of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Independence, 361.  
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the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 1995. Sudan was then 
isolated by its neighbors and by the West, forcing it to abandon its support for terrorist cells.568   
The rise of Islamist groups within Sudan set off alarm bells in Iraq, especially at the 
mention of the Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood.569 Iraq’s complicated relationship with 
Islam is beyond the scope of this work, but, essentially, the Baʿthist state both feared and used 
Islam.  Beginning in 1979, upon Saddam Hussein’s open takeover of the party and state, the 
Baʿth began a “Faith Campaign” in which the state used institutions within the party and security 
apparatuses to control and monitor all religious entities within Iraq.  Baʿthist  authorities used 
Islam in the regime’s symbols, propaganda, and rhetoric when it best suited the Baʿth Party, but 
it also granted the Baʿthists the power to control any who tried to use Islam to contest the Baʿth.   
To the Baʿthists, Islam was a subset of Arab nationalism – not a separate, and therefore 
competing, ideology or identity. In a sense, knowing he could not squelch Islam entirely, 
Saddam sought to use the Baʿthist interpretation of it as another way to justify the state’s rule.  
The Faith Campaign targeted prominent Islamists—including the brutal torture and murder of 
influential Shiʿa cleric Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in 1980—and Saddam’s attempts to establish 
 
568 However, in August 1998, al-Qaeda cells carried out the bombing of American embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania. Factories in Khartoum were bombed by the Clinton administration after it was alleged that Sudan had 
supplied some of the chemical weapons needed for the attack. Meredith, The Fate of Africa: A History of the 
Continent Since Independence, 588-593. 
569 The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna in the 1920s, is an Islamist political party, 
with its accompanying military wing, which believes in a theocracy based strictly on the teachings and scripture of 
the Koran. Since it challenges any government with a “human” head of state, the group has been hunted down by 
authorities in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and others.  See Eugene Rogan. The Arabs: A History. (New York: Basic 
Books, 2009), 271-272, 399-405. Also see CRRC SH‐BATH‐D‐001‐769, Correspondence from the Arab Socialist 
Baʿth Party Office of Sudan's Affairs, 1988‐12‐11. 
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and prove his direct lineage to The Prophet Muhammad, including having the Koran recorded in 
Saddam’s blood. 570  
The rise of Islam in the Horn of Africa troubled Iraq as well. Members of the Baʿth  Party  
in Sudan reported on rising tensions in the country as communists and secularists faced 
increasing hostility from the new Islamic regime.571 The Iraqis also received reports of divisions 
within the Sudanese Army.572 According to EO Khartoum, the new Islamic regime was also 
moving to diminish Iraq’s role in Sudan by “[blacking out] the nationalistic leading role of Iraq 
in Sudan by the official media services.”573 In a conversation with Saddam and other high-
ranking Iraqi officials, Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz argued that the Muslim Brotherhood had  not 
“assume[d] power”; rather, “they became like the communists during the era of Karim Qasim.” 
Here, Aziz likened the Muslim Brotherhood to the first Baʿthist coup in 1963.  Qasim failed to 
fulfill his promises and was then overthrown by the Baʿthists.  In this coup the Baʿthists had 
“emulated the [Iraqi Communist Party]” by realizing “the importance of being able to control—
or to give the impression of being able to control—the ‘street’ at moments of political crisis.”574   
 
570 For more on Iraq and Islam, see Samuel Helfont, Compulsion in Religion: The Authoritarian Roots of Saddam 
Hussein’s Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).  Also see Ofra Bengio, Saddam’s Word Political 
Discourse in Iraq. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 176-191. 
571 CRRC SH‐BATH‐D‐001‐769, Correspondence from the Arab Socialist Baʿth Party Office of Sudan's Affairs, 
1988‐12‐11. 
572 Report, “The Islamic Front receives huge funding from Iran, and the International Organization of Muslim 
Brotherhood; and the youth of the al-Ummah Party” October 2, 1988, CRRC SH‐BATH‐D‐001‐769, 
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573 Report, “Impact of Arabic Aid among the Sudanese People, and Blackout on the Visit of Mr. Muhammad” 
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Most alarming, according to Aziz, was that members of the Muslim Brotherhood were 
moving against Baʿthists within the country. In one example, a newly elected governor in 
Magashi, in northern Sudan, who was affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood began executing 
Baʿthists. The governor accused the Baʿthists of being atheists.  Action must be taken, Aziz 
argued: “…the opposition they have in Sudan against the Baʿth party and others is not a regular 
and limited matter where we can be tolerant toward it.”  Saddam replied that they should follow 
an example from their own history—in the early 1970s, the Baʿthist party feigned friendship 
with the Iraqi Communist Party, only to later turn on the communists and purge them from both 
government and society.575  Instead of making friends with the Muslim Brotherhood, Saddam 
asked if the Iraqis should “act with flexibility toward the political and religious movements 
whenever possible?” He continued:  
We can do this without isolating or paving the way for it to become a permanent 
danger trying to take power. On the other hand, criticism will always be 
allowed…that’s why we can initiate a dialogue with them stating that an attack is 
one thing, while expressing the doctrine is something completely different… .  
We can also tell them, “If you stop talking about the religious state, we will stop 
criticizing the religious state….” 
 
Instead of attempting to clamp down on the Muslim Brotherhood, Saddam called for a “truce.” 
He noted that “they came to power….  They know people in the army, some them belong to the 
old regime.”576 
 
575 See Chapter 2: Iraqi Foreign Policy, 1968-1989. 
576 CRRC SH-SHTP-A-001-167, “Saddam and Baʿth Party Members Discussing the Status of the Party in the Arab 
World and Potential Cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood,” 24 July 1986. See also Kevin M. Woods, David D. 
Palkki, and Mark E. Stout. The Saddam Tapes: the Inner Workings of a Tyrant’s Regime, 1978-2001. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 107-114. 
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The Iraqis could not eradicate the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan as they had the ICP in 
Iraq—distance severely limited their power and capabilities, for one—but the Iraqis believed 
history would be on their side.  Saddam believed that the Iran-Iraq War would lead to the 
downfall Ayatollah Khomeini’s regime in Iran and, once that happened, he predicted, “the 
religious currents are going to be affected very much.” To assure Khartoum that the Iraqis would 
not abandon Sudan, Saddam argued, “we should not let the religious political currents believe 
that the fall of Khomeini means their collapse… one of the factors that will alleviate this feeling 
is our good relations with them … .”  To keep Iraqi influence in Sudan despite the rise of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, the Saddam believed, “we leave to the field command the freedom to act 
in this regard, so that we don’t lose strategically or tactically.”577  
 Iraq decided to tread lightly with Sudan. Part of this certainly had to do with Sudanese 
support for the Eritrean rebels.  Another determining factor was Sudan’s relationship with Libya.  
During Numayri’s tenure, relations between the countries were tense, to say the least, thanks in 
part to the competing narcissistic personalities of both Numayri and Gaddafi. Libya and Sudan 
also had competing geopolitical interests. Numayri had supported anti-Gaddafi groups in Libya, 
including the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, and he had anti-Gaddafi propaganda 
broadcast within both Sudan and Libya.578 On the other hand, besides supporting southern 
separatists, Libya was enlisting the Ethiopians to help arm and train Sudanese exiles then living 
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in Ethiopia.579  Gaddafi was also linked to the bloody coup attempted against Numayri in 
Khartoum in 1976.580 
Iraq also had a contentious relationship with Libya. Ironically, within the Arab world,  
both countries were considered pariahs.581 Besides personality clashes between Gaddafi and 
Saddam, Libya supported Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, including supplying Scud missiles, 
Soviet T-55 and T-62 tanks, and other military equipment.582  Saddam’s enemy in Syria, Hafiz 
al-Assad, had close ties to Gaddafi as well. The two formed a close alliance during the 1980s and 
signed economic and military agreements. The Libyan relationship with Syria was nowhere near 
the size and strength of the Soviet-Syrian relationship, but it still further fueled Saddam’s 
paranoia.583 The Iraqis also saw Libya as a Soviet proxy. During the Iran-Iraq War, notably, the 
Soviets posed as “neutral,” yet this still allowed the Libyans to sell Soviet materiel directly to 
Iran.584  
 
579 Ethiopia resented Sudan for hosting and training Eritrean rebels. By cooperating with Libya, Ethiopia hoped to 
stop Libyan support for Eritrea. According to the Carter administration, when Ethiopia publicly denounced Sudan, 
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580 Meredith, The Fate of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Independence, 351. 
581 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter, 
Subject line: U.S. Relations with Libya and Iraq, 24 February 1977, FRUSA, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle 
East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 130.  
582 Pesach Malovany, Wars of Modern Babylon: a History of the Iraqi Army from 1921 to 2003. (Lexington: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 2017), 89, 146, 188, 280, 453.  
583 Memo, “Current Syrian Situation,” CPG Meeting on Syria, November 4, 1986, OA 91834, 01840, 91843, 
William Burns Files, RRPL. 
584 Untitled Iraq-Soviet study, circa February 1986, Iran-Iraq War [February 1986] (5) Box 90192, OA 91834, 
01840, 91843, William Burns Files, RRPL. 
187 
Therefore, from Baghdad’s point of view, Libyan action in East Africa constituted action 
against Iraq. However, although Iraq saw Libyan action in East Africa as detrimental to its own 
geopolitical interests, it also noted the tensions and disputes between Libya and the new Islamist 
government in Sudan. Disparaging the Islamic Front, which allegedly was “under the illusion of 
liberating the world from Khartoum,” the Iraqis believed that the new regime would prove to be 
problematic for Sudan’s regional interests. The Islamic Front’s overt mission to spread Islam and 
establish Islamist governments threatened to upset Sudan’s neighbors including Libya.  The 
Iraqis detected intelligence that the new government in Khartoum was exploring options to 
support Islamist factions in Libya, a move that Gaddafi surely saw as a threat to him personally 
and to his regime.585 
Iraq blamed Libya’s conflict with Chad—the two had long fought over the Aouzou Strip 
along the border between them —for drawing the United State military into Sudan.586 The Iraqis 
were not pleased with U.S. military presence in Sudan. EO Khartoum wrote to Baghdad that 
“America is a superpower that Sudan cannot fight” and that “America has repeatedly declared 
explicitly against the Islamic trend in Sudan.” The Iraqis were concerned with American forces 
and personnel in Sudan, including the deployment of the Airborne Warning and Control System 
(AWACS ). EO Khartoum reported on these activities, including one report from the EO which 
indicated the presence of “four hundred [American] commandos, a number of military experts, 
and some of those involved in African affairs.” The report also bemoaned that the Americans and 
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their security teams were afforded a comfortable stay in the Hilton Hotel.  American soldiers, 
according to Baʿthist reports, were “staying in first class hotels, roaming the markets, and using 
taxis.”587 
The Iraqis were especially interested in American airpower in the region. For one thing, 
the Iraqis had Scud missiles in northern Sudan themselves, and they were aimed at Egypt’s 
Aswan High Dam.588 EO Khartoum noted the growing relationship between Sudan and the 
Americans, frustrated that Sudan was increasingly relying on the U.S. presence to protect the 
regime. The Iraqis resented the “strength of the Sudanese-U.S.” relationship, which was most 
evident to Baghdad in  joint Sudanese-U.S exercises.   In one example, in August 1983, 450 
Americans were in Sudan for the Bright Stars maneuvers.589 The Iraqis noted an increase in 
security precautions around American military bases and “unusual movement of aircraft” in 
Khartoum. The Iraqis were also concerned about the twelve F-15s deployed to protect the 
AWACS.590 However, following Numayri’s overthrow, the Sudanese withdrew from future 
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Bright Star exercises, including Bright Star 85. U.S. officials attributed this to the increasing role 
Libya was now playing in Sudan.591 The Iraqis were pleased to learn that the Americans were 
withdrawing from Sudan; however, they were frustrated that the Sudanese were looking to 
Libya.  Nevertheless, the Iraqis remained involved with Sudan’s air force. In the second half of 
the 1980s, the Iraqis dispatched senior Iraqi pilots to train the Sudanese in pilot extraction and 
rescue missions.592 
 Arabs and the Horn of Africa 
Baghdad was well aware that other players in the Middle East were watching events 
unfold in the Horn of Africa.593 Several Arab states shared Iraq’s geopolitical concerns; and, as 
the Ethiopian campaign intensified, more Arab states joined the Eritrean cause. 594 King Hussein 
of Jordan relayed his fears of Soviet expansion in Ethiopia to the Ford administration. 595 Hafiz 
al-Assad shared his opinions with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger when Kissinger 
visited Syria in March 1975, countering Kissinger’s accusation that even Syria was joining the 
scramble for the Horn of Africa. Assad retorted that of course he was involving Syria in Eritrea, 
explaining that in part it would be against Israel’s interests. He also argued that it would in 
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Washington’s interests to do the same. He stated: “…it would be in your interest, given the 
difference between Communism and capitalism—because those in the saddle in Ethiopia are 
Communist….” 596  From Addis Ababa’s point of view, Arab interest in the region threatened 
future “Arab encirclement.” Although the rhetoric in Addis Ababa was that the Arab states 
wanted to “destroy Ethiopia’s socialist revolution,” the reality was that because of Eritrea’s 
location along the Red Sea, the Arab states viewed a guerilla victory as a way to guarantee that 
they would have bases of operations in the region in the future.597 
Many Arab states were also focused on the Ethiopian-Israel alliance. Until the Yom 
Kippur War in 1973, according to U.S. intelligence, Ethiopia had been the “cornerstone of 
Israel’s East African policy.”  Israel had supplied Ethiopia with economic aid and military 
assistance after Ethiopia had maintained a neutral stance in prior Arab-Israeli conflicts.598 Under 
pressure from other Arab states, Ethiopia reluctantly broke with Israel in 1973, but the Arab 
states remained skeptical of Ethiopia’s true intentions and commitments.  Assad argued: “Eritrea 
wants to be an independent country…[this would be] against the interest of Israel.”599 Libya also 
supported the EPLF. For one, Libya resented the Ethiopian regime’s close ties to Israel and 
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therefore sought to pressure Israel by pressuring Ethiopia.600  In this sense, Libya served as an 
African base for Arab states’ operations against Israel . 
Arab states generally feared Soviet intrusion in the Middle East. The conflict in Africa, to 
them, only foreshadowed what was to come.  The Arabs knew that the Eritreans were severely 
disadvantaged by Soviet military assistance to Ethiopia and by Eritrean factionalism. And even 
the Arab states were factionalized—after Haile Selassie’s overthrow, Libya, South Yemen, and 
Algeria tilted more toward Ethiopia, while Syria and Iraq remained firmly in the pro-Eritrean 
camp. But even those in the pro-Ethiopian camp had a difficult time justifying relations, 
especially when the new military government started executing alleged political opponents and 
taking an increasingly hard line towards the Eritreans.601 According to the C.I.A., staying in the 
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Alienation: Ethiopia and Israel in the Days of Haile Selassie, (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2014).   
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pro-Eritrean camp meant that Syria and Iraq “would probably try to find some middle way out to 
avoid having either opening going in a direction different from that of their Communist friends 
or appearing to buckle under to them.” Despite this “pessimistic assessment,” the Arab states, of 
both camps, continued to send money and political aid to the Eritreans. As U.S. intelligence 
argued, this was their attempt to “keep trying to broaden the number of players by raising in 
various international forums the issue of possible foreign military involvement in the 
fighting.”602 
The Iraqis noted high levels of Saudi Arabian and Egyptian interest regarding the 
Eritrean conflict. The Saudis and the Egyptians resented Soviet and Cuban attempts to mediate 
the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict, fearing that the Soviets would not only sell Eritrean 
independence short but, in the words of the C.I.A., would also become “peacemakers in the 
region.”603 The worst case for these Arab states was that the Soviets might make further inroads 
in Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya. In attempts to forestall Soviet encirclement, both the 
Saudis and the Egyptians sought to control the delegates in the negotiation over Eritrea.  EO 
Khartoum noted conflict between Cairo and Riyadh over this, despite their having a common 
goal, because each was attempting to seize the initiative over the other and each was trying to 
assert its own designs of self-determination in the region. The ELPF was under pressure from 
Saudi Arabia to agree to Saudi terms, fueling resentment among the ELPF.  As the Americans 
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noted, the Saudis thought that the “Eritreans were a bunch of radicals,” whom they should work 
to contain as quietly and quickly as possible.604 Tensions ran high between the Eritreans and the 
Saudis, as reported by the EO, but this pressure did not rule out a possible settlement on 
Eritrea.605   
The Egyptians had supported the Eritreans during the Derg’s vicious 1974-1975 
cleansing campaign against them. Both supported by the United States, Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat and Sudanese President Jaffar Numayri were also allies. Iraq was dismayed when 
Numayri supported Sadat despite Sadat’s signing of the Camp David Accords.  The Iraqis were 
so disturbed that they withdrew Sudan’s invitation to attend the meeting of foreign and finance 
ministers of Arab League countries in Baghdad scheduled for March 1979. It was at this meeting 
where Egyptian membership to the Arab League was suspended and the League’s headquarters 
were moved to Tunis. As Saddam remarked to his advisers, “we thought we should announce in 
all the newscasts the fact that Sudan will not attend and that the ruler of Sudan supported the 
traitor Sadat and thus became his partner in treason.” 606 But by December 1979, Sudan had 
reconsidered its relationship with Egypt, a reconsideration stemming from Arab backlash.607 No 
matter, Numayri’s relationship with Sadat meant that Iraq remained skeptical of Sudanese 
actions in the region.  
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 Players Outside the Horn 
The Iraqis monitored the actions of non-superpower and non-Middle Eastern states in 
East Africa.  Despite their colonial past, the Italians often acted as the conduit or  go-between for 
the Americans and the nations of East Africa. For example, in 1973, the Italians passed along 
intelligence to the Americans that Somalia wanted to “wean off the U.S.S.R.” Generally 
speaking, the Italians kept pressing the U.S. to resume economic aid to Somalia to counter Soviet 
influence.608 North Korea and Cuba were also involved, largely operating as trainers and 
advisors for various guerilla cells.  In June 1973, for example, 175 Somalis trained in North 
Korean warfare training centers, while another 1,600 guerillas were trained by Cuban advisors 
after a Cuban delegation visited Somalia in mid-April 1973.609 
 Cuban support for Ethiopia angered the Iraqis.  For one, it complicated Iraqi-Cuban 
diplomatic relations, especially after Saddam Hussein’s visit to the island nation in 1978.610 In 
Havana, Saddam had urged the Cubans to reconsider their stance on Eritrea, arguing that “if 
[Cuba is] really eager to maintain good relations with the Arab world and the Arab countries, [it 
has] to know that the way we see Eritrea is different than our view of Ogaden." The Cubans had 
previously told the Iraqis that they supported both Ethiopia and Eritrea and reaffirmed their 
commitment to finding a “peaceful solution” for the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict during Saddam’s 
visit. Since Iraqi intelligence had no indication of Mengistu’s political affiliation before his 
ascension, Saddam asked: “Is Mengistu Mariam a general only or a revolutionary general?”  The 
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Cubans answered that he was a revolutionary general. This response triggered Saddam’s arguing 
that Ethiopia would be engulfed in debates and fights over the role of Marxism-Leninism.  To 
justify this argument, Saddam cited Iraqi intelligence that the General of the Ethiopian 
Communist Party had defected after a “disagreement” with the Cubans. The Iraqis did, however, 
take glee in the fact that the new regime in Ethiopia was “ready to disagree with the Soviet 
Union [and Cuba]” over Eritrea.”611 
The Iraqis also monitored Chinese activity in the region. In 1971, China gave Ethiopia 
$84 million interest-free credit for economic aid.612 Eritreans also received training in China as 
early as the 1960s and into the 1970s.613 Chinese interest in “Black Africa,” according to the 
NSC, rested on expanding Chinese political influence in the region and to advance Chinese 
industry in the region.614 The Chinese were trying to strengthen their interests in the entire Indian 
Ocean, both for their own self-interest and in pursuit of their global ambitions to surpass the 
Soviets. However, Somalia’s reliance on Soviet weapons and provisions prevented the Chinese 
from making significant political headway. Undeterred, the Chinese informed the Somalis that, if 
the Soviet Union were to back out and end its assistance, the Chinese would be a phone call 
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away; the Chinese also continued to expand their economic development in the region.615 The 
same went for Ethiopia—the Chinese were the largest provider of economic aid, but they could 
not compete with the level of Soviet military materiel. As the Carter administration noted, “the 
Chinese run a poor second to the Soviets.”616  Chinese entry into the Horn was discreet, however, 
since they refused to entangle themselves in interstate disputes or to openly support domestic 
dissidents.  After Emperor Selassie formally recognized the CCP, the Chinese ceased supplying 
the EPLF.617  
 The Baʿth documents at the Hoover Institution suggest that Chinese influence in Africa 
did not set off alarms in Baghdad. The Iraqis were aware of Chinese activity in southern Africa, 
especially in Uganda, Tanzania, and South Africa, but they made little public mention of the 
Chinese in the Horn. 618 Iraq had supported Beijing’s push for official recognition in the United 
Nations in 1971, and China began moving to support the Baʿthist regime in the 1970s by offering 
weapons and other forms of assistance whenever the latter felt slighted by the Soviets. As they 
did in Africa, the Chinese considered Soviet interests and Soviet-dominated alliances as 
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detrimental to Chinese interests and therefore sought to assist new  potential new clients for 
themselves among those who were already frustrated with the Soviets.619 During the Iran-Iraq 
War, angry at Iraq’s invasion of Iran, the Soviets cut down on deliveries of weapons to Iraq. This 
created a vacuum for the Chinese to fill. Seeking to expand their own political and economic 
influence, China became Iraq’s third largest provider of weapons, including missiles and tanks; 
Chinese aid to Iraq throughout the war totaled around $6 billion USD.620 This was not altruism 
on China’s part, because Chinese support for Iraq rested on China wanting to contain the Soviet 
Union, find new markets, and maintain balance in the Arab world.621 
 However, China was just as opportunistic as the Soviet Union. Fearing the détente 
emerging between Iran and the U.S.S.R. in 1982—the two had fallen out after the Islamic 
Revolution and because of the subsequent persecution of communists in Iran, among other 
reasons—China began courting Tehran; the Chinese ended up supplying the Iranians with around 
$3 billion USD.622 Unsurprisingly, the Iraqis were none too pleased, calling Chinese actions 
“immoral.”623 Further increasing Iraqi anger was the Chinese government’s public declarations 
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of neutrality, going as far as to maintain this mirage during Tariq Aziz’s visit to China in 
February 1988.624  Chinese and Soviet proposals for ending the war also incensed the Iraqis. 625  
 The East Africans also supplied the Iranians—Libya gave around $2.5 billion USD and 
Ethiopia $70 million USD to Iran.626 Saddam attempted to negotiate with Djibouti and Somalia 
to open bases within those states.  He wanted to use those bases—with four frigates and six 
missile corvettes—to attack and block Iranian naval activities within the Red Sea and Indian 
Ocean. However, both Djibouti and Somalia  refused, acquiescing to Western pressure. The 
Americans had no intention of trading Iraqi Baʿthism for Iranian Islamic fundamentalism, and 
they were intent on stopping both from spreading.627 Western pressure, however, was likely not 
the only reason for Somalia’s refusal, at least. Iraq, which had been Somalia’s sole supplier of 
oil, cut off shipments due to its war with Iran. This only worsened Somalia’s economic situation, 
and it also severely hindered getting aid to  refugees fleeing the region.628 
 
 Iraq in East Africa in the 1990s 
In the post-Gulf War environment, East Africa was still on the Iraqis’ radar screen.629   
Sudan protested Operation DESERT STORM and the ensuing sanctions, accusing the Americans 
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and the coalition of fighting “because their goal has developed into [causing] a change of the 
regime in Iraq.”630 Iraq repaid the favor by sending delegations to Sudan to help repair various 
aspects of the Sudanese military.  Between 1990 and 1992, the Iraqis largely built the element for 
Sudan’s air force within the local staff college.631 On one of these visits, in February-March 
1992, an Iraqi military delegation consisting of 38 officers, including brigadier generals and 
lieutenant colonels as well as non-commissioned officers, traveled to Khartoum in response to 
“the government of Sudan's request, and responding to the national call of duty.” Iraqis met with 
Sudanese military intelligence and with the command of the Air Force.   The specific  mission 
was  to help repair Sudan’s helicopters and aircraft, to provide spare parts, and to instruct the 
Sudanese in  how to conduct repairs.  
After arriving in Sudan in February 1992, Iraqi officers, along with the Iraqi ambassador, 
the military attaché, and the  chargé d’affaires. A ceremony was held upon their arrival. High-
ranking Sudanese officials were in attendance, including the Revolutionary Council Leadership 
General Director, the General Staff Corps Commander, the commander of the Air Force 
Commander, and several other high-ranking officers in the Sudanese air force. Sudanese 
President al-Bashir praised Iraq, stating that “Iraq is truthful in its promises and support to its 
brothers.” According to the report written by the Iraqi delegation, al-Bashir continued by stating 
his admiration for Iraq’s reconstruction efforts after the “occident” tried to send Iraq back to the 
“stone age.” Al-Bashir praised Iraq for its handling of the First Gulf War, adding that “the 
aggression against Iraq caused a great shock but the cloud will eventually go away....  We are 
sure that the change is coming with no doubt....  Iraq with its leadership will remain strong and 
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honored.” Al-Bashir then recited a poem that he had written to commemorate the first Iraqi 
missile hitting Tel Aviv. In the poem, he praised Saddam Hussein and, according to the Iraqi 
report, “[defamed] all the weak regimes.”  The event ended with the Director General of the 
Revolutionary Command Council expressing solidarity with Iraq and sympathy for their current 
situation under the economic embargo. 632 
But things did not go smoothly for the Iraqis.  The delegation’s stay had to be extended, 
as requested by the military attaché in the Iraqi embassy in Khartoum, when repair parts for the 
planes did not arrive on time.633 The Iraqis reported a sad state of affairs in  the Sudanese Air 
Force. Sudan’s helicopter division consisted of only four pilots. Many of their planes, including 
the MiG-24s, were damaged because of hard landings. Although some planes did not require 
repairs, such as the cargo planes, these planes could not fly because there were not enough 
capable pilots.  Even more frustrating for the Iraqis was that, although the MiG-21 jets needed 
repairs, Sudan did not have motivation to repair them  due to the  lack of pilots.634 Even many 
trained aviators had not flown for an extended period of time. Classes and flight instruction also 
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had to cease because “the planes [were broken] down, and [it is impossible] to repair them at the 
present time because of the lack of the spare parts.” Many planes were beyond repair—some of 
them had not had repairs in fourteen years, and some of them required parts that were no longer 
available.635  
The Iraqis even had to repair some of these planes by foraging and repurposing parts 
from nonrunning engines, but this met only with limited success —planes repaired this way 
could then be used only for training and not combat.  New engine covers, cockpit glass doors, 
hydraulic systems, wing balances, propeller shafts were required as well. The Iraqis initiated 
classes for rivet repairs as well as flight instruction and flight recertification. The Iraqi delegation 
also recommended further training for the pilots.  The Iraqi delegation recommended that the 
Sudanese should continue flying the planes in order to improve pilot effectiveness; they also 
stressed that the Sudanese must maintain better technical records and push for more flying 
hours.636  
In a report written for Saddam Hussein, the delegation praised the accomplishments of 
the mission, citing the “brotherhood” between the Sudanese and Iraqi forces.  The delegation 
claimed that “the collaboration of our brothers in the Sudanese air forces and the responsiveness 
of the officials at all levels, was the best help for U.S. to accomplish our mission in this short 
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time.”  The delegation reported that it had been able to repair airplanes that had previously been 
abandoned. It had also been able to prepare other planes for future use by Sudanese airmen. The 
report also mentioned the Iraqis leading training and certification classes for these airmen.  The 
report stated: “we as well retrained all the aviators to practice flying, starting from the highest-
ranking officers and ending with the cadets.” As with other delegations sent abroad, those 
writing this report praised the training they had received in Iraq, attributing their successes in 
Sudan and in the “Arab homeland” to the “military training, which we received from the school 
of the leader, the symbol, the fighter, and the president Saddam Hussein.” 637 
Sudan in the 1990s was marred by civil unrest and war following Al-Bashir’s 1989 coup. 
The Second Sudanese Civil War, often dated back to 1983, saw the deliberate targeting of 
civilians, famine, starvation, disease, child soldiers, slavery, and close to two million deaths.638  
In 1999, Egypt and Libya had attempted to get the Sudanese to enter into a peace agreement. 
However, they refused to commit on issues related to possible secession of the southern regions, 
leading the SPLA to withdraw from the proceedings.  U.N. and other foreign aid to Sudan was  
limited; deliveries were often delayed or even canceled  because of the violence and human 
rights violations. As a result, refugees poured from the country.  Iraq noted the massive influx of 
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refugees fleeing Sudan into Ethiopia, especially near the southeast border. Baghdad estimated the 
total number of refugees to be around 100,000. Famine and the lack of humanitarian aid only  
exacerbated the refugees’ plight.639   
The Iraqis continued to monitor the Sudanese crisis for any political or military 
developments.640 As always, the Iraqis were carefully checking for any communist party activity. 
The Baʿthists believed that their activities were evidence of “African or American auspices” and 
influence.641 Explaining Numayri's overthrow and subsequent internal turmoil, Iraq blamed 
external forces and argued that Sudan had been divided by “foreign intervention”—specifically 
by Uganda, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.642 Any talk of dividing the north and the south was 
attributed to “…foreign intervention in Sudan and the placation of it.” The establishment of 
opposition parties in the south, including religious groups like the Party of Jihad, was under  “the 
auspices of the United States,” according to the Iraqis. 643  But it was not just the United States 
facing the ire of the Iraqis; the United Kingdom was accused of cover-ups and false statements 
about its involvement and support of regional players.644 
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 Somalia and Djibouti 
Chaos in East Africa did not spell the end of Iraqi involvement in the region. By the 
1990s, Somalia as a functioning state essentially ceased to exist. “Politics” consisted of various 
warlords and clans fighting to dominate the streets, the country’s resources, and even 
humanitarian aid.  According to Richard J. Reid, part of this violence resulted from the re-
emergence of militant Islam in the region, itself a response to the “abject failure of secularism.”  
Using the large pool of disenfranchised men, groups like Hizb al’Islam (Party of Islam), al-
Shabaab (The Youth), and al-Qaeda (The Base) “[tapped] into [an] extant network of Islamic 
militancy of some antiquity.”645    
Cold War tensions also contributed to Somalia’s political upheaval. Somalia’s defeat in 
Ogaden in 1978 prompted Siad to preemptively quash one attempted takeover and to protect 
himself against future attempts at a coup. Along with heavy oppression, Siad began relying on 
his own family’s clan, the Marehan of the Darod. By 1987, more than half of the senior officer 
corps in Somalia belonged to this clan or to one of its affiliates.646 The pivoting of the Soviets  
away from Somalia had also opened the country up to Western assistance, but the state’s 
dependence on foreign aid as its main  means of survival resulted in open clan warfare when the 
United States suspended military and economic aid by 1989 as part of their winding down of 
financial support that had been justified as an expense in the Cold War. Clan factions were 
angered by Siad’s corruption, greed, tyranny, and betrayals – for example, he made a deal with 
Ethiopia in 1988 for the two countries to cease operations against one another so that both could 
focus on quelling their own internal strife, a deal many Somalis “likened…to the Hitler-Stalin 
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pact of 1939.”647   Clan factions broke into revolt, driving the country into civil war. Siad 
escaped to exile in Yemen in 1992; but General Muhammad Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi 
Muhammad, both of whom had fought against Siad, split and formed  their own factions, thus 
continuing the civil war.648  By the end of the 1990s, over 250,000 Somalis would lose their 
lives.649 
In response to this humanitarian crisis, the United Nations authorized the establishment 
of United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in late April 1992 to help secure a tenable 
ceasefire between the warring factions. U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had 
strongly pushed for action in Somalia, arguing that “national security should be overridden by 
the United Nations Security Council in cases where it was deemed necessary for peace 
enforcement.”650 After failing to secure the peace, UNOSOM was replaced by UNOSOM II, a 
task force led by the United States, to use “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a 
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”651 Operation RESTORE 
HOPE, as the mission was generally known, sent American troops to Mogadishu on 9 December 
1992.652  
 
647 Meredith, The Fate of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Independence, 468. 
648 Both Aideed and Muhammad belonged to the rival Hawiye clan. 
649 In 2006 and in 2009, Ethiopia re-occupied south Somalia. Border disputes continue to this day. Reid, Warfare in 
African History: New Approaches to African History,174. 
650 Meredith, The Fate of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Independence, 471.  
651 S/RES/794 (1992) 3 December 1992, Resolution 794 (1992), Adopted by the Security Council at its 3145th 
meeting, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/794  
652 See The Associated Press, “Transcript of President's Address on Somalia,” published in the NYT, December 5, 
1992, https://nyti.ms/29bqGci . Ironically, it was an Iraqi diplomat who pushed for intervention in Somalia. Ismat 
Kittani, who replaced UNOSOM I commander Mohamed Sahnoun, allegedly fed the U.N. exaggerated ground 
reports of civilian suffering, including a claim that 2 million Somalis faced starvation after 70-80% of all relief food 
had been looted.  Kittaini’s figures, while disputed by Red Cross officials, were cited as just cause for further 
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Somalia’s descent into chaos rattled Saddam Hussein, and U.S. intervention only 
heightened his fears.  Saddam classified U.S. entry into Somalia as an attack against the Somali 
people, not an intervention in their defense. In a discussion with his advisors, Saddam remarked 
that “[the Americans] will face difficulties in Somalia…the method used in attacking Somalia is 
unfair, since they had no government or stability. If you were fighting an average country, you 
could strike its factories or buildings. What could you do to a starving naked people, fighting 
with their AK-47s? They have no government you could send tanks to attack and that they could 
send their tanks to defend. The Somalis did not even own one plane in order for American to 
strike it.” He continued: “The Somalis were desperately fighting the Americans to obtain their 
shirts off their back…if the Americans continue such politics, they are going to face major 
troubles….”653 
After some initial success in mediation between Aideed and Mahdi, Operation 
RESTORE HOPE only galvanized and stoked more tension, suspicion, and fighting among the 
clans.  Aideed came to see the Americans as pro-Mahdi partisans,  When the Americans moved 
to shut down his propaganda operations, including “Radio Aideed,” forces backing Aideed  
allegedly told UNOSOM officers: “This is unacceptable. This means war.”654 On 3 October 
1993, U.S. soldiers of the Army Rangers, Delta Force, Tenth Mountain Division, the 160th 
Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and other units attempted to capture two of Aideed’s 
closest lieutenants in what was expected to be an hour-long raid. Instead, eighteen American 
 
escalation in the region. Kittani, a Kurd himself, had a peculiar relationship with the Iraqi government. See Paul 
Lewis, “Ismat Kittani, 72, Kurdish Diplomat Who Loyally Served Iraq,” NYT, 27 October 2001.  
653 CRRC SH-SHTP-A-000-753, “Saddam and his advisors discuss the decline of the United States and the 
possibility of rapprochement in the incoming Clinton administration,” circa 14 January 1993. See Woods, Palkki, 
and Stout, The Saddam Tapes: the Inner Workings of a Tyrant’s Regime, 1978-2001, 47-52.  
654 Meredith, The Fate of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Independence, 479. 
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soldiers were killed—with two bodies dragged through the streets, all broadcast on television—
and 72 were wounded.  Two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were downed during rescue 
attempts.655  Public outrage over this event prompted the Americans to cease the hunt for Aideed 
and then to withdraw from Somalia on 31 March 1994. Without U.S. backing, UNOSOM 
collapsed.  All U.N. personnel evacuated Mogadishu by March 1995, and civil strife continued in 
Somalia.  
But Saddam was ever the man of opportunity.  In a discussion with his top political 
advisors early in October 1994, Saddam justified deploying the Republican Guard, the vanguard 
of the Iraqi military, to southern Iraq in early October 1994.656 He said: “We do not accept dying 
of hunger…we do not accept that our people will die of hunger, and we are just sitting idle 
watching it become like Somalia, or like Haiti, or the other countries whose people were dying of 
hunger, and watch our people receive leftovers thrown in by the Westerners in a humiliating 
manner, without affording our people an actual rescue.”657 The goal, according to Saddam, was 
to trigger an international crisis that would draw attention to Iraq.  The world would then see the 
“truth” about the American injustices towards the Iraqi people. The Iraqi people were indeed 
suffering under sanctions, but Saddam wanted to use their suffering—suffering caused by his 
 
655 For more on this incident, see Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War. (New York: Atlantic 
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refusal to adhere to United Nations mandates—to portray Iraq and himself as victims of unjust 
American aggression and greed.658  
Civil war continued in Somalia throughout the 1990s—with various peace talks and 
conferences failing to secure peace—and Eritrea and Ethiopia were back at war between 1998 
and 2000. Eritrea used its alliance with its neighbor to the south, Djibouti, to facilitate trade. The 
two shared common territorial grievances against Ethiopia, thus giving them common cause, at 
least initially.  Previously incorporated as the French Territory of the Afars and the Issas, in June 
1977, Djibouti declared independence after France’s 1976 declaration that it would be vacating 
the region.659 Iraq wanted neither U.S. nor Soviet influence in the newly independent country, 
and it feared that the Americans wanted to set up permanent U.S. naval and aircraft facilities.660 
The C.I.A wagered that “Baghdad would be inclined to use economic and political pressure to 
make its point with the Djiboutians.” However, they also bet that “Baghdad might be too 
preoccupied to do more than protest loudly,” as the Iraqis were more preoccupied with the 
consequences of the Camp David Accords and the Iranian Revolution.661 Nor had the  Soviets  
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contested Somalia’s claims to Djibouti, prior to the latter’s  independence, further increasing 
Iraq’s paranoia over Soviet intentions in the region.662 
Regardless of other pressing regional concerns, the Iraqis had established an OI office, 
housing its intelligence capabilities, in Djibouti.  Like other OI offices around the world, the OI 
Djibouti maintained lists of that country’s politicians and personalities who "have positive 
attitudes towards Iraq” as well as individuals involved in television, radio and other media.  663 
Women’s groups were tracked along with individuals who had political or economic connections 
in Turkey and France.664 OI Djibouti also produced propaganda pieces to be distributed within 
the country.  One pamphlet claimed that the British admitted to their “crimes against Iraq,” and it 
further alleged that the UK was in a conspiracy with Iraq’s other two enemies—the Americans 
and the Jews.665 Intelligence about Djibouti’s internal political strife also reached Baghdad. In 
one example, OI Djibouti at first reported to Iraqi intelligence about an attempted military coup 
in the capital in August 1998.  The OI noted that the coup had failed and that the responsible 
officers and soldiers were being rounded up and arrested.666 Upon receiving confirmation, the 
intelligence agency passed the news up to the office of the General Secretary  of the Baʿthist 
office, the uppermost echelon of the party.667  
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Iraqi foreign policy in the 1990s was largely preoccupied with U.S-led sanctions in the 
aftermath of the First Gulf War (1990-1991).668 However, this did not mean that Iraqi 
intelligence operations ceased in East Africa. OI Djibouti kept an eye on developments on the 
Somalia crisis and the Somalia-Ethiopian border disputes. The OI sent back intelligence reports 
related to the November 1996 conference in the resort town of Sodere, Ethiopia (about 75 miles 
southeast of Addis Ababa).  There regional states and various East African actors, including 
factions of Somalia’s warring clans, gathered to discuss both the fallout of  Aideed’s death in 
August 1996 and the “Ethiopian occupation” of Somaliland in southern Somalia. According to 
the OI, the conference was spearheaded by the Americans, whose aim was “to show the so-called 
Somaliland as a legitimate state and [encourage] neighboring countries and their allies to 
recognize them.” 669 
The conference, which met in January 1997, created a 41-member National Salvation 
Council (NSC), which was then put in charge of organizing a transitional government in 
Somalia.670  The OI reported that the most “powerful Somali political fronts” approved and 
accepted the NSC. However, the conference was boycotted and rejected by Aideed’s son and 
heir apparent, Hussein Farrah Aideed, as well as by the government of Somaliland. A rival 
conference was held at Sana’a in Yemen, but this meeting was rejected by those in attendance in 
Sodere.  The OI chastised Yemen for its involvement, noting that Yemen wanted to promote its 
own choice for Somalia, Muhammad Ibrahim Ayqal. However, the OI gleefully reported, 
 
668 See Chapter 5: Iraq and Russia in the 1990s. 
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Muhammad Ibrahim Ayqal did not see himself as merely the head of a faction, and so he refused 
to visit Yemen unless Yemen was prepared to call him the president of Somaliland.  This they 
were not prepared to do.671 
Intelligence that was filtered through OI Djibouti noted that the number of factions and 
foreigners within Somalia was growing, including Islamist groups.  It was these groups and the 
subsequent collapse of the Somali state that prompted Ethiopia to invade Somalia in August 
1996. The Iraqis rejected Ethiopia’s justification that it was chasing Somali Islamic extremists 
out of Ethiopia—Addis Ababa had claimed to be chasing Islamist groups who were using 
Ogaden as a base of operations.  Instead, the Iraqis argued, Ethiopia was acting as a conqueror, 
an imperialist nation, and its action had resulted in an unwarranted “occupation.”  Although Iraq 
did acknowledge the growth of these Islamist groups, the Iraqis still saw action in the Horn of 
Africa in the 1990s as mostly a product of geopolitical wrangling, a consequence of foreign 
intervention, and a challenge to Iraq’s interests in the region.672 
 
 Iraq and the Horn of Africa 
In March 1988, the EPLF defeated the Ethiopians at the Afabat front in Eritrea, killing or 
capturing over 18,000 Ethiopian soldiers; three Soviet military advisers were also captured.673 
This Eritrean victory was a major turning point of the war. Shortly after, facing famine, financial 
difficulties, and military failure, the Ethiopians vacated western Eritrea. By 1991, the Eritrean  
rebels, having de facto control over the region, formed a government in the city of Asmara, 
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without hindrance from Addis Ababa.  Eritrea declared independence in 1991.674 Independence, 
however, did not spell the end of hostilities between the two states. In 1998, fighting along their 
border resulted in over 100,000 dead and in one third of Eritrea’s population fleeing from the 
border region.675   
Arab interest in the Eritrean conflict, let alone the Horn of Africa, was not a new or 
sudden phenomenon.  But as interest in the region was renewed, there were  different players.  
The race began in 2015 when the UAE, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar—with all focusing on 
the Bab-el-Mandeb strait and proximity of civil war-torn Yemen—started making new inroads 
into the region, such as with the construction of seaports and military outposts in Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan.676 By the second decade of the 21st century, events were all a part of 
their larger efforts “to redefine the regional order and assert themselves as players on a global 
stage.”677 The most prominent successor to the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, continued 
to meddle in African affairs, including in Sudan. The Russians moved to protect and arm al-
Bashir’s regime in Sudan with security training, weapons, and mercenaries, and they even went 
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so far as to shield him from the International Criminal Court.678 What cannot be denied, 
however, is that the legacy of the Cold War continues to affect today’s events in East Africa.  As 
historian Timothy Scarnecchia has suggested, “Given the heavy price Africans paid for the proxy 
wars and violent liberation wars that occurred during the Cold War, it is not surprising . . .  that 
such legacies and influences did not end abruptly with the same celebratory finality compared to 
the Cold War in Europe.”679 
From cultivating relationships with local populations—including students, politicians, 
and the media – to funding rebel fighters and setting up intelligence agencies to run out of their 
embassies, the Iraqis were fully devoted to the Eritrean cause. Even the Carter administration 
gave credit where credit was due, arguing that Iraq was “probably the staunchest backer of the 
Eritrean cause.” 680 But as Baghdad entrenched itself in the conflict, Iraqi interests in the region 
expanded—to Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti.681 By focusing on conflict in East Africa, 
Iraq could keep an eye on Egypt and Libya, and it could exploit local and regional tensions in 
hopes of gaining more influence in East Africa. The Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict, therefore, 
served as an avenue on which to advance and achieve Iraq’s ambitions.  
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The Iraqis used the same playbook as the Soviets when it came to intervention in East 
Africa: exploitation of local tensions, provision of arms, and economic aid.682  The Horn of 
Africa was another arena in which the Iraqi-Soviet relationship was tested – one in which the 
Iraqis saw the opportunity to challenge the Soviet’s “anti-imperialist” credentials on both the 
Arab and global stages and in which the Iraqis tested the limits of Soviet patience with Iraqi 
ambitions. Iraq did not see itself as acting as an imperialist.  In fact, they believed themselves to 
be liberators. Any local and regional decisions which ran counter to Iraq’s desires, in Baghdad’s 
mind, obviously indicated international malice. Even well into the 1990s, Iraq believed that 
“there are interventions by regional and international powers to arrange the conditions of the 
Horn of Africa.”683   
The Iraqi relationships cultivated in East Africa were not always focused on foreign 
policy.  In all its foreign interactions, the Baʿth used these relationships to both glamorize their 
forces and missions and to supervise their own domestic forces. Upon returning from training in 
Iraq, Sudanese military units wrote reports on their experiences, reports that were circulated 
among Baʿthist leadership. Some returnees reported “positive impressions” of the Iraqi Baʿth 
Party and the Iraqi Army. Other Sudanese soldiers were noted for paying tribute to “[Iraq’s] 
amazing army” and they relished in the “adoration” they felt from Saddam Hussein. However, 
not all reports were so positive.  One Iraqi armored force commander reportedly warned his 
Sudanese trainees against replicating “the formation of a [Baʿthist type] organization of the 
army.” The report does not state either who said this or to which unit he belonged, nor does it 
report his fate. However, given the paranoia within the Baʿth Party and its boundless fear of 
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military coups, one could reasonably assume that this officer was relieved of his command, at the 
very least.684  
By examining Iraq’s role in East Africa, historians can see further evidence of African 
agency in these conflicts. Too often, conflicts in the Third World pitted the U.S.S.R. and its 
allies, clients, and cronies against the U.S. and its allies, clients, and cronies. The Americans and 
Soviets were indeed involved in East Africa, and their own allegiances shifted due to local and 
regional circumstances. The third world actors in this region—Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, Somalia—all had their own agendas. Inspired by other global revolutions, Eritrea sought 
assistance, training, and support from the Iraqis and the Chinese at the same time, and it 
launched a complex campaign of resistance, including operations based on guerilla tactics, 
against forces backed by other Cold War powers.  Although the superpowers may have 
prolonged these conflicts, the people and history of East Africa were the most powerful drivers 
in this era.  No matter how many times they tried during the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict, and in 
subsequent conflicts, even the Iraqis could not surmount this fact, no matter how hard they tried.  
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Chapter 5 - Iraq and Russia in the 1990s 
 A global audience watched in shock and awe as the Berlin Wall, arguably the most iconic 
physical manifestation of the Cold War, was torn down by West and East Berliners on 4 
November 1989.  After receiving no word from Moscow, East German authorities did not 
impede the breach of the wall. The fall of the Berlin Wall would later symbolize the unification 
of Germany and the end of communism in Eastern Europe. Between 1988 and 1989, communist 
regimes all over Eastern Europe faced open defiance, civil resistance, and political change—
some peaceful, some violent. Poland was the first to fall in April 1988, followed by uprisings in 
Hungary in May 1988, East Germany in May 1989, Bulgaria in October 1989, Czechoslovakia in 
November 1989, and Romania in December 1989.  With no backing from Moscow—financially, 
politically, or militarily—Soviet puppet governments lost their strength, ability, and nerve to 
continue to rule. Many of these collapsing governments gave way to new and rising political 
powers, including new unions and political parties, and many older parties were soundly 
defeated in the first free and fair elections.   
 This chapter examines how Iraq navigated the fall of the Soviet Union. The end of the 
U.S.S.R. came shortly after the Iraqis were expelled from Kuwait by U.S-led coalition forces in 
March 1991. From then on, Iraq faced over a decade of United Nations sanctions and 
intermittent U.S.-led bombing campaigns.  Baghdad felt abandoned and even betrayed by 
Moscow, given the perceived inaction of the Soviet Union to resist  the American counter-
invasion of Kuwait.  But this did not stop the Baʿthist regime from seeking to re-establish 
relations with the new Russian Federation.  Even then, Iraqi diplomatic operations continued to 
run across the globe—while their missions shifted, Iraqi organizations that facilitated these types 
of operations were by and  large structured in the same manner as they had been before.  By 
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1993, with the political situation settling down in Russia, Moscow and Baghdad renewed their 
relationship. However, the dynamic between Iraq and Russia drew on the legacy of the 
relationship between Iraq and the Soviet Union from the years of the Cold War. Although bound 
by their mutual interests, Baghdad and Moscow still struggled to trust one another. Their 
relationship during the Cold War had been turbulent at times, and the two states could neither 
walk away from one another nor forget their conflicted past. Iraq learned important lessons 
during the time period, lessons that it would use in a new decade and era. 
 
 The End of Soviet Union  
By 26 December 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist.  The fall of the Soviet Union 
was ordained well before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Decades of corruption and mismanagement, 
changing demographics, ethnic tensions, the rise of labor unions and other workers’ groups, 
resistance in satellite states, overspending in the arms race, competition with the United States, 
environmental and nuclear disasters, technological backwardness, and the war in Afghanistan all 
contributed to the Soviet Union’s demise. This demise was not necessarily a surprise for Soviet 
clients in the Middle East, who had seen economic investment and monetary aid from Moscow 
all but dry up by the end of the 1980s.    
The Soviets began a rapid expansion of arms sales to Third World states in the 1960s.  
Other factors played key roles in this change:  economic aid was replaced with military aid as a 
means of  guaranteeing greater returns; the Soviets began a massive military buildup under 
Leonid Brezhnev; Soviet naval transportation and infrastructure expanded;  the 1965 Indo-
Pakistani and 1967 Six-Day wars prompted other non-Western states to seek Soviet arms; 
Israel’s destruction of Egypt’s armed forces, pressuring  the Soviets to begin supplying modern, 
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rather than outdated, equipment to their clients; the Soviets were pursuing  arms parity with the 
Americans; and a rise in Soviet confidence to exert influence in any conflict where their interests 
might arise.685  
But troubles first materialized in the mid-1970s. Grain crop failures in the U.S.S.R. and 
the Soviets’ increasing need for hard currency were the first signs of trouble.  Tensions appeared 
with clients in the Third World, such as Egypt’s expulsion of the Soviets in 1972; and the poor 
showing of Soviet equipment in combat, such as Lebanon in the 1982 war, foreshadowed further 
trouble. The behavior of Soviet military advisors was a serious problem.  They often came across 
as arrogant towards their clients, even though the Soviets were usually afraid that their 
equipment would fall into the wrong hands and thus were reluctant to pass on everything they 
knew about the equipment and its production.  The lack of adequate training left clients even 
more frustrated. This frustration prompted many Third World states to seek Western arms 
instead.  Nor was the Soviet Union well placed to compete in that moment.  The price of oil per 
barrel had declined in the 1980s, and, as Mark Kramer argues, this severely hurt the Soviet 
Union’s most “lucrative source of hard currency earnings.”   Also, massive debts incurred by 
most Middle Eastern states and owed to the Soviet Union remained unpaid, so that Soviet coffers 
were often in the red in the 1980s.686 
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By 1986, Soviet arms sales and shipments began to decline markedly. This was due in 
part to the global saturation in arms and weapons, as well as to the “new political thinking” in 
Soviet foreign policy. This new policy encouraged the use of political means to end conflicts in 
the Third World rather than the continuation of an armed conflict; in one example, the Soviets 
encouraged Ethiopia to end its long-time war with Eritrea.687 This change in policy was part of 
Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempts to improve East-West relations, a major area of 
focus for Gorbachev’s new foreign policy. The Soviets had originally traded sophisticated 
equipment and arms to curry favor and win access in the Third World, including in Syria, Egypt, 
and Iraq, but this dynamic was in serious jeopardy by the end of the 1980s.688 
Even Gorbachev’s ambitious internal reforms—perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost 
(openness)—could not stem the Soviet decline.689 In describing the decline of the Soviet Union,  
the Iraqis pointed toward the lack of “individual entrepreneurial bureaucracy”—an interesting  
remark given the highly centralized bureaucratic nature of the Baʿthist regime itself— and also 
toward limited Soviet resources and low productivity as the main drivers for decline. A June 
1990 Iraqi political report argued that the Soviet experience produced “harmful results,” 
including an economic crisis that was produced by the “inability of the productive apparatus” to 
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689 See Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: the Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008). 
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meet the needs and demands of the Soviet people.  With their needs unaddressed, the Soviet 
people were waging a “silent revolution,” demanding democracy.690  
For the Iraqis, the collapse of the U.S.S.R. was inevitable from the beginning of its 
foundation, but not all the fault rested in the Soviet government’s actions. Yes, according to 
Baʿthist literature, the Soviet system was inherently flawed, but its demise was expedited by 
external factors—mainly its confrontation with the West. According to the Iraqis, since 1917, the 
West had sought the destruction of the Soviet Union, starting with the American, British, and 
Czech invasion of Russia; this was an attempt to forestall and even defeat Bolshevik forces.691 
The West’s victory in 1945—in this instance, the Iraqis do not seem to have considered the 
U.S.S.R. as part of the Allied victors—however, changed everything. As Baghdad viewed it, the 
Soviets had to sacrifice their national income for massive military expenditures, and thus began 
their decline.692  
All of this, according to the Baʿthists, showed the Soviet model of governance to be a 
“poor” one.  Gorbachev, therefore, was left with only two possibilities: He could accept 
Brezhnev’s approach, in which the U.S.S.R. was to wait for the “inevitable explosion” of the 
Soviet population, as the Baʿthists viewed it, or else he could prevent the crisis by implementing 
new reforms.  The Iraqis noted that the last Soviet leader who had tried to implement reforms, 
Nikita Khrushchev, had failed; and the  failure had  cost him his political career. Reformist 
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leaders in the Soviet Union, held the Baʿthists, had to confront a “double edge sword.”  Their 
attempts to win over the people would often bring on confrontation with the conservatives within 
their own party.  From Khrushchev’s experience, Gorbachev learned, as did the West, that 
reform could only come if the regime was open to criticism and allowed the broadcast of  
criticisms that did arise. This, to the Baʿthists, explained the need for glasnost first.693   
Gorbachev’s attempts to outmaneuver the conservatives in his party by means of glasnost 
did not convince the Iraqis.  The Baʿth Party still doubted the prospects of these reforms, 
believing it would be nearly impossible to transcend the history and legacy of the Soviet Union’s 
one-party state.  “There was a violent shake-up in the party,” according to an Iraqi report, but 
establishing a “multi-party policy,” and thus a democratic framework, within the Soviet Union 
remained improbable. The Baʿth were self-aggrandizing here.  The Iraqi government “permitted” 
other political parties to operate, but the Baʿth party was the only meaningful party in Iraq. 
Elections were held , but they were  merely  another means to legitimize Saddam’s regime.694 
However, the Iraqis did note that there were murmurs and complaints about perestroika and its 
likelihood of success emanating from Soviet media and parts of the Soviet government, 
including the Communist Party and Council of Soviets. 695  
In 1989, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze, conducted his 
final diplomatic tour of the Middle East.  In his first stop in Syria, Hafez al-Assad grilled the 
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Soviet statesman, arguing that Soviet leadership was failing to fulfill its promise to protect the 
region from American imperialism.  Worse, according to Assad, the Soviets had forsaken the 
Middle East, favoring Asia, Africa, and East Europe in terms of time, money, and effort. The 
Syrian dictator expressed little sympathy or support for Moscow’s situation.696  After this 
bruising encounter, Shevardnadze travelled to Baghdad.   When informed that the U.S.S.R. 
wanted to improve relations with both Iraq and Iran, an oddly jovial Saddam Hussein joked: 
“May Allah help you. Only let it be our Allah and not the Iranian one!” Finally, in Iran, 
Ayatollah Khomeini did everything he could to avoid meeting the Soviet entourage and refused 
to greet them in Tehran.  Eventually, and only begrudgingly, he allowed them to visit his home 
in Qom. Even there, the Ayatollah refused to discuss anything related to foreign policy, only 
finally agreeing to consider buying Soviet weapons.  He did not commit to any purchases.697   
This trip is emblematic of declining Soviet prestige and influence in the Middle East at 
the end of the 1980s. Iraq watched this decline with trepidation.  The collapse of the Soviet 
Union was problematic in that the U.S.S.R. was Iraq’s most important and powerful Cold War 
ally. But the new political era of  the 1990s offered a new chance for Russia and Iraq to review 
and renew their relationship. Guided by many of those who had been  part of the Soviet state, the 
new Russian Federation sought to capture the glory that the new leaders saw in old Russia.698  
 
696 The C.I.A. assessed that Syria was “one of the first Soviet clients to sense the impending changes that Gorbachev 
and his ‘new thinking’ would bring to the Middle East.”  Assad began courting the Egyptians and the Americans as 
means to “maintain Syrian credibility with Israel and Iraq in the wake of the Soviet retrenchment.”  C.I.A. 
Memorandum, “Syria: Assessing Asad’s Regional Politics,” 25 October 1990, Desert Shield/Desert Storm 
(November 1990) [1], OA/ID 91144-008, Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files, Chronological Files OA/ID 91143 Box 
36, Brent Scowcroft Files, GHWBL. 
697 Robert Service, The End of the Cold War, 1985-1991. (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2017), 384, 393. 
698 For more, see Andrei Soldatov, and Irina Borogan. The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia’s Security State 
and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB. (New York: Public Affairs, 2010).  
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However, it would not be that easy. Russia had a history of vacillating in the Middle East during 
the Cold War. Its legacy of playing both sides of the fence with its clients and their enemies left 
the Baʿthists feeling embittered. Both the Soviet Union and Iraq had a habit of saying one thing 
and doing the exact opposite, much to the frustration of their supposed partners.  As they saw it, 
each  had been burned by the  other numerous times. This was not an easy legacy to escape. 
However, given their common enemy—American hegemony—these two states could not bear to 
sever or even to lessen their  relationship.  
In terms of organizational structure, the Iraqi state reflected much of the Soviet system, 
just without the ideological zeal for communism. Baʿthist Iraq and the Soviet Union each had 
strict hierarchies, along with an overly complicated bureaucracy. The regimes operated by means 
of party patronage, a deep security apparatus, corruption, and favoritism. Saddam Hussein and 
the Politburo used their own visions of nationalism to justify their rule and to expand control 
over the people.699 But the Baʿth Party watched the collapse of the Soviet Union, along with its 
puppet governments in the satellites in Eastern Europe, with both glee and fear. On one hand, 
Saddam cited the collapse of communism as both a triumph and a vindication of Baʿthism.   On 
the other hand, the fall of the Soviet Union meant Iraq lost its most important ally.  
 
699 For more on “Iraqi nationalism”, see Kamyar Abdi, “From Pan-Arabism to Saddam Hussein’s Cult of 
Personality: Ancient Mesopotamia and Iraqi National Ideology.” Journal of Social Archaeology 8, no. 1 (February 
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Saddam Hussein’s Baʿth Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
For nationalism in the Soviet Union see Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in 
the Soviet Union, 1923-1939. (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2001); Robert John Kaiser, The Geography 
of Nationalism in Russia and the U.S.S.R. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); Jan W.  Bezemer, 
Robert Van Voren and Alexander Bon, Nationalism in the U.S.S.R.: Problems of Nationalities. (Amsterdam: Second 
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Although “socialism” appears in the formal Baʿth Party name, Saddam Hussein and the 
Baʿthists abhorred communism.  On one hand, communism offered an alternative to the 
Baʿthists, and so it  was perceived to be a threat to the regime. On the other hand, the Soviets 
attempted to use communism to make inroads into Iraqi internal affairs during the Cold War; this 
included support for communist elements in Kurdistan and for the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP).  
Although Baʿthist regime long tolerated the existence of the ICP, historians of Iraq often identify 
May 1978 as the turning point in a different direction . It was then that 21 Iraqi communists were 
executed, accused by the regime of “traitorous” and subversive activities.700 From then on , the 
Baʿthists openly persecuted any confirmed or suspected communists, along with their families 
and other associates. This obsession with  eradicating  communism within Iraq, according to 
prominent historian Joseph Sassoon, stemmed from the perspective that the “Baʿth ideology was 
not as successful as Communism in attracting young people and intellectuals. Time and again, 
Saddam called for fighting Communist ideology with a more creative Arab worldview.”701  In 
Saddam’s mind, the collapse of the Soviet Union confirmed his theory.702   
 
700 See Chapter 2: Iraqi Foreign Policy, 1968-1989. 
701 In the 1990s, Saddam Hussein also became increasingly convinced that Islam, rather than Baʿthist ideology, was 
more appealing to young people. Joseph Sassoon, “The East German Ministry for State Security and Iraq, 1968-
1989,” Journal of Cold War Studies. 16 (1), Winter 2014, 4-23: 8-9, 9n20.  See also Ofra Bengio, Saddam’s Word 
Political Discourse in Iraq. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) (in particular the chapter titled “Manipulation 
of Islam); Samuel Helfont, Compulsion in Religion: The Authoritarian Roots of Saddam Hussein’s Islam, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2018).  Sassoon also cites a report by the General Security, “Study: The Iraqi Communist 
Party and the Military forces,” 11 November 1987, in NIDS, PUK 017, Box 071 (310013– 310021) to illustrate how 
the Baʿth Party feared the lures of Communism over Iraqi Baʿthism.  
702 In discussing Poland’s 1993 elections, where the Communist Party faired with 30% of the vote, Saddam 
remarked:  “Because now [Poland] is going back to communism, well, well, where will things end up? Not 
communist but socialist, in the end the same way as us. We concluded very, very, very early in Gorbachev’s era.” 
Tariq Aziz says that “they [the Poles] lost their minds.” CRRC, SH‐SHTP‐A‐000‐755, “Saddam meets with Tariq 
Aziz and Iraqi high‐ranking officials regarding Ekeus, inspections, and other matters,” unknown, after July 1993.  
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This rejection of communist ideology, however, did not stop the Iraqis from tracking how 
communist parties viewed the Baʿthist regime. Official political affiliations and protocols were 
established with communist and socialist parties in Italy, China, Finland, Bangladesh, Germany, 
Egypt, Yemen, Cape Verde, Greece, and Mauritius. Communist parties partook in celebrations 
of the al-Faw campaign (during the Iran-Iraq War, in 1988, the Iraqis recaptured al-Faw 
peninsula from Iran in a decisive victory) and the July 14 anniversary of the Baʿthist takeover in 
1968.703 Celebrations were noted in Cuba, Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Mexico, 
Australia, China, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Spain, Czechoslovakia, West Germany, Russia, Poland, 
Bulgaria, and Switzerland.704 The Baʿthists also took great pleasure in receiving letters of 
condolences from the Chinese Communist Party when Michel ‘Aflaq, who had a founding role 
with the Baʿth Party, passed away in 1989; ‘Aflaq’s exile and eventual passing in Iraq gave the 
Baʿthists a greater feeling of regional and ideological legitimacy in their dispute with Syria.705 
The Baʿthists abhorred communism at home, but they had no qualms about establishing official 
party channels and communications with communist parties abroad. This policy allowed the 
Iraqis to expand the  geographical scope of their influence by not refusing support or aid from 
anyone or anything that wanted to support Baghdad. The regime also relished the admiration that 
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left-leaning governments abroad bestowed upon Iraq.  The Baʿthists took it as a sign of 
legitimacy and respect.706 
But Iraqi celebrations over the Soviet Union’s demise went far beyond ideology. Too 
many times, according to Saddam, the Soviet Union had slighted Iraq. This list of slights 
included, but was not limited to, Soviet betrayal of them during the Iran-Iraq War, working with 
the Kurds, assisting the Iranians, cooperating with the Americans, and allying with Israel. The 
fate suffered by the Soviet Union, therefore, befitted those who had betrayed Iraq. In the 
aftermath of the U.S.S.R.’s collapse, Saddam pointed to the Soviet Union’s previous power, 
noting that it “had national willpower not long ago.”  Then, with Gorbachev’s arrival, it all 
ended, leaving Saddam to boast: “In spite of the missiles, atomic arms, and everything [Russia] 
has, Iraq, which does not have any atomic arms, is currently more powerful.”707 
Changes in Iraqi-Soviet relations were developing well before the fall of the U.S.S.R. 
The Soviets played both Iran and Iraq during the 1980-1988 war, and Iraq was vocally critical of 
the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. However, the U.S.S.R., under Gorbachev’s 
leadership, also began improving its relations with Israel as part of its attempts to bolster 
cooperation with the Americans and the West. This change in policy came at a cost for Arab 
states, because the Soviets also began cutting back their support for radical Arab regimes, 
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including Iraq.708 With the decline in arms sales and a shift in Soviet policy, the Iraqis knew that 
the Soviets were in trouble.  
From the point of the view of the Iraqis, the Soviets had betrayed the Iraqis during the 
Cold War over and over by supplying and remaining friendly with Syria and Iran, Iraq’s long-
term enemies. Intelligence in the northern part of Iraq in 1989, for example, had detected that 
“special contracts were signed with the Soviet Union providing Iran with munitions including 
aircraft (including 20 MiG 29s, accompanied by Soviet pilot trainers), tanks, surface-to-surface 
missiles, radar, surveillance devices, and wireless devices.”709 The Iranians had sent military, 
industrial, and agricultural assistance and also increased their gas exports to the U.S.S.R.710  
Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi intelligence had also discovered that some prominent 
Kurdish communists, as well as lawyers, had fled to the Soviet Union; these refugees had 
assisted others in escaping to the Soviet Union as well.711  The Baʿth Party had also spent 
decades rooting out and destroying elements of the ICP, driving any surviving members well 
underground or into exile. Iraqi communists had had assistance from the U.S.S.R. in the 1980s, 
and some, including Kurdish communists, had fled Iraq to the U.S.S.R. as well, much to the 
frustration and anger of the Baʿthists.712   
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 Despite the anger at the Soviets, the collapse of communism still created shock and 
confusion in Iraq, just as it had in the rest of the globe. The Iraqis had even signed another round 
of economic and technical deals with the Soviets in 1988 and 1989, and, in spite of the 
tumultuousness of their relationship, the Iraqis still saw the economic importance of ties with the 
Soviets.713 However, in early December 1989, with the dust barely settled across the globe after 
the events in Berlin, a memo released by the Central Planning Office reflected the Iraqi 
government’s confusion.  In it, the office recommended releasing a newsletter from the Ministry 
of Culture and Media to “explain [to the party] the dimensions of these transformations” from 
the point of view of Saddam Hussein.  “In light of the changes occurring in the socialist countries 
and the fall of the Berlin Wall,” the memo also called for “clarifications” from Saddam on Iraq’s 
stance on these events for the sake of unity within the Baʿth party.714   
The collapse of communism jeopardized Iraq’s relations with the Eastern bloc and the 
Soviet republics. Besides running intelligence operations out of these countries, Iraqi students 
and military officers were sent for education, training, or other missions, often on the behalf of 
the Iraqi government or industries connected to the Baʿthists. The Soviet republics, including 
Azerbaijan, for example, were crucial for the Iraqis. To Baghdad, these states not only possessed 
natural resources, but they offered more political thrusts into the Soviet system. Often, military 
officers and diplomats received education in one area of the Soviet Union, and then they were 
later posted in a different area.715 The Soviet Republics were also seen as key to keeping an eye 
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on Iran. The Baʿth party feared that the Iranians were covertly transporting goods through this 
region, and they also had suspicions that the Iranians were also trying to establish their own 
relations with these republics. These concerns later materialized. During the Iran-Iraq War 
(1980-1988), Iraqi intelligence noted that the Soviets were allowing contraband and weapons 
from North Korea to be delivered to Iran through Azerbaijan. 716  In the 1990s, Iraqi intelligence 
detected that some of the newly independent states were cooperating with Tehran’s nuclear and 
oil infrastructure projects.717 
The events in Romania particularly rattled Saddam Hussein.  Dictator Nicolae 
Ceausescu and his wife were captured and subsequently executed by firing squad on Christmas 
Day 1989 after anti-regime revolutionaries reacted violently to Ceausescu’s attempts to solidify 
his control in the aftermath of fall of the Berlin Wall.   Video of their execution by firing squad 
and of their bodies after the shooting aired on both Romanian and international television. 
According to Ofra Bengio, Ceausescu’s fall prompted Saddam to “[jump] on the bandwagon of 
glasnost…at least, he wished to appear to move with the times.”  But, as Bengio argues, this was 
no more than “lip service” to the idea of democratization as Saddam sarcastically mused that 
“Iraq needed democratization and ‘openness’ just as a person opens the windows ‘lest they 
shatter at the moment of an explosion.’”718  Back in Romania, OI Romania’s organization was 
not in the best shape. There were 485 Iraqis in the Bucharest embassy (145 of whom were 
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students, along with others of various party levels and membership), but the Iraqis were losing 
more Eastern European associates than they could count.719 
In terms of geopolitics, the Baʿthists were also anxious about the power vacuum in the 
region. Saddam told U.S. officials in early 1990 that “the collapse of the Soviets left the U.S. as 
the only outside power that counted in the region." They speculated that “[Saddam’s] subsequent 
paranoia about perceived slights may only testify to his genuine fear of us. This is an asset, if 
used wisely.”720   The Americans believed that they could use the collapse of the U.S.S.R. to 
further their interests in the Middle East.  Syria’s economy was extremely weak, and it felt 
abandoned by the Soviets who disagreed with Syrian involvement in Lebanon.721  Also,  the 
Syrians were diplomatically isolated in the Arab world with the Palestinian Intifada (uprising) in 
1991 stripping Assad of credibility as an influence over the Palestinians. As the U.S.  
government noted, “[Syria] is a tired regime.”  With Assad’s decline, they speculated,  Iraq 
under Saddam would be “free to bid for Arab leadership.” Because of this, the U.S. government 
wagered that they should prepare policy suggestions in case of a war between Iraq and Israel.722  
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 The First Gulf War (August 1990-Febraury 1991)723 
Iraqi actions in the Middle East forced the Soviets to expose their deterioration one last 
time. On 2 August 1990, Iraqi forces crossed the border and invaded Kuwait.  Under the guise of 
recovering Iraq’s “stolen” 19th province, as the Iraqis saw Kuwait,724 Saddam was moved by his 
desire to control the small country’s abundant oil fields, expand Iraq’s shoreline  on the Persian 
Gulf, and find a quick solution to Iraq’s rapidly deteriorating financial situation.  After a brutal 
eight-year war with Iran (1980-1988), which was largely financed with loans, the Iraqi economy 
was in dire straits.725  Saddam contended that the loans should be forgiven considering that, in 
his war with Iran, he had been protecting the Arabs from Persian encroachment. Needless to say, 
the Kuwaitis did not buy this logic and refused to cancel Iraq’s debt.  Saddam began increasing 
his political attacks on Kuwait in the mid-1990s, arguing that Kuwait was deliberately 
manipulating oil prices and production to further hurt Iraq’s economy and that Kuwait was 
stealing oil from the Rumaila oil field, an oil field that was near the border.726 Saddam also 
feared losing face and prestige at home, and he feared plots against his regime. Therefore, by 
invading Kuwait, Saddam hoped for two outcomes: immediate economic relief, thanks to 
 
723 In the Middle East, this is often colloquially referred to as the “Second Gulf War,” with many Arabs, especially 
those residing on the Arabian Peninsula, considering the Iran-Iraq War to be the “First Gulf War.” Other times, it is 
also referred to as the “Invasion of Kuwait” or the “Liberation of Kuwait.”  Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is 
therefore considered the “Third Gulf War” or the “American Invasion.”  
724 This narrative goes back to 1961, when Kuwait was given independence by Britain. Then Iraqi Prime Minster 
General ‘Abd Al-Karim Qasim threatened to invade Kuwait, calling it an “integral part of Iraq” since it had been 
part of the Ottoman Empire’s territorial control. Although Iraq eventually backed down, thanks to British military 
threats, the Baʿthist regimes after Qasim never accepted Kuwait as a formally independent country, and occasional 
border clashes—such as the 1973 Samita border skirmish—continued.  
725 Some estimates total these loans around $37 billion USD by 1990.  
726 For compensation, Saddam also demanded that Kuwait turn over sovereignty of both Bubiyan and Warbah 
Islands to Iraq. 
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Kuwait’s massive oil fields and reserves, and a distraction for any disgruntled elements of Iraqi 
society.  
Saddam began maneuvering Iraqi forces to positions near the Kuwaiti border in July 
1990, but his maneuvers were largely interpreted by the American government as  feints and 
mere shows of force.727 However, Saddam called everyone’s bluff on the morning of 2 August. 
Kuwait’s small armed forces were no match for the Iraqis, and they collapsed within hours of the 
invasion. This prompted the Kuwaiti ruling family to flee to Saudi Arabia while the rest of the 
country fell under Iraqi rule.728 Almost immediately, the United Nations Security Council 
sanctioned Iraq under Resolution 660 (UNSCR 660), condemning the invasion and demanding 
Iraq’s immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, while Resolution 661 imposed 
economic sanctions on Iraq, including banning Iraqi export commodities, prohibiting importing 
any Iraqi goods, and turning away Iraqi ships calling at international ports.729 
U.S. and coalition forces were deployed to Saudi Arabia as part of the buildup for both 
the defense of Saudi Arabia and the counterinvasion of Kuwait as soon as 7 August; Operation 
DESERT SHIELD was launched by the Americans on 8 August. Aerial bombing of Iraq began 
on 17 January 1991, with bombs targeted on military and civilian infrastructures, including Scud 
 
727 The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq sent a note back to Washington, D.C. in July 1990 arguing that Saddam “has never 
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missile sites, power stations, and Baʿth party facilities. After Saddam refused to adhere to the 
conditions set by UNSCR 660, the ground invasion began on 24 February 1991. U.S. Marines 
pushed into Kuwait while Army units swung into southern Iraq. Within 100 hours, the Iraqi 
forces were expelled from Kuwait and were retreating back to Baghdad. A ceasefire was signed, 
and subsequently UNSCR demanded that Iraq pay reparations to Kuwait. UNSCR 687 also 
established the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to investigate Iraq’s suspected 
program in chemical and biological weapons.730 
Just like the Americans, the Soviets interpreted Iraqi maneuvers near the Kuwaiti border 
in July 1990 as a bluff.731 Even though the Soviets did issue a statement condemning the 
invasion, in the form of a joint communiqué with the Americans on 3 August, there were 
nonetheless some initial hesitations in Moscow. First, Iraq and the Soviet Union were still bound 
by the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Pact. Joining an  U.S.-led coalition 
presented problems since  Article 10 of the Pact specified that “each of the two high contracting 
parties declare that it will not enter into any international alliance or grouping to take part in any 
actions or undertakings directed against the other high contracting party.”732  There was 
acknowledgment that the invasion was illegal and carried all the hallmarks of imperialism, but 
 
730 For more on the military buildup, coalition building, and military action, see Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. 
Trainor, The Generals War: the Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995). For UNSCR 
687 see: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/687  
731 Gordon and Trainor, The Generals War: the Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf, 35. 
732 Never mind that Iraq violated Article 4 (which specified that “the high contracting parties condemn imperialism 
and colonialism in all forms and manifestations”). See Appendix B. Russian sources believed that disregarding the 
Pact seriously damaged Russian standing in the Arab world. Ismael and Kreutz, “Russian-Iraqi Relations: A 
Historical and Political Analysis”, 91n39.  The C.I.A. also estimated that “Moscow probably had little to no 
knowledge of Iraq’s invasion, or direct knowledge of Saddam future military planning/operations.” C.I.A. 
Intelligence Memorandum, “Soviet Intelligence on Iraq,” 14 August 1990, FOIA Collection, Document Number 
0001466695, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001466695.pdf  
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many Russian statesmen were worried about Iraqi debts owed to them and Russian credibility in 
the region—this was a client after all.733  
Second, many Soviets, including Yevgeny Primakov, still held onto the U.S.-Soviet 
rivalry and did not want the U.S. leading the coalition or assuming responsibility in the region.734 
These hardliners believed that the Soviet Union following an American initiative would signal 
the decline of the U.S.S.R. – as if it was not already evident it.  Primakov and others instead 
called for an Arab solution.  The Soviets believed that the size of U.S. contingents in the region 
and the American ability to enforce the embargo of Iraq indicated a desire among U.S. leaders to 
expand the “Pax Americana.” Secretary of State James Baker’s promises of “no permanent force 
presence” in the Arab world, along with assurances that the Americans were going to keep force 
numbers at a minimum, did not assuage fears of hardliners in Moscow.735  
 
733 Russian sources indicate Soviet-Iraq contracts were worth around $37.4 billion USD in 1990.  Ismael and Kreutz, 
“Russian-Iraqi Relations: A Historical and Political Analysis,” 91n31. Tariq Aziz discusses the unhappiness 
emulating from the pro-Iraq but anti-Kuwait invasion faction in Moscow, CRRC SH‐SHTP‐A‐000‐670, Saddam 
Meeting with the Revolutionary Command Council about Iraqi Foreign Policy after Invading Kuwait and the 
Likelihood of an American Attack, 11 October 1990.   
734 Primakov served as a member of Gorbachev’s Presidential Council until 1991, where he was then appointed First 
Deputy Chairman of the KGB. The KGB changed to the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) after the fall of the 
U.S.S.R. and Primakov served as its director until 1996. After that, he was appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
He became Yeltsin’s Prime Minister in 1998, only to be fired in 1999 after Russia’s economic and agriculture 
conditions continued to deteriorate. After a long political career, Primakov died in 2015. For more on his firing, see 
Andrew Higgins and Mark Whitehouse, “Yeltsin Fires Prime Minister Primakov; Crisis Clouds IMF Loans, Kosovo 
Pact,” The Wall Street Journal, 13 May 1999. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB926472695362778967  
735 Baker even hoped his promises could be used to calm “right-wing” critics in Moscow, but also noted that because 
the Soviets were worried about their future, future policy and action, they faced “some potentially tough sledding.” 
Telegram from Secretary of State Baker to the President, “Thursday Meeting,” 14 March 1991, Persian Gulf 
Conflict -February 1991, OA/ID CF00946, Roberts M. Gates Files, NSC, GHWBL. 
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However, third, conversations between Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign 
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze showed that the Soviets were worried about Soviet families and 
advisers in the Kuwait and Iraq—totaling about 534 persons in Kuwait and 7,380 in Iraq.  Thus, 
they did not want to partake in action against an “old friend.” Privately, Shevardnadze called 
them hostages.736 The Soviets also had over 1,000 military advisors in Iraq, further complicating 
their worries. 737 Saddam was clearly aware of this fear, and he continually promised and then 
reneged on freeing Soviet workers. Seeking leverage against the United Nations and the United 
States, Saddam promised to release Soviet workers specifically to forestall Soviet support for 
Resolution 678, which offered Iraq one final chance to implement Resolution 660 before the 
UNSCR authorized the United Nations to enforce it by any means necessary.738 In the end, 
however, the Soviets did vote for UNSCR 678, and all foreign hostages were released by Iraq in 
December 1990.739 
 
736  Saddam Hussein’s use of foreign hostages as political pawns, including broadcasting his visits with them on 
television, did not ease the worries of the Americans or the Soviets.  Dana Priest, “Saddam Orders the Release of all 
Hostages” The Washington Post, 7 December 1990. Gordon and Trainor, The Generals War: the Inside Story of the 
Conflict in the Gulf, 35; Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War 
in the New World Order. (London: Faber and Faber, 1994), 80, 140-141. Table 1: Foreign Nationals in Kuwait and 
Iraq (early August 1990). The citation for this simply states “Sources: Various.” Ismael and Kreutz, “Russian-Iraqi 
Relations: A Historical and Political Analysis,” 91n33 also cite around 8,000 Soviet citizens.  The C.I.A. also 
estimated that there were around 1,000 Soviet military advisors in Iraq at the time as well. C.I.A. Intelligence 
Memorandum, “Soviet Intelligence on Iraq,” 14 August 1990, FOIA Collection, Document Number 0001466695, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001466695.pdf 
737 By 21 August 1990, the Soviets had confirmed Soviet advisers were working with the Iraqis but only on “repairs, 
education, and construction,” adding that the “advisers would be coming home as soon as their contracts were 
fulfilled.” Graham E. Fuller, “Moscow and the Gulf War,” Foreign Affairs, 1 June 1991. Bill Keller, “The Iraqi 
Invasion; U.S. and the Soviets as Allies: It's the first time since 1945,” NYT, 8 August 1990. 
https://nyti.ms/2PYM6O9  
738 Freedman and Karsh. The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, 240. 
739 Dana Priest, “Hostages Pour Out From Iraq, Kuwait,” The Washington Post, December 11, 1990.  
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The Soviets were therefore divided into two major camps: Eduard Shevardnadze 
adamantly agreed with the Americans, whereas Primakov led the hardliners, who resented the 
rise of the Americans at the cost of the decline of Soviet influence.740 The Americans were well 
aware of the divisions within the Soviet government. They were concerned  about Primakov in 
particular. Special Assistant to the President, Richard Hass, argued that the Americans needed to 
“ensure that ‘Primakovism’ and its search for face-savers is not getting out of hand.” The main 
focus was to keep the Soviets in line for whenever the time to use military force materialized. 741  
The Americans and Soviets agreed on three basic principles regarding the Persian Gulf crisis: 
they must work together, Saddam “must clearly, unmistakably fail,” and sanctions must be given 
their due process before force was used against Iraq.  The Soviets thought that it was too early to 
use force as authorized by the UNSCRs.  But there were nuances of difference among the 
Soviets.  U.S. Secretary of State James Baker believed that Eduard Shevardnadze was more 
“inclined to think [force] will have to be used eventually.” Baker also felt that Gorbachev 
struggled to “reconcile” the use of force, since he wanted this newly emerging “era to be 
different from the Cold War and based on different kinds of norms.”742 
Gorbachev tried to walk the middle— although he believed Saddam’s actions ran against 
all international norms, Gorbachev still sought to exhaust all diplomatic avenues before 
accepting that force must be used to drive Saddam out of Kuwait. From August 1990 through the 
 
740 For a more detailed analysis of these divides, see Galia Golan, “Gorbachev's Difficult Time in the 
Gulf.” Political Science Quarterly 107, no. 2 (1992): 213-30.   
741 Memorandum, “Country-by-Country Package of Objectives” from Richard Haas to Secretary of State Baker, 2 
November 1990, Persian Gulf Conflict Pre-1991, OA/ID CF00946, Subject Files, Roberts M. Gate Files, NSC, 
GHWBL. 
742 Memo for the President, from James Baker, “My day in Moscow” 8 November 1990, Persian Gulf Conflict Pre-
1991, OA/ID CF00946, Subject Files, Roberts M. Gate Files, NSC, GHWBL. 
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beginning of Operation DESERT STORM, the Soviets tried to act as middleman, carrying on 
their own form of shuttle diplomacy, between the Americans and Iraq.  Delegations were sent 
between Moscow and Baghdad and between Moscow and Washington D.C., all through the time 
of the military buildup. Gorbachev met with Iraqi delegations in Moscow, including Tariq Aziz, 
and he sent Primakov, acting as special Soviet envoy, to Iraq to negotiate with Saddam 
personally as well.  
Primakov’s first visit to Baghdad occurred in early October 1990. He was dispatched to 
help secure the release of 500 Soviet workers after Saddam had refused to meet with the Soviet 
ambassador following Moscow’s vote in support for the UNSCRs.743 Primakov was also tasked 
with repairing Soviet-Iraqi relations, using this hostage-release mission as an opportunity to meet 
face to face with Saddam. The meeting was not amicable. Saddam disparaged Primakov for 
suggesting impossible hypotheticals.  “Let me be honest with you, comrade Primakov,” Saddam 
said, “you can't lift the American sanctions against Iraq. Thus, even in a hypothetical promise of 
[withdrawal] from Kuwait, the sanctions will remain, oil will not be exported, and things will 
remain the same, waiting for another negotiation with the United States just to allow us food or 
medicine, and not knowing where it may lead us. This will continue [until] America crushes the 
regime, economically and socially.” Saddam demanded to know where Soviet loyalties truly lay: 
“You, as the Soviet Union, are you able to give me something, or you are just going to take this 
flexibility around to Bush and [Saudi Arabia’s King] Fahad?”744  Saddam wanted to know if the 
 
743 The Associated Press, “Confrontation in the Gulf; Gorbachev Aide Meets Iraqi On Soviets Trapped In Gulf,” as 
published in the NYT, October 5, 1990, https://nyti.ms/2WwinBZ . See also John Hannah, “The Primakov Mission 
to Baghdad and Washington: What Happened?” Policy Analysis via The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
24 October 1990, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-primakov-mission-to-baghdad-and-
washington-what-happened  
744 CRRC SH‐PDWN‐D‐000‐533, Meeting between Saddam Hussein and the Soviet Delegation, October 1990 
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Soviets were shopping around policy suggestions to the Americans and Saudis as well. He was 
worried that the Soviets were waiting to commit entirely to Iraq in the event that better prospects 
emerged from Washington D.C., and Riyadh.  
For his part, Primakov likened the Gulf crisis to the “Caribbean crisis”—the Cuban 
Missile Crisis.  Even though the Soviets pulled their missiles from the island nation, an 
unpopular decision in Cuba, the Soviet Union, according to Primakov, had still been 
“considering other means of securing Cuba's security….  Because had we insisted on keeping 
our missiles and aircraft, a military confrontation with the United States would have been 
imminent. The deceased Kennedy came to our Embassy, it was raining, and he was wearing a 
raincoat; he raised his hat and said to us, ‘I beg you, the President has no choice but war.’”745 For 
Primakov, Soviet initial flexibility towards the Americans granted them both crucial time. 
Therefore, Primakov insisted, the Soviets were not abandoning Iraq but instead following 
historical precedent, a precedent that had arguably averted World War Three.  
At first, the Americans welcomed these Soviet diplomatic efforts. Bush told Gorbachev 
that he appreciated Gorbachev’s having sent  Primakov to the United States after his visit to Iraq. 
Bush told Gorbachev: “It is yet another indication of just how much the relationship between our 
two countries has developed….  The two of us—the United States and the U.S.S.R.—have led 
the way. Our cooperation has cemented the international consensus.”746  Bush told Egyptian 
 
745 The “Kennedy” referred here is likely Robert Kennedy, brother of President John F. Kennedy. CRRC SH‐
PDWN‐D‐000‐533, Meeting between Saddam Hussein and the Soviet Delegation, October 1990. 
746 Message from President Bush to President Gorbachev delivered via U.S. Ambassador Jack Matlock, 20 October 
1990, Desert Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [1], OA/ID 91144-006, Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files, 
Chronological Files, OA/ID 91143, Box 36, Brent Scowcroft Files, GHWBL. 
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President Hosni Mubarak in late October: “We need the Soviets, and they’ve been very good, 
and I think they’ll stay on the line.”747 
Consultations with Primakov did not produce the assurances that Saddam so desperately 
sought. In discussing with the former’s visit, Saddam remarked to his cabinet: “…basically I 
want to say that nothing important resulted from Primakov coming here.” 748  Nevertheless, 
Saddam continued to search for supporters as international pressure to withdraw continued to 
mount. In attempts to shore up Arab support for his annexation, Saddam tried to link Kuwait’s 
occupation with the Israeli “occupation” of Palestine.  This invasion, according to Saddam, was 
to draw attention to the plight of the Palestinians and bring their grievances to the forefront of the 
world’s attention.  Saddam also told Primakov that the “the return of legal rights of the 
Palestinians” was not just for the sake of humanity or for “Pan-Arab reasons,” but for “Iraq’s 
security.” 749  But the Arab world, except for PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, was not 
persuaded.750  Saddam persisted, as in early January 1991 when Saddam offered to withdraw 
 
747 Mubarak also met with Primakov, telling him that “there can be no rewards for Saddam” and “that there will be 
no negotiations before an unconditional withdrawal and the return of the legitimate government of Kuwait.” 
Mubarak told Bush that he was going to “convince Primakov to be aligned with us on the situation.  He should not 
separate with us.”  Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak, 25 October 1990, Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm (October 1990) Part II [2] OA/ID 91144-007, Desert Shield/Desert Storm Files, Chronological 
Files, OA/ID 91143, Box 36, Brent Scowcroft Files, GHWBL. 
748 CRRC SH‐SHTP‐A‐000‐670, Saddam Meeting with the Revolutionary Command Council about Iraqi Foreign 
Policy after Invading Kuwait and the Likelihood of an American Attack, 11 October 1990.  
749 CRRC SH‐PDWN‐D‐000‐533, Meeting between Saddam Hussein and the Soviet Delegation, October 1990 
750 Arafat’s support for Iraq significantly weakened the PLO cause. See Mattar, Philip. "The PLO and the Gulf 
Crisis." Middle East Journal 48, no. 1 (1994): 31-46. Also see Chapter 3: Iraqi Intervention in the Lebanese Civil 
War, 1975-1990. 
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from Kuwait in exchange for the removal of foreign troops and a settlement of  Palestinian 
issues. The Bush administration, however, immediately rejected this offer.751 
Nonetheless, Soviet diplomatic efforts continued into 1991 as Gorbachev told the Bush 
administration that he “wanted to take advantage of the even the smallest chance” with Iraq.752 
After the aerial campaign against Iraq began on 17 January, despite repeating that “Saddam was 
to blame for the war,” Gorbachev argued that Saddam had “lost the military capability to 
threaten his neighbors and that the time had come to stop the fighting.”753 However, American 
patience with Iraq was running out, and Soviet initiatives were increasingly seen as more 
troublesome and annoying than as helping to resolve the issue.  In early February, Gorbachev 
claimed that the events in the Persian Gulf—the bombing of Iraq and other military actions 
against Iraqi targets—were “threatening to exceed the [United Nations] mandate.” In short, he 
believed that the coalition led by the United States was going too far.  The Americans fired back 
that “Iraq’s use of massive force against Kuwait and in defense of the occupation of Kuwait 
legally justifies massive defensive attacks against the force. The objects of military force 
therefore may legally include those elements of Iraq’s infrastructure that support and sustain the 
occupation of Kuwait.”754 Differences over objectives divided the two Cold War superpowers. 
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For example, the U.S. was also upset that Soviet proposals in late February did not mention 
repatriation of POWs, did not set a time for withdrawal, and did not refer to economic 
reparations.755  
The major difference between Soviet and American proposals for Iraqi withdrawal rested 
on what was meant by the “unconditional” withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait.  The Americans 
wanted Iraq out of Kuwait immediately, and they would only negotiate the end of sanctions and 
a ceasefire once the Iraqis had crossed the border and left Kuwait. They wanted Iraq to “meet the 
test of immediacy,” but the Soviets wanted to grant Iraq three weeks to withdraw. To the Soviets, 
this demand of immediate withdrawal was an American “ultimatum,” and, if the Soviets went 
with it, they would be in “a very difficult position in the future.”  According to Soviet logic, 
military intervention was not necessary if Saddam agreed to withdraw from Kuwait using a 
negotiated timetable.  However, the Iraqis had their own contingencies—they wanted all 
economic sanctions lifted before they removed two-thirds of their forces from Kuwait.  Even 
though the Soviets talked Saddam down to removing all troops to ease sanctions, the Americans 
would accept nothing of the sort. They wanted Iraq out immediately, timetable and contingencies 
be damned.756 
The Soviets tried to mediate a deal up until the day of the allied ground invasion on 24 
February. On 21 February, Gorbachev tried in vain to convince the Americans that Aziz’s 
willingness to publicize the Soviet peace proposal must mean that the Iraqis were open to 
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change.757  Although Gorbachev told Bush that Aziz had “some kind of impression based on 
realism,” Bush responded that “we have no trust anymore in anything that man says.”758 On 22 
February, Bush announced a 24-hour ultimatum, giving Iraq one last chance to leave Kuwait; 
failure to do so would trigger the ground invasion.  In yet another conversation with Gorbachev, 
Bush said that Saddam’s destruction of Kuwaiti oil fields and infrastructure was the final straw, 
suggesting to Gorbachev that “it seems that he is taking advantage of the talks with you to 
destroy Kuwait and play for time.”759 
On 23 February, Gorbachev called Bush again, begging for more time.  “George,” he 
said; “Let’s keep cool.”   He then asked Bush to go back to the UNSC.760 While he did not want 
this to “divide the U.S. and the Soviet Union,” Bush responded bluntly, “I don’t want to leave a 
false impression that there is any more time….  I do not want you to feel that there is any 
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inclination for the U.S. and the coalition to delay…  I don’t want to mislead you. I don’t feel 
inclined to wait.”761  The ground invasion commenced on 24 February, and, less than one 
hundred hours later, the Iraqis were defeated. On 28 February, the Iraqis agreed to a ceasefire, 
which was signed in Safwan, Iraq on 1 March. 762 
 
  After the Gulf War of 1990-1991 
The aftermath of the Gulf War shaped Iraqi foreign policy and outlook throughout the 
remainder of the 1990s.763  For one thing, under UNSCR 687, the United Nations continued 
sanctions against Saddam’s regime as a means to force Iraq to embark on further disarmament. 
After reports of dire conditions among Iraqi civilians, the U.N. authorized the Oil-for-Food 
Programme in 1995. This program was marred by controversy and corruption, to say the least.764 
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A thorough discussion of sanctions and the Oil-for-Food Programme falls out of the scope of this 
work, but how to maintain a regime under severe sanctions was a key driver of Iraqi foreign 
policy in the 1990s. For Saddam, whose paranoia about his regime’s stability increased 
throughout the 1990s until his downfall in 2003, a sanctions regime could lead to the end of 
Baʿthist rule and therefore his own. 765 A relationship with Russia was seen by Baghdad as 
crucial to this matter.  
The “Mother of All Battles” (the Iraqi name for the First Gulf War) and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union confirmed, according to the Baʿthists, the “so-called new international order,” 
one that was already influencing affairs in the Arab world. 766 In August 1990, as indicated by the 
Saddam tapes, the Baʿthists believed that the Soviets would continue to support them. Thus, the 
Soviet backing of UNSCR 660 shocked the Iraqis. In a letter he sent to Gorbachev, Tariq Aziz 
argued that the “the nature of the relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union do not jell with the 
hasty stands that were taken by the Soviet Union.” Citing “strong ties, deep and historic ties,” 
Aziz suggested that the Soviets try to “investigate” and “identify” with Iraq’s position— that the 
annexation of Kuwait was legal and justified—rather than rush to support the American-led 
efforts against them. Aziz stated: “the relations between the Soviet Union and Iraq, or between 
the Soviet Union and the Arabs must not be compromised by making this hasty decision, and he 
asked that the Soviet Union must not follow the American ambitions in the region.” However, 
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according to Aziz, the Soviets said that they were under tremendous pressure from the 
Americans. After a “huge argument” with the Soviet Ambassador, Aziz told the Soviets that “it 
is a shame that you are joining the Americans.” Even so, in the words of Aziz, the Baʿthists did 
not view Soviet action in this matter as “hostile” towards Iraq. Instead, Aziz blamed the “out of 
control Soviet press” for forcing the Soviet government to tread lightly. Aziz concluded that it 
was the pressure from the United States that was really to blame, adding that there were “no 
tangible signs that the Soviet Union is cooperating, except for the diplomatic field and the 
announcements that are being released due to the American pressure.” 767 
 As mentioned above, the Soviets were not able to mediate a deal between the Iraqis and 
the United States. Even Saddam asked:  “…are the Soviets so intent on stopping the war that 
they would claim there is hope for a peaceful resolution even though they know we are steadfast 
in our stance and even though they didn’t come back with anything important from Iraq?” 768 
Saddam’s refusal and intransigence to retreat from Kuwait triggered the ground invasion, but the 
Iraqis put more blame on the Soviets for this than on their own actions.  Even hours after the 
ground invasion commenced, some members of Saddam’s immediate circle believed that the 
“plot has been accurately executed and the Soviet Union is well aware of that. In fact, it 
supported the United States in its aggression. Despite all this, I believe it is crucial for us to 
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embarrass the Soviet Union in this phase and escalate our political maneuvering.”769  As the 
ground invasion commenced, the Iraqis overwhelmingly felt betrayed by the perceived Soviet 
inaction during war.  Saddam lamented that the Soviet Union had even “tricked” and “trapped” 
Iraq.770  
Arguably as a form of revenge against Gorbachev, Iraq supported the late-August 1991 
coup in Moscow, in which hardline Communist Party members attempted to remove Mikhail 
Gorbachev and roll back his efforts at decentralization. Boris Yeltsin would lead the effort 
against those who plotted the coup, even standing on tanks outside Russia’s Parliament Building 
to address the protesters and media.771 Still angry over Soviet inaction during the First Gulf War, 
official Iraqi media outlets quoted Iraqi government officials saying: “It is natural that we 
welcome such change like the states and people who were affected by the policies of the 
former regime.”772 His support for the coup was not well received, even in the Middle 
East—only the PLO, Libya, and Sudan joined in Iraq’s support of the coup. In conversation 
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with President George H.W. Bush, in which they discussed the August coup, Turkish President 
Turgut Ozal remarked that “Saddam is foolish to support the coup.”773 
Iraq was hardly on Moscow’s radar between the First Gulf War and 1993.  Following the 
collapse of the U.S.S.R. in December 1991, the newly independent Russian Federation, under 
President Boris Yeltsin, was in the midst of three simultaneous transformations: the collapse of 
Communism and the transition to a market economy and democracy; the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc and the security it had provided to the historically insecure Russia; and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union itself and with it an empire built over several centuries.774  This transition was 
economically and politically painful for the new country.  Russian territory held just 50% of  the 
population of the old Soviet Union, and its GNP was one tenth that of the United States in 
1995.775  Gruesome wars in the breakaway province of Chechnya (1994-1996 and 1999-2000) 
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and the loss of the submarine Kursk in August 2000 illustrated the weakness of Russia’s foreign 
policy and its inability to project power very far as well as its own domestic instabilities.776   
In the early 1990s, as argued by scholars Tareq Ismael and Andrej Kreutz, Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin’s administration consisted of political figures with a “neo-liberal and 
occidentalist” mentality  who wanted to leave behind the alliances, legacies, and turmoil of the 
Soviet period. This regime viewed Iraq with contempt, so much so that the Iraqi ambassador was 
not received by Russian leaders when he sought to discuss the money that Iraq owed Russia; this 
prompted the ambassador to complain to various members of the Russian Parliament.777  Yeltsin 
and his liberal supporters sought to move away from the networks created by their Soviet 
predecessors. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and subsequent intransigence before the United Nations 
further justified the Yeltsin faction’s belief and attitude towards Iraq.  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the new Russian Federation struggling to hold 
on, the Americans were left as the one surviving Cold War superpower.  With the overwhelming 
victory in the First Gulf War, the U.S. government was ready to assume the status of hegemon. 
Despite losing their Cold War ally and because they had been humiliated on the global stage, the 
Iraqis were eager to navigate this new political era. The Iraqis began manipulating the memory 
and narrative of the First Gulf War. Saddam even argued that Iraq was actually victorious in the 
war, since the Americans had requested the ceasefire rather than send troops to conquer 
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Baghdad.778 Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz argued: “we paid the price in 1991 when our 
weapons were destroyed….  It is not in our interest to remove ourselves from the game….”779   
Further cementing Iraqi resentment of Moscow, the Russians were of no help to the Iraqis 
in their fight against the continuing sanctions under UNSCR 687.  When informed of the latest 
renewal in February 1992, Saddam remarked that the Russian representative to the U.N. was 
“becoming like a little agent” and that Iraq needed to “admonish the Russian representative.” To 
Saddam and the Baʿthist state, the Russian representative, and therefore Russia, was acting like 
an American puppet.780  Saddam wanted two Russians to be part of the U.N. inspection team, 
arguing that Russia’s participation could “revive [the] old role of that dead giant.” However, he 
also demanded that the Russians be notified that “we still estimate them though [as if they] are 
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fruitless and useless.” The Russians for their part rejected this Iraqi request, countering that 
Baghdad was trying to use Moscow as part of their ploy to try to  divide the U.N.781 
The new Russian Federation refused to be an Iraqi pawn. The Iraqis saw that they must 
avoid the mistake they had made during the Cold War – they could not rely on the Russians to 
back them. Without completely writing off their relationship with the Soviet Union  (and with 
the soon-emergent  Russian Federation), Iraq now sought alliances with and assistance from 
other European nations and from the United Nations.  Using multilateralism, Iraq set out to build 
coalitions in order to counter American hegemony, a hegemony that was determined to punish 
Iraq for its transgressions in Kuwait. Therefore, both overtly, and covertly, the Iraqis began 
courting French, Chinese, and European interest by touting economic possibilities—especially 
oil—within the country; to be sure, the Iraqis had courted these groups in the Cold War, but this 
time they did so with much more bravado, both inside and outside the U.N.  Emphasizing 
Europe’s own uncertain future, Saddam firmly believed “that… except for Britain…what we 
know to be true according to our analysis, [as] the French and Italians are talking about it… is 
that all of Europe does not want a weak Iraq, because they have started to make the connection 
between their interests and [having] American control the region by itself, or a weaker 
America.”782  The Iraqis gambled that it was not only the Russians who resented American 
hegemonic status. 
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 The idea of developing allies outside the Soviets began even during the Kuwait crisis.  In 
October 1990, Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, the Iraqi Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command 
Council, argued: “[N]ow the U.S. has destroyed the Soviet Union. It is destroyed, you see it 
disbanding, falling apart, the people and the military. That is the international situation.” He then 
suggested that the Baʿthist regime instead shift its focus to France, claiming that both the Soviets 
and the French “have no interest in war” and because France could “influence Europe.” Taha 
Yasin Ramadan, Vice President of Iraq, argued that, “because of their president and current 
policies,” the Soviet Union would no longer be able to provide Iraq with a “security buffer.” He 
echoed Izzat’s calls for Iraq to shift its focus to France; “they will be a better security buffer for 
us.” 783 
 In the same meeting, Taha also disregarded China, citing the wavering of their support 
for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War.  During the First Gulf War, the Iraqis had reached out to 
China, noting that China’s “position is, of course, better than that of the Soviet Union” in that 
China was not in political turmoil like the Soviet Union . Although China voted for the initial 
UNSCRs, the Iraqis noted the more “moderate” tone of the Chinese, a signal that the Chinese 
were not enthusiastic about following the Americans.  According to the Baʿthists, this indicated 
that the Chinese were willing to cooperate with the Iraqis. 784 
However, the Iraqis were well aware that China would not cooperate with them in the 
open.  Rather, they would operate as they had before. Tariq Aziz argued that, "when we were at 
war [the Iran-Iraq War], they sold us arms and sold [to] the Iranians as well, and then they would 
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turn around and claim they did not send arms to either party.”785 During the Iran-Iraq War, the 
Iraqis courted the Chinese, fed up with the Soviets’ flip-flopping. In 1986, Tariq Aziz visited 
China at Beijing’s  invitation.  Iraqi objectives were increased coordination and cooperation 
between the two states. There he met with the Foreign Ministry, the General Secretary, and 
media offices.786 The Chinese told the Iraqis that they were upset with Iranian intransigence and 
were alarmed by the West’s support for Iran.  The Chinese were also upset that the Iranians had 
sought weapons from Vietnam, especially abandoned or captured American weapons.787   
The Americans had other ideas, however. They wanted to convey to the Chinese a sense 
of “our growing impatience with sanctions and with Saddam’s refusal to withdraw or release 
hostages.” But the U.S. government essentially wanted to inform the PRC what they were doing 
and leave it at that. Chinese offers of assistance in the UNSC and other diplomatic avenues were 
largely disregarded by the American government.788  Even then, the Chinese were not as forceful 
in this regard as the Iraqis would have appreciated.  In the aftermath of their use of the military in 
the suppression of protesters advocating greater democracy in Tiananmen Square in June 1989, 
the Chinese treaded lightly in the U.N. As scholar Ronald C. Keith argues, the Chinese “acted 
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with studied circumspection, avoiding any frontal Security Council challenge to the U.S.-led 
U.N. coalition against Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.”789 This lack of action by China 
was noticed by the Iraqis.  In a July 1991 conversation with his advisors, Saddam remarked that 
“that the whole world is taking orders from the U.S….”790 
Other events soon confirmed Iraq’s decision to seek out new alliances. In June 1992, to 
protect the Kurdish populations in the northern portion of the country, the Americans used the 
authority of UNSCR 688 to keep Iraqi aircraft from flying north of the thirty-sixth parallel.791  
Similarly, a boundary was imposed later in the summer in the south.  Acting in August 1992 
without U.N. authority, the Americans, along with the British and French, instituted a no-fly-
zone along the 32nd parallel as means to protect the Shiʿa populations in southern Iraq. 
Answering calls to rise up, the Shiʿa and the Kurds had rebelled against Saddam’s regime after 
the First Gulf War, only to be slaughtered by the Iraqi army in return.792  
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Yeltsin wrote to the Americans, expressing his sympathy for the Kurds, but he also 
expressed fears of American encroachment, arguing that “…it cannot be denied that the fact of 
the introduction of foreign troop contingents into the territory of another state without that state’s 
request or consent, even with such a humane goal, can be perceived as a threat to its territorial 
integrity.” Yeltsin indicated that he had discussed this with Saddam, trying to convince him that 
the West was only interested in time-limited humanitarian operations, and he asked Bush to pass 
along “strict instructions” of restraint and caution to foreign troops assisting Kurdish refugees.793   
Again, however, the Russians could not save the day for Iraq. In late December 1992, an 
Iraqi F-16 plane was shot down by the Americans for crossing the 32nd parallel.794 Although the 
U.S.  government thought Baghdad was deliberately trying to provoke the Americans, the Iraqis 
believed the F-16 shootdown was part of President George H.W. Bush’s plan to coordinate with 
“the United Kingdom, France, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to escalate the situation with Iraq, in 
order to create a new confrontation because they failed to accomplish their intentions during the 
previous period.”795  Yeltsin refused to intervene, despite having two warships and anti-
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submarine ship in the Persian Gulf.  Iraq was irate that Russia did not do more.796 Yeltsin’s 
decision to avoid confrontation with the U.S would enrage Russian nationalists, some arguing 
later on that he and his Foreign Minister, Andrey Kozyrev, “caused a noticeable decrease in 
Russia’s prestige and political influence…” in the Middle East.797 Other Russian nationalists, 
including Sergei Vasilyvich, would later tell the Baʿthists that Yeltsin “handed over Russia to the 
Americans.”798 
 
 Organizations of Iraqis  
The strain in the Iraqi-Russian relationship did not stall other Iraqi diplomatic operations. 
In fact, the fall of the Soviet Union did not alter the embassy organizations’ missions.  If 
anything, the embassy organizations (EO) became even more important in an era of American 
hegemony.799 The Iraqis continued to run EO operations in 69 countries, and these activities 
were abundant. 800  For example, there were EO activities in Mexico—where the EO was 
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working to coordinate with local news agencies, papers, and correspondents to broadcast pro-
Iraqi messages.801  Similar action occurred in Lebanon, Canada, Poland, and China, to name just 
a few.802  
Nevertheless, there were some structural changes, including name changes, within the 
Baʿthist bureaucracy.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the EOs were re-named “Organizations 
of Iraqis” (OIs) while the Office of Organizations Outside the Region in Baghdad (with  
headquarters in Baghdad) was renamed the “Branch of the Bureau of Iraqis Outside the Region.”  
The name changes did not significantly alter the structure of the party organization. Baʿth 
hierarchy remained the same: the party was first organized by local party divisions (which 
controlled neighborhoods or districts), then into sections (which controlled small- to medium-
sized cities), then branches (similar to governates), and finally the regional command.803 This 
name change did, however, elevate the Office of Organizations Outside the Region in Baghdad 
to branch level.  The branch level was crucial, responsible for everything in its territory and 
reporting directly to the Baʿth Party’s headquarters, the regional command. Branches carried 
great influence, as Samuel Helfont argues, in that “everything from investigations of Iraqis to 
security operations to patronage projects were carried out by the party branches.” 804   
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By the end of the Cold War, the headquarters managing embassy organizations had been 
elevated to branch status—hence the name change to Branch of the Bureau of Iraqis Outside the 
Region. The branch was now given responsibility for all operations conducted outside Iraq. 
Separate embassy organizations, such as those in Prague, Paris, or London , reported to the 
Branch of the Bureau of Iraqis Outside the Region, who then reported to the Regional Command.  
The embassy organizations’ party structure—the hierarchy of party members and employees—
replicated the party hierarchy in Baghdad.805  According to Helfont, these name changes 
“[reflected] a process of bureaucratic standardization that aligned the party structure outside of 
Iraq with the party structure inside Iraq.”806  
As they did in the Cold War, so after it as well, the OIs continued to track individuals—
those Iraqi citizens who were abroad, those who were sympathetic to the regime, and those who 
were not, including dissidents and exiles.  An example of the latter was Kanan Makiya, a 
prominent Iraqi dissident and author of the influential book Republic of Fear (1989).  The 
Baʿthists tracked Makiya in the United States, going as far as to attending lectures he gave.807 
The OIs were also looking for non-Iraqis who held sympathetic views of Iraq. For example, a 
report written by a pro-Baʿthist professor in Mali was relayed back to Baghdad.  According to 
this report, the professor argued that on “the day of the death of communist Russia, and the 
breakup of the U.S.S.R., the world became subject to one dictatorship, dictatorship of the west, 
especially the hegemon U.S.…. While Western capitalist countries are trying to unite to replace 
the Soviet Union, recognizing the danger of American hegemony, the Arabs and the teams seem 
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to be in a state of apathy.”808  The fact that this report was passed through Baʿth party channels 
illustrates that the regime wanted to know who else outside Iraq agreed with Iraqi assessments of 
world affairs.  
Intelligence and political operations were still run out of the OI as they had during the 
Cold War. OI China, for example, monitored the activities of the Chinese Communist Party, and 
it was keen to understand China’s growing and changing economy. They also were eager to learn 
China’s perspective, policies, and strategies in  the new era without the Soviet Union.809 The OIs 
located within the U.S.S.R’s former sphere of influenced were crucial for the Iraqis in that they 
served as another way to keep an eye on neighbors, allies, and enemies. Relations between Iraqis 
and Bulgarians continued to be tracked, in one example.810 Since Iraqi students continued to 
study in the new republics—again, students were seen as both intelligence assets and a potential 
concern—and therefore the OIs were needed  to monitor their activities.811 In some cases, 
students who had studied in the republics when the Soviet Union existed were sent back to the 
republics following their respective independence. In one case, an Iraqi student who had studied 
in Baku, Azerbaijan in 1988 was sent back to Baku for further “specialization” in his chemistry 
studies. To be sure, it is not clear whether he was recruited for this position solely to pursue more 
training in chemistry or because he had prior experience operating within Baku. However, it is 
safe to wager that it may have been a mix of both.812 
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809 The OI also believed that there would be “significant” changes within the CCP due to age and the rising 
generations. Conference of the Chinese Community Party, 1992/9/24, 0177, BRCC 3260-0002, HB, HIA.  
810 Bulgaria, 1993/4, 0147-0148, BRCC 2696-0002, HB, HIA.  
811 For a list of student branches operating within the OIs, see Untitled, 1993, 0605, BRCC 033-4-2, HB, HIA.  
812 Information, 1992/2/6, 0487, BRCC 033-4-2, HB, HIA. 
259 
 Party bureaucracy continued to dominate the daily affairs of the OIs, even in those 
countries that were in political upheaval.  Documents within the BRCC show that the distribution 
of party membership badges continued, as did OI party elections.813 Elections for leadership 
positions were held in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Russia and Poland in 1991. 
However, in almost all these instances, one can find another hallmark of Baʿthist “elections”: 
election meddling. In some cases, victories of certain candidates were invalidated by the Baʿthist 
elite, often by secret motion and with little to no explanation why.814 The paranoid, party-driven, 
and bureaucratic structure of the Baʿthist regime continued to rule supreme, even abroad. 
However, as the OIs continued to operate as they did when U.S.S.R. existed, the OIs’ 
mission, as ordered by Saddam himself, was refocused to counter American actions against the 
country.  Saddam ordered the OIs to “communicate and explain the Iraqi position to the rest of 
the world,” using whatever means to which they had access, including political parties, peace 
organizations, and “anyone else who has similar positions as Iraq.” Anyone who was pro-Iraq 
and anti-U.S. was to be courted.815  The embassies and party organizations were supplied with 
official party rhetoric from the Foreign Affairs Ministry and ordered to contact political parties, 
party officials, the media, and religious committees in host countries. Other official Iraqi groups , 
including peace organizations and Islamic women’s groups, were all encouraged to distribute 
official and semi-official statements and declarations of support for Iraq at their various posts.816  
 
813 Party badge,1993/9, 0825 (Russia), 0837 (Egypt and Czechoslovakia), 0839-0841 (lists Yemen, Russia, 
Czechoslovakia, Belgium, GB, Finland, Tunisia, Jordan, Austria, Djibouti, Canada, Bulgaria, Algeria, Libya, 
Poland, Turkey) BRCC 3288-000, HB, HIA. 
814 Party Elections, 1991/9/26, 0014-0018, BRCC 2671-0001, HB, HIA. Party Elections, 1991/9/26, 0019-0020, 
BRCC 2671-0001, HB, HIA.  
815 Guidance, 1993/7/12, 0129, BRCC 100-3-5, HB, HIA. 
816 Guidance, 1993/8/4, 0147, BRCC 100-3-5, HB, HIA.   
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  The OIs made political inroads into numerous political parties across the globe to protest 
U.S. sanctions against the Iraqi regime. Among the countries where the OIs worked in this way 
were Great Britain (the Workers Party, the Liberal Party), Turkey (Socialist Party, the 
Democratic Left Party), Japan (the Communist Party), France (Workers Party, Communist Party, 
Communist Association), India (Communist Party, Marxist Party), Kenya (United Muslim 
Citizens), Bangladesh (Workers Party, Islamic Society), Belgium (Workers Party, Anti-
Imperialism Association), Hungary (Workers Party), Eritrea (Liberation Front), Sudan (Baʿth 
Arab Socialist Party in Sudan), Somalia (Liberation Front), and Palestine (Liberation Front).817  
 
 OI Moscow 
In early September 1988, unknown perpetrators snuck past the Soviet sentry and broke 
into the Iraqi Embassy in Moscow. After failing to gain access to the military offices, they 
entered the meeting room of the OI and offices that dealt with Iraqi students and immigration 
matters. However, they were not able to break into the main part of the embassy, and they 
escaped with nothing taken or missing.  When asked by the Iraqi  ambassador why he had not 
tried to stop the break-in, the Soviet guard replied that, when the intruders entered the grounds of 
the embassy, he, as a Soviet citizen, could not enter the embassy without official permission 
from the responsible authorities. Soviet officials were not overly concerned when notified, much 
to the frustration of Baʿth party officials both in Moscow and in Baghdad.818 They did not 
 
817 Within Jordan, 21 different parties, including Democratic, students, socialists, Islamic, Palestinian, Youth Groups 
and Unity groups were courted. Other parties located with Tunisia, Mauritania, and Algeria can be found within 
these documents. The list provided here does not include every political party courted by the Iraqis. It will take 
much work to fully understand just how far these courtships went. Foreign Parties, 1993/7/19, 0101-0105, BRCC 
100-3-5, HB, HIA.  
818 Attack, 1988/9/20, 0054-0059, BRCC 3854-0001, HB, HIA.  
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believe that the perpetrators were professionals, given that they left fingerprints behind. 
However, Iraqi intelligence believed the incident to be politically motivated, and perhaps even 
sanctioned by the Soviets, given Moscow’s anger with the high level of Iraqi activity in the 
country.  Moscow’s apathy, and even intransigence, signaled that Iraq had brought this upon 
itself. From the Kremlin’s perspective, this attack may have been justified given the high level of 
activity sustained by the OI in the Soviet Union.  
The Soviets were also uneasy with the ambassador’s relationship with the OI.819  
Therefore, the Iraqi intelligence service suggested that the ambassador be relieved of 
responsibility for the OI. Not only would this change allow the ambassador to focus on his 
primary responsibility—to maintain and advance Iraqi-Soviet relations—but it would give the 
Iraqi ambassador  leeway and separation from the activities of the OI.820  Party officials in 
Baghdad supported this suggestion. Since the OI was connected to intelligence operations, the 
Council argued that the Baʿth party should refrain from personally nominating political 
appointees from within the party to the OIs. The objective, it appears, was to curtail the 
suspicions of the host countries’ intelligence services.  The Iraqi government did not want host 
countries to assume that all members of the Baʿth Party who were working abroad were 
necessarily intelligence operatives.821  
 
819 Embassy attack on 1988/9/2, 1989/1/25, 0254-0255, BRCC 021-1-4, HB, HIA.  
820 Iraqi Embassy in Moscow, 1989/1/17, 0033-0034, BRCC 3854-0001, HB, HIA. In the report listed between 
0054-0059, for other party officials, concerns that it was a professional job were discounted because of the 
fingerprints.  
821 Party organization in Moscow, 1990/8/13, 0141-0142, BRCC 3268-0002, HB, HIA. Information, 1989/1/25, 
0132-0134, BRCC 2679-0000, HB, HIA. Iraqi Embassy in Moscow break-in, 1988/10/1-18, 0143-0144, BRCC 
2679-0000, HB, HIA.  
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The Iraqis eventually met with members of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but 
the Soviets said they were unable to provide any information on the perpetrators. Along with 
Soviet promises to provide extra security, the embassy was to add new lighting in the back area 
of the embassy, including spotlights, as well as to fit iron bars to the windows on the lower 
floors. Technicians from the Iraqi intelligence services were also dispatched to the embassy to 
inspect all equipment and reinforce security measures. Baghdad also reduced the number of 
Soviets employed by the embassy, including drivers,  replacing them with Iraqis living in the 
Soviet Union.822 
 It appears that after this break-in incident Baghdad moved to separate the OI apparatus 
from the Embassy organization, heeding proposals to give the Ambassador cause for denial—the 
Iraqis wanted to continue their political operations in Moscow, but they did not want to risk 
jeopardizing their entire diplomatic mission.   However, this did not mean an automatic 
resumption of Iraqi intelligence operations.   The Iraqis were not free to operate without scrutiny 
from the Soviets. The embassy reported as much, informing Baghdad that specific Iraqis—who 
were likely working for Iraqi intelligence—required special approval from Soviet authorities to 
travel to different cities within the Soviet Union.823 Despite the tension over the 1988 embassy 
incident, the two countries continued their diplomatic relationship. The Iraqis received the new 
 
822 Report/Recommendation List, 1989/6/28 (1989/1/8 is listed on 033) 0030-0031, BRCC 3854-0001, HB, HIA. 
Replacing Soviet users with Iraqis living in the Soviet Union, 1989/4/8, 0048, BRCC 3854-0001, HB, HIA. 0030-
0031 also details the Iraqi bureaucracy involved in this incident. The full report on this incident, along with other 
inquiries and recommendations, can be found throughout 0031-0061. Details of the break-in can be found in 0055-
0059.  
823 The embassy did mention the difficulty of expanding and working within the Soviet Union, given its sheer size. 
Migration regulations, 1989/1/28, 0230, BRCC 3751-0000, HB, HIA. Other suggestions can be found at Soviet 
arena/suggestion, 1989/8/3-13, 0233-0236, BRCC 3751-0000, HB, HIA. 
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Soviet ambassador to Iraq in July 1989; the two countries exchanged  diplomatic pleasantries, 
including customary expressions of “friendship and cooperation.”824  
 Like other OIs, OI Moscow continued to run political and intelligence operations while 
simultaneously courting sympathetic Russians who were sympathetic to Iraq’s cause.  In August 
1990, the OI was staffed by a party administrator, ambassador, two division commanders, five 
team members, 22 organization members, and 300 supporters spread throughout the U.S.S.R., its 
cities and republics. Heeding their lessons from the 1988 break-in, Baghdad sought to limit its 
direct meddling in OI affairs, choosing to minimize attention to Baʿthists abroad by limiting its 
hand in nominating party members to certain posts. The quality of candidates was taken by the 
party to be more important than their number, a care that might reduce the prospect of  
jeopardizing missions.  OI staff were posted as cultural attachés  to give them diplomatic cover 
in Moscow; this also gave the ambassador more leeway if Soviet intelligence became 
suspicious.825  Like their fellow OIs within the Eastern bloc, OI Moscow had the difficult task of 
trying to navigate political turmoil within the Soviet Union. Unfortunately for Iraqis based in 
Moscow, their task was even more difficult given Baghdad’s decision to invade Kuwait. This 
invasion triggered international sanctions against the regime, which put a strain on Baghdad’s 
coffers. As a consequence, OI salaries were cut down and a policy of reducing expenses  was 
implemented.826  
 
824 Exchanges of thanks, greeting card, circa 1989/7/30, 0224-0226, (0025 is the Russian version), 0227-0028, 
BRCC 3685-0001, HB, HIA. 
825Party Organization in Moscow, 1990/8/8, 0083-0084, BRCC 2679-0000, HB, HIA. For America, see 0086-0087 
in the same document batch. Placement, 1989/2/10, 0089-0090, BRCC 2679-0000, HB, HIA. 
826 Many Iraqis complained they could not pay for their families’ needs at home. Party reports, 1992/12/24, 0798-
0800, BRCC 033-4-2, HB, HIA. 
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 The Iraqis were eager to figure how who was going to attain power and what exactly was 
to take shape in Moscow after the break-up of the Soviet Union—would communism return? 
Would democracy win the day? Would anarchy ensue? No matter who was to emerge in charge, 
the Iraqis were looking to receive, if not more, at least the same level of support from Moscow as 
they had gotten before the Berlin Wall fell. The OI reported back to Baghdad any Russian press 
interviews and other reports from Russian media concerning  Russian support and sympathy for 
Iraq. 827 In one example, the Iraqis were especially pleased to learn that the Liberal Democratic 
Party had sent letters to the U.S., French, and British governments to protest recent action against 
Iraq in the aftermath of the 1992 airstrikes.828 
OI Moscow, however, remained plagued by infighting and bureaucratic messiness. In 
1988 and 1989, the embassy requested more staffers and officials, including the permanent 
assignment of a Baʿth Party member to the staff, even going as far as to recommend specific 
persons to be assigned.829  The OI cited its work as near the branch level as justification for this 
request.830 The request was denied, but concessions were offered.  Two different staffers in 
Moscow would be assigned to complete OI tasks. This was not enough for the OI, which then 
sought out new avenues within the Regional Command to attain this permanent staffing.831  In 
the aftermath of Soviet clampdown on Iraqi actions in Moscow in the aftermath of the 1988 
 
827 Television tapes, interviews, January-February 1993, 0505, 0508, 0510, BRCC 033-4-2, HB, HIA. 
828 Letters of Protests, 1993/1/24, 0657, BRCC 033-4-2, HB, HIA.  
829 Nomination, 1988/7/12, 0256-0257, BRCC 3680-0001, HB, HIA. 
830 According to Helfont, “It should be noted that there was one small anomaly. In Iraq, a branch would not normally 
report to another branch, but the branch in charge of Iraqis in Russia reported to a branch in the regional command 
secretariat in Baghdad.” Helfont, “Authoritarianism Beyond Borders: The Iraqi Baʿth Party as a Transnational 
Actor,” 235n31.    
831 Nomination, 2-5 June 1989, 0245-0246, BRCC 3680-0001, HB, HIA. 
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embassy break-in, the cultural office and Iraqi ambassador clashed over splitting duties, each 
resenting the other’s authority.832  In another instance, a party comrade within the leadership 
purchased unnecessary furniture and a car with party funds. Authorities in Baghdad chided that 
“there is no need for furniture at the residence and a private car.”833 
 Bureaucratic disputes also continued between Iraqis based in Moscow and Baghdad. In 
one case, after completing his fellowship in Russia, an Iraqi Baʿthist sought to continue living 
and working in Moscow. The Ministry of Oil, his patron, wanted to bring him back to Baghdad, 
prompting the party member to seek assistance through various other channels within Iraqi 
capital. As Samuel Helfont argues, “a Baʿthist in Russia could use the party to circumvent his 
own bosses in the ministry....” 834 In another instance, the Iraqi Atomic Energy Organization 
(IAEO) petitioned Baghdad directly after the embassy in Moscow did not reply to their requests 
to provide travel vouchers to travel to Russia for a member of their organization and his family. 
In response, the branch leadership in Baghdad asked the IAEO to work with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to compel the embassy in Moscow to issue the necessary travel documents.835 
Personnel issues strained the missions too. Although it carried out sophisticated political 
operations, the OI struggled with the quality of embassy and diplomatic staff. In one instance, the 
Iraqi ambassador to Russia was placed under surveillance by the Iraqi state for suspicious 
behavior; it is ironic that those reporting on him to Iraqi security services were members of his  
own staff.  He was then documented as meeting with Iraqi Communists in Moscow, not to gauge 
 
832 The bureaucratic infighting is thick as weeds.  For more see, the following pages within BRCC 2679-000, HB, 
HIA: 008, 0083-084, 0085, 0086-0087, 0088-0089, 0090, 0091-0096,0100-0106, 0111-0112, 0116, 
0119,0122,0124,0126,0128-0134,0135-137,0137-0139,0140,0143-0146. 
833 Cash transfer, 1989/5/14, 0211, BRCC 3854-0001, HB, HIA.  
834 Helfont, “Authoritarianism Beyond Borders: The Iraqi Baʿth Party as a Transnational Actor,” 243.    
835 Authorization, Iraqi Atomic Energy Organization, 1998/4/11, 0090-0098, BRCC 3553-0000, HB, HIA. 
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their interest in Iraqi affairs but to “satisfy his personal and sexual desires.” As it turns out, he 
was using these meetings to rendezvous with female Iraqi students in Moscow.  Issues of the 
ambassador’s personal conduct continued, and  his behavior caught the attention of the Russian 
authorities. One night the ambassador and his driver, after a night of heavy partying and 
drinking, not only crashed their car but also managed to engage themselves in a shootout with 
the Russian police officers who were trying to stop them. Although the ambassador managed to 
escape and slip back into the embassy, Russian tabloids picked up the news and ran numerous 
stories on the incident, much to the frustration of the Iraqis and to the glee of the Russians, 
judging by the tabloid-like quality of the stories.836  Defections and the diaspora grew as well, 
further complicating the OI’s mission and stature. The OI’s central headquarters in Baghdad 
removed from the official list of personnel one member who was based in OI Moscow because, 
apparently in chronological order, he failed to attend party meetings, ceased paying his party 
dues, skipped out on his military service, married a Russian woman, and then escaped to 
Sweden.837 
  Despite these difficulties, OI Moscow continued to perform its mission. Policy, 
personnel, and missions fluctuated among the OIs, and between the OIs and Baghdad. 
Examining OI Czech Republic, based in Prague, demonstrates this.  For example, it had 
connections with OI Moscow, and military officers transferred between Baghdad and OI Czech 
Republic. 838 OI Prague coordinated with Iraqis and other members of the Arab community living 
 
836 Information, dated 1992/8/5, 0126, BRCC 3390-0003, HB, HIA. 
837 Removal, 4/14/1994, 0170, BRCC 3770-0003, HB, HIA.  
838 Recall, 1992/2/22, 0109, BRCC 2211-0000, HB, HIA, Transfer and voucher request, 1987/6/19, 0493, BRCC 
2878-0002, HB, HIA. Relations with the Czechs were not always smooth. The Iraqis were embarrassed during the 
then Czechoslovakian Prime Minister’s visit to Iraq in 1989 when he confronted the Iraqis over their lack of 
commitment to paying back loans issued by Prague. This apparently triggered questions, in the orders of the 
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in the Czech Republic just as OI Moscow did in Russia.    Reports on Iraqi government 
employees, party affiliates and members, and other Iraqis were compiled and relayed back to 
Baghdad.839 Just as Saddam’s system operated in Baghdad, intelligence was gathered by Iraqis 
trained as spies as well as by ordinary Iraqis.  Intelligence was also collected on other Arabs or 
persons deemed to be of  interest to  the Baʿthists. 840 As the diaspora of Iraqis fleeing Iraq and 
Saddam grew in the 1990s, the Baʿthist regime resorted to creating and implementing more 
channels of control; simply leaving Iraq did not mean that an Iraqi had escaped the eyes of the 
regime.841 
To make it appear as if the Baʿthists had more global support than they really did, the 
Baʿthist regime used Iraqi-controlled or Iraqi-influenced civil societies, whatever their own 
beliefs and wishes were, to promote Baʿthist interests overseas.  Groups of Iraqis such as the 
General Union of Farmers and the General Union of Cooperative Agricultural Societies in 
Moscow wrote to the Russian, U.S., and various other governments on behalf of Iraq, protesting 
sanctions and American hostility towards Iraq.842 Iraqis living abroad were encouraged to find 
 
Baʿthists, “among the diplomatic spheres and was explained as a failed visit.” Although meetings with various 
deputies and subordinate committees smoothed out some of this tension, future meetings were insisted upon, by both 
sides. The Czechoslovakians wanted to be paid back, and the Iraqis did not want to lose their economic relations due 
to unpaid debt. Visit of Czechoslovakia Prime Minister to Iraq and the meetings of the Iraqi-Czechoslovakian Joint 
Committee, 1989/11/19, 0260-0261, BRCC 3809-0001, HB, HIA. 
839 The Baʿth party was a multi-tiered party in that there were multiple levels of membership. Starting with the 
lowest ranked member, the party membership hierarchy is as follows: sympathizer, supporter, advanced supporters, 
candidate, apprenticed member, active member, division member, section member, branch member, and then finally 
secretary general. Saddam Hussein held the position of Secretary General. See photo 0180 in BRCC 005-3-3, HB, 
HIA as cited in Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Baʿth Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime, 45-52.  
840 General connections, 1993/4/27, 0329, BRCC 3342-0003, HB, HIA.  
841 For more, see Helfont, “Authoritarianism Beyond Borders: The Iraqi Baʿth Party as a Transnational Actor.” 
842 Results, 2002/7/1, 0290, BRCC 3018-000, HB, HIA. 
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and recruit local groups, media affiliates, religious community members, student groups, unions, 
and politicians to join the Iraqi cause against the sanctions.  Student organizations in Greece and 
the United Kingdom, for example, were encouraged to write directly to the Clinton 
administration or to contact officials of their own local government  to petition against the U.S.  
sanctions. These groups were encouraged to stress the suffering of the people of Iraq and to call 
for the immediate end to the humanitarian crisis caused directly by what the Iraqis called 
“American aggression.” 843 
In one example, Baʿthist affiliates located in Jordan, upon instruction from Baghdad, 
wrote to the President of Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel, asking the Czechs to cry out against the 
“American conspiracy against Iraq” and to condemn the suffering of over “12 million Iraqis” 
from the sanctions.  In the same letter, these Jordanians went so far as to ask the Czechs in 
helping to “liberate” Iraq from the so-called conspiracy.844 But over time not everything worked 
in Iraq’s favor. In October 1998, the Iraqis learned of a deal made between the U.S. and Czech 
governments to allow Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE), whose headquarters had been 
moved to Prague in 1995, to begin broadcasting messages into Iraq.  Saddam was so incensed at 
this decision that OIs were ordered to begin operations to discredit the Czechs, with instructions 
to call for “mass organizations and Arab residents abroad to express their protest to the Czech 
embassies wherever they may.”845 Saddam also allegedly ordered Iraqi intelligence services to 
attack RFE headquarters; their plot to use RPGs was foiled by Czech intelligence services.846 
 
843 Letters/telegraphs, 1992-1993, 0738-0739, 0822, BRCC 033-4-2, HB, HIA. 
844 Relations with the Czech Republic, 1998/11/18, 0044-0051, BRCC 3398-0001, HB, HIA.  
845 Relations with the Czech Republic, 1998/10/18, 0069, BRCC 3398-0001, HB, HIA.  
846 Maysoon Abo al-Hab, “Czech Intelligence Reveals Iraqi Plot To Attack RFE/RL,”Radio Free Europe, November 
30, 2009, https://www.rferl.org/a/Czech_Intelligence_Reveals_Iraqi_Plot_To_Attack_RFERL/1891512.html. For 
more on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, see Ross A. Johnson, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: the C.I.A. 
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Since the 1992 southern no-fly zone was neither sanctioned nor implemented by the 
United Nations, the Iraqis were interested to know how the Russians would interpret “the 
[cowardly] American aggression.”  Although the Baʿthist party noticed that the “official stance 
of the Russian leadership justified the aggression,” it also noted that some individual ministers—
the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, and even the Vice President—condemned the 
Americans.  The Russian Parliament and various political parties and their leaders all dissented 
from the official Russian government position, and many voiced sympathy and support for the 
Iraqi cause.847  The Iraqis were quick to notice divisions between the Russian Foreign Ministry 
and the rest of the Russian government—the former refused to condemn the Americans outright 
while the latter were incensed, some even calling for officials the Foreign Ministry to resign.848  
The OI in Moscow was pleased to receive support from ordinary Russians of “different 
ages and professions,” as well as support from “Chechnya, Tatarstan, and the Ukraine.”849 More 
important was the reaction by Russian media. The Iraqis noted that there were two 
interpretations: The first was from “the newspapers of the national powers and parties 
condemned the aggression and dismissed the American justifications considering the attack as a 
violation of the international laws, while the second is [from] the newspapers and magazines 
 
Years and Beyond. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010; Richard Cummings, “'The Ether War: Hostile 
Intelligence Activities Directed Against Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the Émigré Community in Munich 
during the Cold War.” Journal of Transatlantic Studies. 6, 2 (2008): 168-182.  
847 This included the Russian Communist Party, the National Rescue Front, the Democratic Liberal Party, the 
Russian National Reunion Party, the Christian Democratic Movement, the Peace Today Movement, the National 
Russian Youth Front, the Working Russian Movement, and the Union of Russian Officers. 
848 These groups included Russian Communist Party, National Rescue Front, the Democratic Liberal Party, the 
Russian National Reunion Party, The Christian Democratic Movement, Peace Today movement, the National 
Russian Youth front, the Working Russian Movement, and the Union of Russian Officers. Reactions, 20/8/1992, 
0196-0201, BRCC 100-3-5, HB, HIA. 
849 Reactions, dated 8/20/1992, BRCC 0197-201, Batch 100-3-5, HB, HIA. 
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speaking for the government and which generally employees journalists with antagonistic views 
to Arab and Iraqi issues…most of [these journalists] are Jews.”850  The Iraqis were long obsessed 
with the actions and rhetoric of  the “Zionist entity,” that is, the State of Israel  In the 1990s, their 
concern turned also to the alleged “Zionist” influences both inside  and outside  Russia. In a 1990 
report discussing Zionism and Jewish migration to Palestine, the Baʿthists viewed “Soviet 
migration to the Zionist Entity [as] one of the most dangerous migration types….” The same 
reports cited figures from the Israeli government which  estimated the arrival of over 750,000 
Soviet Jews to Israel by 1996. These numbers, according to the Iraqis, revealed the “magnitude 
of the conspiracy that is being executed to make demographic changes in Palestine and 
especially the West Bank and Gaza,” as if Russian Jewish migration to Israel was an indication 
of a strengthening Russian-Israeli relationship.851  
This focus on Russian media and “Zionist” influences was part of the Iraqi state’s 
“political operations” abroad. According to Samuel Helfont, the goal for these operations was  to 
influence “the internal politics of other states to help Iraq achieve its strategic goals,” and this 
included everything from “espionage, to planted stories in the foreign press, establishing overt 
and covert relations with various parties, and attempting to silence anyone who disrupted their 
preferred political narrative.”852  In 1992, the Iraqi ambassador in Moscow reported that Russia is 
 
850 Reactions, dated 8/20/1992, BRCC 0197-201, Batch 100-3-5, HB, HIA. 
851 Zionist, Jewish migration, 1990/6/7, 0059, BRCC 2465-0001, HB, HIA. However, in another report, the Iraqis 
argued that the Soviets were being pressured by the Americans to allow for immigration to the “Zionist entity.” A 
Study on Russia and Perestroika, the New Political Russians Environment, Russian Jews in Palestine, the goals of 
the Russian Jews, and international and Arab opinions on Russian Jewish immigration to Palestine, 1990/6/7, 0046-
0069, BRCC 2465-0001, HB, HIA. 
852 Samuel Helfont, “Iraq’s Real Weapons Of Mass Destruction Were ‘Political Operations’,” War On The Rocks,  
26 February 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/iraqs-real-weapons-mass-destruction-political-operations/  
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“totally influenced by American and Zionist policy…especially in the ministries of external 
affairs, the economy, and official media channels.”853 The Iraqis were looking for support against  
claims that the Iraqi regime was persecuting the Shiʿa in southern Iraq when they sent an 
invitation to the Russian Parliament to present their evidence. However, the Russians ignored 
this.854  
These Iraqi political operations collected information on political, economic, religious, 
educational, and media institutions in Russia which had pro-Iraqi sentiments, and they courted 
them for friendship and continuing ties.  In the media, Iraqis showed interest in newspapers such 
as the Russian Bulletin, Soviet Russia Newspaper, Patriot Soviet, Young Guard, Belarus’ Slavic 
Telescope, and Light of Islam, a newspaper in Dagestan. Russian political leaders of all 
ideologies—nationalist parties, communist, liberal democratic, unionist, and socialist—were 
both studied by these Iraqi operatives. Since Baghdad was unsure how this new Russia would 
unfold, the Iraqis sought meetings with political leaders who favored  Soviet communism  as 
well as political leaders who supported the Russian Federation.  The Iraqis hoped that Sergey 
Baburin, an opposition leader in the Duma who was very nationalistic, favored the Soviet Union, 
and opposed Yeltsin, would have a bright future.855 They also hoped that the leader of the 
Freedom Party at the time had a decent chance for success in the new regime. The Iraqis reached 
out to pro-Iraqi Russian oil and technological firms, as well as powerful Christian groups in 
Russia. They also connected with members of academia in Russia, including many professors 
specializing in diplomacy and international relations at the American University in Moscow.856 
 
853 Annual Political Report, 1992, dated 1/1/1993, BRCC 0663-0665, 033-4-2, HB, HIA. 
854 Annual Political Report, 1992, dated 1/1/1993, BRCC 0663-0665, 033-4-2, HB, HIA. 
855 Baburin ran in the 2018 Russian Presidential election, but only garnered less than 3% of the vote.   
856 Movement, dated 5/22/1993, BRCC 0278-0282, 3370-0003, HB, HIA. 
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 The Reorientation of Russia  
 Russian nationalists were soon frustrated with the political and economic chaos in Russia, 
and they yearned to return to the perceived glory days of the old Soviet Union.  These 
nationalists made significant political headway.  In 1993, elections were held for the Duma, the 
Russian parliament, in the aftermath of a major constitutional crisis in 1993.  The crisis had been 
triggered by Yeltsin’s market-oriented economic program.  Yeltsin’s program, later described  by 
others as “shock therapy,” saw government spending severely reduced and new taxes 
implemented.  The results were traumatic for Russian citizens—by 1999, the GDP had fallen  by 
more than 40%, hyperinflation ran wild, mortality rates had increased, and there were decreases 
in the standard of living and in life expectancy. As a result of this program—Yeltsin’s own Vice 
President called the economic program a “genocide”—the Duma moved to reel in the President’s 
powers, thus triggering the crisis. Yeltsin ultimately survived, but the nationalists emerged as a 
growing and increasingly powerful force to be reckoned with. 857  
The year 1993 was crucial for the Russian-Iraqi relationship, and Iraq keenly watched the 
constitutional crisis and the 1993 elections. Although still incensed by the snubbing they endured 
between 1990 and 1992, the Iraqis were never quite willing to walk away from the Russians 
entirely, especially when they were under severe sanctions. Iraq paid close attention to all 
political parties, not just the nationalists. They abhorred the ideology, but the Baʿthists still paid 
close attention to the Communist Party, another force gaining traction due to the worsening 
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economic situation. 858 They also hoped that Yevgeny Primakov would play a crucial role at this 
time, a hope that came to fruition later when Primakov was named Foreign Minister in 1996. 
Primakov’s support for Iraq never wavered, and the Baʿthists hoped that his role in Russian 
politics could help to reshape the debate over sanctions. 859 
 The nationalists emerged victorious in the 1993 parliamentary elections.  Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and Yegor Gaidar’s Russia’s Choice Party 
emerged as the front-runners.860 The Iraqis were delighted—Zhirinovsky had previously spoken 
out against the no-fly zones and the downing of the Iraqi pilot in December 1992.  Saddam had 
also earlier predicted that, even if the nationalists did not win, Iraq would still see “an accelerated 
development of relation with Iraq…due to historical relations between Russia and Iraq, and due 
to geographic location of Russia and its closeness to the region, Russia will strive to be one of 
the superpowers whether in this era or any other era, any Russian president will always strive to 
forge advanced relations with Iraq....”861 The OI scrambled to coordinate sending the appropriate 
congratulations to Zhirinovsky, and finally settled on sending him roses.862 From then on, the 
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Iraqis followed Zhirinovsky’s party even more closely, tracking employees and sending Iraqi 
delegations to party conferences and conventions.863   
From 1993 onward, the nationalists in Russia could not be ignored, much to the joy of 
Iraq and to the dismay of Yeltsin and his liberal followers.  Thanks to outrage over the 1992 
airstrikes and the growing strength of the nationalists, the Russians “diplomatically apologized” 
for snubbing Iraq in 1993, according to the Baʿthists. The Russians also agreed to address the 
concerns of Iraqi diplomats. The Iraqi ambassador in Moscow noted that “a vast majority of the 
Russian people [have] started to understand the fair position of Iraq. [They are] feeling that the 
position of Russia towards Iraq is wrong and continuing with it means inflicting damage not only 
to the Iraqi People but to the interests of the Russian People.”  Russian citizens, according to the 
ambassador, were tiring of the opposition embracing Iraq—as evident in their protests within the 
media. They also worried that Russia was going to lose even more international prestige by 
rejecting Iraq.864 
For the nationalists, the U.S. bombing of Iraq in June 1993—ordered by President Bill 
Clinton as retaliation for Iraq’s alleged attempt to assassinate George H.W. Bush during his visit 
to Kuwait—was an abomination and the final straw.865  Not to miss a chance to one-up Moscow 
and to test the mettle of the new Russia, Saddam addressed the Iraqi nation, linking Russian 
government to the 1993 attacks. He asked, “what do the Americans, the British, and the French, 
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and the Russians, who joined in their [despicable conspiracy] have to say? What do they have to 
say to their peoples this time, and how can they convince the world public?”866  
The Russians and Iraqis began re-orienting their alliance. To Baghdad’s delight, Iraqi 
diplomats were received by Russian parliamentary officials, and prominent Russians began 
attending Iraqi events. For example, in 1994, the Russians took part in Iraqi anniversary 
celebrations of the “Mother of All Battles”—Saddam’s name for the Gulf War 1990-1991—
hosted by the Iraqi-Russian Friendship Association. As noted by OI Moscow, important 
parliamentary figures as well as the Iraqi community in Moscow attended.867 Following high-
level meetings between the Iraqis and Russia, both in their respective countries as well as in the 
Czech Republic, the Russians began supporting Iraq in the United Nations, joining in the latter’s 
efforts to have sanctions lifted and to end the global embargo against Iraqi oil. This pressure 
included Russian promises to challenge the defense of the sanctions put forward on the basis of 
international law and suggestions to lift the embargo after certain time limits.868  During the 
October 1994 Kuwaiti-Iraqi border crisis, the Russians dispatched Foreign Minister Andrey 
Kozyrev to Baghdad, a move which angered the Clinton administration but also gave Russia 
more credibility with the Baʿthists.869  
The Russians saw economic benefits to renewing this relationship as well.  At the same 
time when  oil deals with Iraq were signed in 1995, Moscow began moving for the restitution of 
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the $7 billion debt Iraq owed the Kremlin for the Iran-Iraq War.870  Given Russia’s dire financial 
situation, the  $7 billion was desperately needed. The Iraqis also considered giving Russia as 
well as France first priority and other advantages for potential contracts in the agricultural and oil 
sectors in Iraq.  In an October 1994 meeting with Saddam and other high-ranking Baʿth Party 
officials, the Iraqi Minister of Oil remarked: “The Russians are now in need of $80 billion, so 
they can develop their oil fields and bring them back to the previous production levels….  The 
Russians will not come to us, but I think we should propose to them a favorable offer and give 
them priority.”  Because most Russian companies were owned by the government, he added, 
giving them first priority should enable the Iraqis to see enormous political and financial gains. 
The Minister continued: “They are very influential on the ministry of transportation, regardless 
of who the [prime] minister is…and even on the president himself. Sir, if we were to sign 
contracts with these companies tomorrow, then they would definitely influence the political and 
economic decisions [in Russia]; and they would keep that influence for the next five or six years 
to come. It is true that the Russians lack the technology, but they will bring over Western 
companies to invest and these Western companies will bring that technology with them.”871 
It is hard to say with absolute certainty why Russia decided to re-affirm its alliances with 
Iraq—most analysis and evidence comes from subjective sources, and Russian government 
documents are not easily accessible. However, the argument here is that in the Cold War the 
Soviets saw both economic and ideological potential in collaborating with Iraq, and, even when 
the ideological goals faded away, the Soviets still favored Iraq.  There is little to no doubt that 
Iraq had immense economic and strategic value, given its vast oil reserves and location in the 
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Gulf region.  And although Saddam had proven difficult to work with, both during and after the 
fall of the U.S.S.R., it was a relationship from which the Russians, many of whom had served for 
or worked within the former Soviet system, could not easily walk away. For an emerging 
Russian Federation, with an economy barely hanging on by a thread, Iraq’s economic potential 
represented a lifeline that  it could not easily ignore.  
But it was more than just economics. The Americans did emerge as the global 
superpower. The rise of the Russian Federation from the remains of the Soviet Union did not 
wipe the slate in Moscow.  The Russian Federation had lost a vast sweep of land, but elites, 
backed by those with economic and military influence, still controlled the country’s population. 
The system that emerged in Russia favored those with personal connections (or wasta, as it is 
termed in the Middle East), just as the system in the Soviet Union had.  Russia had not even 
cared much about “socialism” in Iraq before the collapse of the U.S.S.R., so there was no need to 
care about it now that the Soviet Union had collapsed. Both the U.S.S.R. and Russian Federation 
sought to preserve, advance, and protect their national interests. The new ideology in Russia was 
nationalism, shown in a desire to return to the days of when countries, including the United 
States, thought twice before challenging Moscow. Most nationalists knew that they did not yet 
have the power to challenge the Americans directly; they were also restrained by the liberals who 
supported Yeltsin’s government.  
In October 1994, Saddam dispatched elements of his elite Republican Guard to the 
Kuwaiti border. Whether it was intended to be a show of force, or a “bluff intended to encourage 
the United Nations Security Council to lift economic sanctions,” as journalist Michael Gordon  
articulated, Saddam’s moves prompted the Americans to respond by deploying their own 
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forces.872 The Russians, for their part, dispatched Foreign Minister Kozyrev to Baghdad. As a 
result of Kozyrev’s visit, the Iraqis withdrew their forces and, for the first time, officially 
recognized the border between Kuwait and Iraq. The Americans were none too pleased with this 
cooperation. Even Saddam believed that Russia was using Iraq to challenge the United States, 
adding that the Americans were a “little perturbed that Russia might play a big role” regarding 
Iraqi affairs.873 
Saddam Hussein sought to use Russia’s desire to reclaim its glory days and to recover 
from economic disaster for Iraq’s gain. Saddam sought to tip the scales in the global debates over 
how to handle Iraq by leveraging Iraqi oil. In the same sense that Russia, like China and France, 
was using the United Nations Security Council to undermine the U.S.’s determination to uphold 
the legality of the sanctions, Saddam sought to do the same. In conversation with his cabinet 
ministers following the 1994 Kuwaiti border crisis, he said: 
We are determined to give Russia an opportunity to do what it has to do politically, 
and to come up with a strong push in this regard, that all of this should be managed 
within the international laws at hand and the laws set up by the United Nations 
convention, and that no one should embarrass the other….  In conclusion, the 
Middle East area and more precisely the oil area have a connection with this 
description in terms of reducing the powers of these great nations, it takes part in 
empowering these great nations or it can weaken it… . 874 
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 Saddam was also keenly aware of the legacy of the relationship between Moscow and 
Baghdad, a legacy he sought to emphasize and use to shape Russian reorientation towards Iraq.  
In conversations much earlier with Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev and First Secretary Alexei 
Kosygin, Saddam had emphasized the need for the U.S.S.R.’s friendship with Iraq and the Third 
World. However, he had added that “most of your friends cost you: there are some that you carry 
on your back, whether it's for war, financially, expertise, or something else. You need friends 
that you pick and place in the first row, friends to focus on in the pattern of friendship, whereby 
you present them to the world as a standard—a standard of success—and with that your burden 
will decrease….  And your influence will increase.”875 In this sense, Saddam knew that all 
relationships cost both (or all) their members something.  The Iraqis, therefore, continued to 
offer Russia the chance to reap the rewards for this relationship, however tumultuous it had been 
in the past and might be in the future. Access to more oil and a chance to reclaim their prestige 
would be too much for the Russians to turn down. 
By advocating for Iraq on a global stage, the Russians sought to take advantage of Iraq’s 
isolation.  This might draw political and economic favors from Baghdad, but it also challenged 
the Americans through legitimate means—the United Nations. By using the U.N. as the means 
by which to contain Iraq, the Americans had set the stage for the Russians, French, and Chinese 
to challenge them through the same legitimate means and channels that the United States had 
sought to command.  In this sense, while the Iraqis were using the Russians to challenge the 
Americans, the Russians were using the Iraqis to do the very same thing.  Just as in the Cold 
War, so now, mistrust and convenience went hand in hand. To the extent that rising American 
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hegemony revived concerns and tensions generated in the era of the Cold War, both Moscow and 
Baghdad played against it, exploiting it to advance their own interests. As Saddam argued in the 
aftermath of the First Gulf War, Russia was once “sleeping” but was now “thinking about how to 
build relations with Iraq, in order to have an effect on the region.” For this purpose, Saddam 
reasoned Saddam that Iraq “started helping Russia on their role, to gain their role back, not for 
Russia, but for the Arabs, Iraq, the region, and for humanity.”876 
 
 Coalition Building Against UNSCOM 
Much to Baghdad’s frustration, Russian rapprochement with Iraq did not mean that 
Moscow was choosing Iraq over the West or even abandoning the West entirely.  Rather, the 
Kremlin was seeking to have it both ways— beneficial relationships with both the West and Iraq.  
Yeltsin was also trying to balance his liberal supporters and his nationalistic opponents at home. 
This balancing act would be severely challenged when a U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) 
investigated Iraq’s alleged development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).877 Although 
many in Moscow firmly believed that Saddam was corrupt, they also believed that he did not 
have these types of weapons. 878 The debate within the Russian government was not over 
whether  Saddam had these weapons but rather over how much  leeway the Russians should  
allow  Iraq for  its weapons programs.   Many Russians had keen business interests in the 
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country—such as oil companies Lukoil and Zhirinovsky’s conglomerate.879  However, the 
question of how the Russian state should act within the U.N. and how it should deal 
diplomatically with Iraq divided Russians.  
Primakov later claimed that “Russia did everything in its power to get Saddam to pull 
back from the brink” and that the Russians “[urged] him to refrain from issuing ultimatums to 
UNSCOM, all while working with UNSCOM to make [significant changes].”880  Thanks to 
Saddam’s Nixon-esque tendency to record his conversations, we now know that Primakov was 
more than just sympathetic to the Iraqi cause. In 1996, in the midst of the UNSCOM 
investigation, Saddam and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz discussed Primakov’s “usefulness” 
in terms of negotiating with the French, who were in the midst of their own economic 
difficulties. Primakov appears to have been the middleman between this French-Russian-Iraqi 
scheme of trading oil for the lifting of sanctions. Richard Butler, the Chairman of UNSCOM, 
even alleged that Primakov accepted bribes to lobby for Iraq within Russia and abroad.881 
The debates surrounding the UNSCRs against Iraq, the merits of the sanctions, the 
corruption of the U.N. programs, American intentions, UNSCOM’s reliability and role in the 
crisis, and changes in policy debates within the U.N. fall way beyond the scope of this work. It is 
no secret that the Russians were siding with Iraq on the issue of sanctions.  For example, the 
Russians, with French help, orchestrated the deal in which Iraq was to destroy all chemical 
weapons and close its biological program for the U.N. to lift the embargo. The Russians then 
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helped Iraq craft its defense in front of the UNSC, and they also continued to form delegations 
and committees to stall and question American initiatives; the Russians even passed along 
communications, signals, and opinions from other UNSC members.882  
However, what is clear from the Iraqi side of things is that Russia was not only an active 
participant in helping Iraq fight sanctions within the U.N. legal structures but also assisted Iraq in 
skirting sanctions. From arranging political deals to facilitating financial transactions, the 
Russians were very much involved in circumnavigating the sanctions.883 Russian and Turkish 
scientists who were working in Iraqi facilities were hidden from IAEA inspectors.884 Russian 
intelligence about U.S. intentions was also being allegedly passed to Iraqi authorities.885 Russian 
military officials were also in talks with the Baʿth about developing Iraqi defense systems against 
American cruise missiles. According to captured Baʿth records, Yeltsin himself approved these 
negotiations and he sanctioned the Russian defense ministry to pass along “information about the 
American plan and objectives that the American enemy is hoping to achieve from hitting during 
the present crisis.” The Russian Military Attaché in Baghdad offered to either “[send] Russian 
experts to Iraq or [send] Iraqi experts to Russia to benefit from the parts of the missiles that have 
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been downed by the Iraqi units.”886  As the meeting concluded, the Baʿth asked the Russian 
Military Attaché to pass a message back to Moscow: “[we] desire to continue to cooperate and 
[wish] for the return of the Iraqi Russian relations to better than what they were before the 
immortal Mother of [all] Battles.”887 
In the October 1994 speech discussed above, Saddam remarked “that no one should 
embarrass the other.”888 This statement is highly emblematic of Iraqi-Russian relationship, then 
and during the Cold War.  As it was during the Cold War, Iraq occasionally betrayed Russia.  
For example, without any advance warning, the Iraqis divulged to UNSCOM in November 1995 
that they were importing gyroscopes from the Russians.  Humiliated by the disclosure, Russian 
officials told the Iraqis that “[this] cooperation…and sincerity with the UNSCOM…has damaged 
Russia’s position.”889  In another instance, the Russians were frustrated by Iraq’s intransigence 
when Rolf Ekeus, the Director of  UNSCOM-Iraq, filed his May 1995 report on Iraqi chemical 
and biological weapons. UNSCOM had been able to determine that the Iraqis were lying about 
the status of their weapons program after they had turned in reports with missing information. 
Iraq’s attempt to deceive the UNSCOM investigators was so glaring that the Russians and the 
French were  able neither to back Iraq nor to challenge the accusations after Ekeus released his 
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May 1995 report. The Iraqis had also not informed the Russians of their attempts to bypass the 
weapons inspectors beforehand.  As Oil Minister Amir Rashid argued that the U.N. “now has a 
solid ground against us, actually…I regret to say that we are responsible for what happened on 
this issue. We wanted to succeed. We succeeded in some sections when we went to Russia and 
convinced the Russians on certain creative calculations.” 890 
In yet another incident, one that was entirely outside the control of the Baʿthists, the 
defection of Saddam’s son-in-law Hussein Kamil to Jordan in August 1995 brought even more 
unwanted attention to Russia’s role in supporting Iraq.891 In charge of Iraq’s weapons program, 
Kamil had attempted to obtain nuclear materials from Russia and Romania. His defection forced 
Iraq and Russia to acknowledge  this fact to UNSCOM; the Russians were none too pleased with 
this forced revelation.892   
The Russians, despite their anger, supported Iraq arguably because they were trapped by 
their economic and diplomatic interests in the country.  However, the Iraqis did not see Moscow 
as their only ally, and they embarked on creating a powerful alliance network which could help 
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them in the fight against sanctions. Russia, China, and France all sought economic gains in 
dealings with Iraq, and the membership of all three countries on the U.N. Security Council gave 
them all the power to cultivate better relationships with the country. The Iraqis were not afraid to 
broadcast this. Tariq Aziz even informed the U.N. that Iraq had powerful “friends in the 
Council.”893  The Iraqis were also delighted to find that the Chinese, in the words of Tariq Aziz, 
were “more forward than what they used to be.”894 After moving to secure these alliances with 
these countries between 1993 and 1995, the Iraqis turned to courting the rotating members of the 
UNSC as well. When Tariq Aziz informed Saddam that the Chinese remained supportive of the 
Iraqi cause and that Iraq was now concentrating on courting new members of the U.N. Security 
Council, Saddam simply, and gleefully, replied, “one after another.”895 
But the Iraqis did not always get what they wanted in this matter.  They were often 
impatient, criticizing both France and Russia for playing both sides of the fence.896 Iraqi officials 
complained that “neither Russia nor France is considered a friendly country because of their 
current situations. They are exchanging their roles. Every time there is a French or a Russian 
official declaring that he is supporting us. Other times they disappear. These things are not 
right.” In recalling the past paranoia of some Iraqi leaders, in some cases, when the French and 
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Russians were not able to produce desired results or when they met unexpected resistance, the 
Iraqis believed that this must be the work of the “Zionists.”897 
Iraq was not afraid to stoke the fire, using their agency, no matter how limited it truly 
was, to their advantage. It pressed new allies when they sought fit, and they criticized them as 
well. In 1993, after UNSCR 687 was renewed, the Iraqis demanded to know what French oil and 
infrastructure companies were going to do. When informed that the French government would 
permit only negotiations but not the signing of contracts, the Iraqis pressed them to go further.898 
The Iraqis also boldly attempted to promote competition among their allies. With the Russians 
interested in oil fields in western Iraq, Saddam encouraged his diplomats to tease out the 
Chinese, who had also expressed interest for the same oil fields. As Saddam remarked, “Let them 
come and take and market the Iraqi oil,” further suggesting that this deal would somehow make 
China and Iraq even.  Competition would force the Russians, according to Saddam, to act sooner 
rather than later. This would only benefit Iraq.   Saddam argued that “the presence of Russian 
companies in Iraq is very important because that’s how you would establish a powerful Russian 
[lobbying network working] for the interests of Iraq!”899 
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with the Revolutionary Council about Relations with the U.N. Security Council, 1 January 1993. 
899 CRRC SH‐SHTP‐A‐001‐482, Saddam Hussein Meeting with His Council of Ministers to Discuss a Variety of 
Issues Including Economics, Education, and Foreign Oil Deals, Undated circa 1996.  
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 Operation DESERT STRIKE (1996) to Operation DESERT FOX (1998) 
 The Iraqis were generally pleased with Russian assistance in their fight against sanctions. 
In discussions with other high-ranking Baʿthist officials in 1995, Tariq Aziz noted that “the 
discussion atmosphere with the Russian side represented by the Foreign Ministry, and other 
officials was very, very good, I mean it was very good, they listened and sympathized with the 
Iraqi point of view… President Yeltsin and [Foreign Minister Andrey] Kozyrev highly 
appreciate the wise policy of Mr. President Saddam Hussein in taking these steps, and he 
personally highly appreciates his meeting with Mr. President.”900 After U.S. airstrikes against 
Iraq—under code name Operation DESERT STRIKE in 1996—in retaliation for Iraqi troops attacking 
the Kurdish city of Irbil, the Iraqis noted that the Russians were gaining confidence in challenging the 
U.S. and the UNSC.901 The Russians were especially incensed because they believed that the 
Americans had launched strikes despite Iraq’s alleged intentions to withdraw from Kurdish territory by 
3-4 September.  (The strikes were launched on 2 September).902 According to Iraqi diplomats, for the 
first time Russia was “clearly [expressing] its opinions and threatens” to “execute” the resolution 
at the UNSC. Primakov also announced that he would undertake “specific action” with Baʿthist 
leaders; Russia was “prepared to perform continuous work in that context.”903   
Still, doubt remained among Iraqi leadership about the usefulness of the Russians—after 
all, the strikes were still happening. Some Baʿth Party members argued that “we will be 
 
900 CRRC SH-RVCC-A-001-774, Saddam Hussein meeting with the Revolutionary Council Command and State 
Command, circa 1995.  
901 Alison Mitchell, “U.S. Launches Further Strike Against Iraq After Clinton Vows He Will Extract 'Price,’” NYT, 
September 4, 1996, https://nyti.ms/2A9Q7Jv  
902 Ismael and Kreutz, “Russian-Iraqi Relations: A Historical and Political Analysis,” 98. 
903 CRRC SH‐SHTP‐A‐001‐997, Saddam meeting with both RCC and State Command talking about UNSCOM, 
1996‐09‐13. 
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perceived as compliant with a country’s opinion, a country which is still the second 
superpower—the Russian Federation.” Saddam brushed aside these doubts, arguing instead that 
they will “stick” with the Russians and noting that the “the Russians do not feel good about 
Clinton.” Saddam did acknowledge his comrades fears that they were being perceived as Russian 
stooges on the global stage, so he urged Tariq Aziz to call upon the Russian ambassador and 
remind him of Iraqi sovereignty and rights that should be respected according to international 
law.904   
This doubt and frustration also prevailed in Moscow, especially with the Iraqi 
government’s intransigence and refusal to cooperate in instances when the Russians believed 
cooperation was easier than deceit. Although Russia had much more power in this regard, Iraq 
was still not afraid to push Russian boundaries—agency that would severely test Moscow’s 
patience.  In October 1997, the Iraqis ordered all American members of the UNSCOM inspection 
team to leave Iraq, a move which angered the Americans immensely. Russia and France 
condemned Iraq for these actions, and they called for Iraq to readmit the inspectors as a signal of 
their intent to cooperate, a contingency required if any sanctions were to be lifted. Although the 
Russians were able to mediate an agreement between UNSCOM, the Americans, and the Iraqis, 
Baghdad would play the same hand again in January 1998, and then in August 1998, when  they 
expelled all UNSCOM inspectors.905 Although both incidents were mediated and resolved, 
thanks to Moscow’s efforts, the Russians were especially frustrated with Iraq. In spite of this 
 
904 Saddam and Aziz then share an awkward joke about Yeltsin surprising Saddam with a pocket-knife as a gift. 
CRRC SH‐SHTP‐A‐001‐997, Saddam meeting with both RCC and State Command talking about UNSCOM, 1996‐
09‐13. 
 905 Press Release/ SC/6571,“Security Council Condemns Iraq's Decision To Suspend Cooperation With UNSCOM, 
IAEA,” United Nations, 9 September 1998, https://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980909.sc6571.html  
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frustration, the Russians told the U.S. that Iraq’s actions in these matters “represented a threat to 
vital Russian national interests and it could not be approached only in the context of American-
Iraqi relations.”906  In other words, Russia was signaling that it was not going to tolerate 
American unilateral action and would remain very much involved in these affairs.  
Russia remained the middleman, still focused on Iraq’s economic potential and too 
deeply involved to merely walk away without jeopardizing their credibility in Baghdad and in 
the Middle East. In response to Iraq’s intransigence and refusal to permit UNSCOM and IAEA 
inspectors into Iraq again, under OPERATION DESERT FOX, the United States and United 
Kingdom carried out bombing operations against Iraqi military and security targets between 16 
and 19 December 1998.907 Russian nationalists were incensed and the divide within the Duma 
became even more apparent. Western states often had to navigate between Yeltsin’s and 
Primakov’s distinctive idiosyncrasies. After the first airstrikes, French President Jacques Chirac 
told President Bill Clinton: “Yeltsin is much calmer in this respect than Primakov. And I tried to 
calm him down, but he remained very bothered by this affair....”908  U.S. officials also noted that 
Primakov had reacted “very emotionally” to the strikes and felt that he had been blindsided.909    
The Clinton administration did not inform the Russians or the Chinese prior to Operation 
DESERT FOX, fearing, as Clinton told British Prime Minister Tony Blair in December 1998, 
 
906 Ismael and Kreutz, “Russian-Iraqi Relations: A Historical and Political Analysis,” 99-100.  
907 Francis X. Clines and Steven Lee Myers, “Attack On Iraq: The Overview; Impeachment Vote In House Delayed 
As Clinton Launches Iraq Air Strike, Citing Military Need To Move Swiftly,” NYT,  December 17, 1988, 
https://nyti.ms/2jUjRU  
908 Chirac also added that, because Primakov and the Duma were lobbying against the Americans, Yeltsin was likely 
to join their chorus. Memorandum on Telephone Conversation between the President and President Jacques Chirac 
of France, 17 December 1998, NSC, “Declassified Documents Concerning Iraq,” WJCL, accessed online.  
909 Memorandum for Samuel Berger from Andrew Weiss, “Letter to President Yeltsin on Iraq,” 17 December 1998, 
NSC, “Declassified Documents Concerning Iraq,” WJCL, accessed online.  
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that “if we had [told them] they would have told the Iraqis.”910   Clinton also remarked to Blair: 
“The Russians and Chinese are hot and really angry at me right now—and the burden is on us to 
work hard to manage the [U.N. Security] Council. I think they are lot madder at me than you.” 
However, he did not express remorse over his decision, noting that it would have been necessary 
to change operations dramatically, especially considering Russian and Chinese interests in Iraq, 
if Moscow and Beijing had been informed of the operations before they began.911 
The Clinton administration viewed actions taken by the Iraqi regime as detrimental to the 
U.S.-Russia relationship.  President Bill Clinton specifically warned Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin that Saddam Hussein “seeks also to divide the U.S. and Russia…[we] can’t let Saddam 
[do so], we have too much work to do.” The Americans feared that this relationship between 
Russia and Iraq would threaten Russian economic stability with Clinton telling Yeltsin that 
Moscow and Washington “share [the] unique responsibility for ensuring that the United States 
and Russia enter next century as partners. [We] need to stay in close touch to sustain the 
relationship.”912 However, the Americans continued to act unilaterally, much to the frustration of 
the Russians.  
As for the French, President Chirac wanted to know how long the Americans planned to 
continue bombing Iraq. Clinton told the French, “what’s done is done.”  But he asked Chirac not 
to side with Moscow, arguing that the “Russians are going to try and do something to express 
their opposition to what I have done and to [UNSCOM Chair Richard] Butler in particular. I 
 
910 Memorandum on Telephone Conversation between the President and Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United 
Kingdom, 18 December 1998, NSC “Declassified Documents concerning Iraq,” WJCL, accessed online. 
911 Memorandum on Telephone Conversation between the President and Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United 
Kingdom, 19 December 1998, NSC, “Declassified Documents concerning Iraq,” WJCL, accessed online. 
912 Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Boris Yeltsin, 30 December 1998, NSC, 
“Declassified Documents concerning Iraq,” WJCL, accessed online. 
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hope France will not join this and will perhaps work to become a mediating force….  I think you 
are in a unique position to reach out to the Russians and Chinese to get us on a responsible 
course and figure out where we all go from here.”913  
The decision to bomb Iraq was controversial not only abroad but also at home in 
Washington—the Republican Party accused Clinton of using the attack as a political ploy and a 
distraction.  Many countries expressed outrage over the attacks.914 In the end, France, China, and 
Russia quickly condemned the bombings and went even farther, calling for the lifting of 
sanctions against Iraq.  Yeltsin called the bombing a “gross violation of the U.N. Charter” while 
Primakov blamed the Americans and Butler, characterizing the latter’s behavior as 
“scandalous.”915 Even the British began to waver, eventually shifting to France’s position that 
sanctions should be lifted before Iraq was expected to disarm. (The U.S. had always maintained 
that Iraq should disarm prior to any sanctions relief).  Iraqi coalition-building continued, and 
their efforts even appeared to be working. As Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
acknowledged, the world appeared to be “suffering from sanctions fatigue.”916 
 
 Iraqi Observations of Kosovo 
The Baʿthists observed the U.S.-Russian relationship with caution. They wanted to see 
just how far Moscow was willing to either cooperate or challenge Washington D.C. Iraqi 
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observations of the wars in the former Yugoslav territories in the Balkans highlight these 
concerns.  Yugoslavia crumbled and fell into civil war after the fall of communism, with 
Bosnians, Croats, Serbs, and other ethnic groups vying for their own independent states and 
control over region.  As genocidal acts spread—Serbs massacred 8,000 Bosniaks at Srebrenica in 
1995—the Europeans and Americans rushed to end the fighting and find a peaceful solution. 
After the 1998 Dayton Accords, in which Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia agreed to end 
the war and re-establish territorial boundaries, fighting again broke out in the Kosovo region of 
Serbia, with ethnic Albanians rebelling against Serbian control. 
 The massacre of 45 Albanians by Serbian paramilitary forces in Račak on 15 January 
1999 triggered NATO forces to intervene in the conflict by military means.917  Just as they had 
during the 1992-1996 Balkan wars, the Americans assumed the leading role in resolving this 
conflict.  When Serbian forces refused to allow war crimes investigators into Račak, the Clinton 
administration pushed for Russia to issue a condemnation of the massacre, to support calls for a 
United Nations Criminal Tribunal in Yugoslavia (UNCTY), and ultimately to support the 
ultimatum threatening NATO airstrikes against Belgrade if the Serbs did not adhere to the 
October 1998 ceasefire.918 Between January and mid-March, the Americans tried to facilitate a 
peace agreement between the warring factions. They had also considered Russian trepidation 
over the strikes—Primakov was due to visit Washington, D.C. to discuss the matter. However, 
 
917 Misha Glenny, “Motives for Massacre,” NYT, January 20, 1999, https://nyti.ms/2h2g57H  
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293 
when Serbian forces began moving into Kosovo, the Americans could no longer wait.  NATO 
began bombing Belgrade on March 24, 1999.919 
 The Russians were incensed. Primakov, who was flying over the Atlantic Ocean at the 
time, had his plane diverted mid-air back to Europe—the mid-air change of plans was later called 
the “Primakov Loop.” 920 The Kremlin expelled NATO’s representative from Russia, and 
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov broke contact with his counterparts among NATO members. To 
ease tensions, Clinton wrote to Yeltsin, acknowledging that NATO strikes against Kosovo were 
a “burden on Russian-American relations,” but he also stressed the “vitality” of their relationship 
and celebrated successes such as the 1992 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces on Europe 
(CFE).  Clinton called for Yeltsin to stand with the Americans and against [Serbian President] 
Milosevic.921 Although they did send troops to Kosovo and participated in peacekeeping 
missions, in the end, the Russians did not seriously challenge NATO. The Serbs formally 
withdrew from Kosovo in late June 1999, and NATO’s bombing mission ceased.922 
 NATO’s role in the crisis especially alarmed Russia.923 It not only enraged the 
nationalists in Moscow but alarmed Yeltsin, who desperately wanted to work with the 
Americans.  President Bill Clinton remarked to British Prime Minister Tony Blair that “the 
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Russians are allergic to NATO.”924 When Clinton asked Yeltsin if he truly believed that the 
Americans “got a foothold in Poland we would bomb western Russia,” Yeltsin replied: “No, I 
don't, but there are a lot of old ladies out in the country who do." Clinton, in conversation with 
Blair again, acknowledged that the Kremlin’s mentality was driven by the past, that they were 
“still affected by Napoleon, Hitler, and the way the Cold War came to end, and [by] . . .  the way 
the Soviet Empire collapsed.” Yeltsin abhorred communism, but even he and his liberal 
proponents could not escape the past, since they were, as Clinton observed, still proponents of 
“Mother Russia.”925  
Baghdad watched the events in Kosovo with great unease. For one thing, the Iraqis were 
also running intelligence operations out of their OI in Belgrade, using the information collected 
from various sources to keep track of their own Iraqi citizens, foreign nationals, and its party 
apparatus within the region.926 In one instance, OI Belgrade was instructed to refuse assistance to 
a certain Syrian student within the country and even to impede his activities if need be.927 The OI 
Belgrade had also been courting favor with Serbian politicians and media in hopes of gaining 
another European ally in the fight against sanctions.  In one example, the Yugoslav-Arab 
Friendship Society, a civil group essentially controlled by the Iraqi state, worked to promote pro-
Iraqi messages within Serbian media outlets.928  In January 1998, the group published an open 
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letter in the Serbian media, highlighting the suffering of the Iraqi people, especially “the Iraqi 
children.” The letter criticized the U.S. attempts to garner further support from the U.N. Security 
Council for a “new armed attacked on Iraq” and warned that, if they fail to win over the Security 
Council, the Americans would not be afraid to act unilaterally, given that their forces already 
gathered within the Gulf region.  The letter then takes the opportunity to remind the United 
States of the words of Benjamin Franklin: “There was never good war, nor bad peace.”929 
According to a special report, the Iraqis believed that the U.S.’s involvement in the 
Kosovo conflict was driven by the desire to “[impose American hegemony] on the world through 
its leading role in Europe.” Washington also wanted to weaken “Russia politically and 
economically by destroying its last fortress in Yugoslavia.” The study argued that the U.S. feared 
European unity in this matter and therefore wanted to keep European leaders —especially, 
France—from resolving this issue in a way that fell outside U.S. parameters. Therefore, to 
maintain Washington’s advantage, NATO was being used as a “practical alternative” to the U.N.  
This push to maintain hegemony was part of the U.S.’s “desire” to expand its economic markets 
on the European continent. According to the Iraqis, the United States expected the Europeans to 
understand that U.S. actions in Europe meant that the Europeans needed to align their positions 
with Washington D.C.930 
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 At the same time, the Iraqis believed that Moscow was “unable to participate in the war 
due to its collapsed economic situation.” According to this Iraqi report on the Kosovo crisis, 
Russia’s role had been limited to mediating between Serbia and NATO.  In effect Russia was 
marginalized by the U.S.’s financial influence on Russia’s future.  A special Iraqi report on the 
Kosovo crisis argued that the “Americans bargain on their [International Monetary Fund (IMF)] 
loans for this year” as means to support the Kremlin during Russia’s worsening economic 
crisis.931  Here, the Iraqis wagered that the IMF was an American agency and thus Washington 
could manipulate the loans given to Russia from the IMF.  Given Russia’s economic disarray, 
the Americans did have considerable say in Russia’s economic future. As Clinton put it to British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, “we have more leverage with Russia because of IMF programs and 
denuclearization funding.”932 According to the Iraqis, the U.S. was holding Russia as an 
economic hostage, and this limited Russia’s ability to influence events and counter NATO.933  
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But American hegemony was being contested. The Iraqis did note that, although the 
Europeans were working within NATO, there were divisions among allies. The Iraqis observed 
German and French displeasure with the current events, and that both Berlin and Paris were 
willing to work with Russia to find a diplomatic solution.  The Chinese government sided with 
Russia, and, as the Iraqis noted, Beijing “called for the necessity of establishing an international 
force parallel” to the U.S. force on which its hegemony was based. The Iraqis believed that the 
NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was an American way “to test Chinese 
reactions” and to demonstrate force to any state who “depended” on China.  The Americans 
claimed that the bombing was an accident, but the Iraqis did not interpret it this way.934 The 
Iraqis had wondered if the Chinese were supplying Serbs with information that could be used 
against NATO operations and thus became a legitimate target in the eyes of NATO. However, 
from Baghdad’s point of view, the crucial message was that, if the U.S. acted without regard for 
China as well as for Russia, other countries had better cooperate. As the Iraqis remarked, China 
is “no different from Russia.” 935 
The Iraqis concluded that relying solely on the Russians and the Chinese to counter the 
Americans might need to be reconsidered, given that the Americans had been successful in 
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marginalizing them both in the Kosovo conflict so far.  Europe bending the knee to the 
Americans, according to the Baʿthists, “clearly showed the world that the authority of the 
international decision in the first decade of the 21st century will be at the hands of America.” The 
Iraqis, therefore, believed they needed to “establish a specialized and developed center devoted 
to American affairs” to research any ways to challenge American hegemony. The deep 
involvement of the United States and NATO in the situation in Kosovo gave the Iraqis an 
opportunity.  They could bring up this issue with other states, including current temporary 
members of the U.N. Security Council. The Baʿthists sought to “create an axis against the 
American and British positions when they take any decision of aggression on our country in the 
future.” Essentially, Iraq wanted to maneuver in the shadows and influence those states that also 
resented U.S. hegemony.936  The need for the coalition remained. 
 
 Old Enemies  
Even after  the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iraq’s obsession with Syria continued.  
While  they grappled with the consequences of their patron’s fall, the Iraqis were especially 
concerned that  Syria might gain  an advantage over them. Local issues continued to affect the 
two countries, but both also wanted to have the affections of whatever new regime emerged in 
Moscow. For example,  Iraqi intelligence tracked an Iraqi of Syrian origin in Czechoslovakia.   
They tried to recruit him, deeming him likely to become an “intelligence benefit”; but the Iraqis 
also found that he was wanted by the Syrian authorities, possibly for the same reason.937  Fear 
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that  Syria would succeed in  infiltrating into Iraqi political and intelligence operations continued 
as well. One Iraqi working within OI Belgrade was deemed suspect because his mother was from 
Syria and he was therefore entitled to Syrian citizenship. Intelligence reports were thus ordered 
and generated on his activities, background, and contacts.938  The Iraqis were dismayed to learn 
that the Soviets were paying more attention to Rifat Assad, the younger brother of Syrian 
President Hafez al-Assad.  Despite lacking evidence to suggest that either Syria or the U.S.S.R. 
pushed for this visit, Iraqi officials took this as a sign of Moscow’s pursuit to renew and promote 
new relations with Damascus. The Iraqis detected Moscow’s pleasure after Rifat’s visit to the 
Soviet Union in late 1989, which arguably only reinforced Iraq’s anger and jealousy of their 
enemy.939  
Saddam had predicted that Russia would emerge as a challenger to America prior to the 
1993 Russian parliamentary elections, and he also predicted that “Russia will not improve its 
relations with Iran to a large extent….  Russia will remember that Iran has played a [nefarious] 
role and Iran’s intentions were clear in weakening Russia and weakening all states that belonged 
to the former Soviet Union….”940 Unfortunately for Saddam, this did not ring true. Following 
Damascus’ lead, the Iranians also began making inroads with the Russians. 
 Iraqi intelligence estimated that Iranian debts between 1990 and 1995 totaled around $30 
billion dollars, thanks to elaborate economic and military spending from Russia, China, North 
Korea and other countries. In particular, the Russians and Iranians were working together on the 
“establishment of [the] Bushar reactor” and on “two nuclear power stations; one near Tehran and 
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the other near Caspian, with 440 megawatt each.” Iraqi intelligence suggested that Iran was 
attempting to gather nuclear material from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, India, Argentina, 
Brazil, and North Korea in exchange for hard currency. However, enriched uranium of high 
quality was hard to come by.  But Iraqis bet that only Russia and China could reliably provide it 
to Iran.  According to an Iraqi military study of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, Tehran was 
“[employing] many scientists from Russia and from former Soviet Union states to acquire 
expertise in the field of manufacturing nuclear weapons.” 941 The Iraqis believed that Russia 
would also help Iran build a nuclear reactor. 
Although the Iraqis acknowledged that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons was weakening Iranian capabilities, Iraqi intelligence reports took note of continued 
Iranian ambition and drive for nuclear material.  Western sources, alleged the Iraqis, confirmed 
that the Iranians had acquired nuclear warheads that had gone missing during the breakup of the 
Soviet Union.942 “Iranian military doctrine is considered the offspring of the current situational 
requirements,” argued one Iraqi intelligence report. The Iranians wanted nuclear weapons for 
purposes of deterrence. Since Iran’s conventional military was deemed to be too weak to deter its 
neighbors, Iraqi intelligence concluded that Tehran was seeking to achieve “weaponry 
superiority over neighboring countries in the nuclear field especially over Iraq.” Russian, French, 
and Chinese offers to help build nuclear reactors did not ease  either the Iraqis’  frustration with 
their supposed allies or their fears of their neighbors.943 
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 A New Cold War 
For Iraq, the 1990s were marked by the survival of the regime of Saddam Hussein under 
severe sanctions.  In the new millennium, observing a sense of sanction fatigue around the world, 
Iraq began focusing on the potential to expand both economically and politically.  Iraq was also 
interested in keeping tabs on China, Russia, and the United States. Of the three, China and Russia 
were part of the Iraqi alliance system, and they were crucial to combatting America’s status as a 
hegemon. Yet these two were also competing with each other.  Just as they had during  the Cold 
War, the Iraqis were always looking for opportunities for exploitation, even among their own 
allies. 
In the summer 2000, in what was then coined as the Shanghai Group, the presidents of 
Presidents of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, and Tajikistan gathered in Dushanbe, the capital of 
Tajikistan.944 Besides regional security issues—smuggling, terrorism, illegal immigration—the 
participants signaled their support for Russia in its efforts against Chechnya and for China’s pursuit of its 
“One Chine, One Rule” policy.  What was of more interest to Iraq was a Chinese-Russian bilateral 
meeting in which both parties criticized American efforts to dominate the region and America’s pursuit 
of what they cast as a new arms race.  The main theme of the conference was to “[express] their 
concern about the presence of hegemonic tendency and use of force policy.” The Iraqi Foreign 
Ministry argued that, although the Russians and Chinese appeared unified in their efforts to 
stymie American encroachment, each was actually vying for hegemony in the region. 945  This 
 
944 Eleanor Albert, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Council for Foreign Relations, lasted updated 
October 2015, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/shanghai-cooperation-organization  
945 The fifth meeting of Shanghai Group, CRRC SH‐IISX‐D‐002‐012, Presidential Diwan Documents Concerning 
Relations with Several Other Countries, 2000‐12‐19. 
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was not the first meeting of the Shanghai Group that the Iraqis tracked. In fact, the year previous, 
Saddam had expressed interest in inserting Iraq into the region as well. He sought to engage the 
Shanghai Group, especially China, Russia, and Kazakhstan, seeing the benefits of engaging with 
these countries on issues of trade, security, and cooperation.  
In August 2000, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, through its Research and Study Center, 
sent Baʿthist leaders its report titled “Possible Conflicts in the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea — 
Indicators for a ‘New Cold War.’” In it, Iraqi intelligence reported that the region was ripe for 
conflict. On one side, Russia was seeking to regain territory lost with the fall of the Soviet Union 
but was facing a “complicated ethnic-political situation in the Caucasus and Central Asia.” On 
the other hand, America was interested in expanding its influence in the region as means to 
secure energy sources. The report stated that the “whole situation can be an indicator for a new 
cold war in the region, along with [polarization] and out-of-control confrontations.” 946 
Weighing historical legacies, Iraqi intelligence wagered that Russia, Turkey, Iran, and 
China were all vying for control beyond their borders and into neighboring regions to acquire 
materials, influence, and prestige.  Each of these countries’ governments pursued its own role as 
hegemon, but at the same time each aimed at denying that status to the others. Iraqi intelligence  
suspected, too, that American interests in the region also relied on its goals to further weaken 
Russia, denying it access to resources while embroiling it in further conflicts with NATO and 
local populations.  To prevent this, the intelligence services predicted, China and Russia would 
 
946 Possible Conflicts in the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea — Indicators for a "New Cold War" in CRRC SH‐IMFA‐
D‐000‐545, Letters from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Administrative Office of the Presidency Concerning 
the Relationship between Iraq and Russia, August 2000. 
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work together to prevent American domination in the region. 947  For leaders of the Baʿth Party, 
this showed that coalition building was vital and should be maintained. Although they would 
never stop seeking to exploit opportunities, the Iraqi government continued to maintain working 
relationships and even alliances even though every other country had its own agenda to pursue. 
 
 The New Millennium 
 In 2000, President Boris Yeltsin stepped down from the presidency, turning control over 
to his protégé Vladimir Putin.948  Unlike Primakov, Putin had few to no links or connections in 
the Middle East, having spent most of his career in the intelligence services focused on Eastern 
Europe. Nonetheless, Putin kept Russia on the same path as his predecessor, maintaining the 
country’s  alliance with Iraq. A major difference, however, was Putin’s emphasis on Israel, 
Turkey, and Iran as well, because he sought to reaffirm relationships with those countries. In 
June 2000, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz visited Moscow. There, he was told by Russian 
Security Council Secretary Sergei V. Ivanov that “Russia continues to apply maximum pressure 
for the quickest end, and then the permanent lifting of international sanctions.”949 
 In August 2000, the Kursk, a Russian nuclear submarine, was conducting missile tests 
when its fuel tank exploded, sending the submarine to the bottom of the Barents Sea, just south 
of the Arctic Ocean. However, unknown to the Russian authorities at the time, as many as 23 
sailors survived the initial explosion.  In the end, however, after its own attempts at a rescue were 
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delayed, the Russian government refused foreign offers of help.  A general sense of apathy about 
the situation developed throughout the Russian government; and all 118 sailors were later found 
dead, triggering both a political and public relations nightmare for the Kremlin.950  The Iraqi 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Muhammad Sa'id Al-Sahhaf, called on the Russian chargé d’affaires 
in Baghdad to pass along a condolence letter to President Putin from Saddam.  The Russian 
diplomat thanked the Iraqis, expressing both his and Putin’s gratitude for the gesture—the Iraqi 
Foreign Minister believed this signaled that “the Iraqi-Russian relations are headed in the right 
direction and improving to serve their interests.” Al-Sahhaf also added that Iraq “saw that the 
West and the U.S. tried to distort Putin's image in front of the Russian people using this 
incident.”951 
After a tumultuous decade that had seen the Iraqi defeat in Kuwait, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, American bombing in Iraq and the Balkans, and dire economic conditions in both 
countries, the Iraqi-Russian relationship resumed its Cold War dynamic. Iraq and Russia did not 
trust each other but they were bound by their mutual interests. And although the Iraqis were no 
longer placing their bets solely on Russia, turning to France and China for assistance and support 
as well, the Iraqis and Russians were united: challenging America and its hegemonic status. 
 
950 Sophia Kishkovsky, “In 15 Hours, Submarine Kursk is Raised from Sea Floor,” NYT, October 9, 2001. 
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Some Americans— especially the neoconservatives— pressed for more action against Iraq as 
sanctions were slowly losing diplomatic traction and credibility within global diplomatic circles; 
by late 1999, even the British were slowly losing the will to continue the sanctions.952  
Baghdad believed that the United States would continue its warmongering, however. In 
2001, in the wake of American and British bombing of Iraq in February, the Duma tried to force 
Putin to lift sanctions against Iraq unilaterally.953  Although the resolution was approved with a 
359-2 vote, Putin’s administration ignored it. 954 This was a sign of Putin’s unwillingness to 
contest the U.N. and U.S. so openly. Ever frustrated, the Iraqis threatened to end Lukoil’s 
contract, which in turn prompted the Russians to create new bilateral delegations and 
commissions to appease Iraq. Even with its back in a corner, Iraq was never afraid to test and 
punish Russia’s mettle.  
Despite tensions between the two countries, there was nonetheless a continuing 
development of cultural, business, and religious connections between Iraq and Russia. Iraqi 
governmental and cultural delegations visited Russia; their Russian counterparts later visited 
Baghdad in return. In summer 2000, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Russia and its southern (and 
predominantly Muslim) regions to expand Iraq’s influence within Russia’s Islamic community. 
Negotiations for commercial and civilian air travel between Moscow and Baghdad continued as 
well.955 In the summer of 2001, the Russians sent the Iraqi ambassador in Moscow a “message of 
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congratulations” to commemorate the “glorious anniversary” of the July 1968 revolution, when 
the Baʿthists cemented their complete takeover of Iraq.956 From the Russian and Iraqi 
standpoints, their joint diplomatic efforts were working. They maintained a shared hope that the 
Americans, facing increasing isolationism, would eventually give up their efforts and back off.  
Unfortunately, however, events in September 2001 would change everything. 
 
Chapter 6 - The End of the Baʿthist Regime 
The United States invaded Iraq on 19 March 2003 as part of the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT) campaign in response to the attacks on New York City and Washington D.C. on 11 
September 2001. The U.S. government justified the invasion by citing Saddam Hussein’s pursuit 
and alleged acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) along with claims that Iraq was 
complicit in the 9/11 attacks. Before the invasion began, the evidence provided by George W. 
Bush’s administration had come under repeated and severe criticism from both domestic and 
foreign sources. The global backlash against these claims resulted in the United States’ ultimate 
failure to secure a United Nations resolution to endorse the invasion or to form a coalition similar 
to the one posed against Iraq in  the First Gulf War.957 In less than a month, the Iraqi state 
crumbled, ending nearly 35 years of the Baʿthist regime. In July 2003, Saddam’s two sons, Uday 
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and Qusay, were killed by American forces, and Saddam himself was captured in December that 
year.   He would be executed for his crimes against humanity in 2006. 
 How did it all come to this for Saddam and Iraq? After his humiliating defeat at the hands 
of the U.S.-led coalition in 1991, Saddam embarked on a decade-long campaign to shore up 
allies in an effort to prevent another invasion. A man who had come up through violence and 
intimidation, Saddam always feared that these means would be used to remove him from power. 
Russia was Iraq’s most powerful ally in the 1990s, and Iraq used Russia’s economic needs and 
desire to project strength abroad to its advantage. But as the Americans made it more and more 
clear that they were seeking to remove Saddam and his regime, Russia was not able to alter this 
course. Iraq’s fitful efforts at friendship with Russia did not pay off.  
 
 America Rattles the Saber 
Even in the new millennium the Iraqis continued to fear the communists. For example, an 
intelligence report told of  an Iraqi bookseller selling a book containing the “Political Report to 
the 27th Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev.”  In 
2001, too, a study was issued by the Institute of Preparing and Training, which discussed the 
history and legacy of communism in Iraq, emphasizing its secrecy, malicious intentions, and its 
foreign connections.   Overall, the Iraqis continued to monitor any and all communist 
movements, whether active or not. The 2001 report most interestingly places blame on a Russian 
Red Army officer, Peter Fasili, for bringing communism into Iraq; he allegedly smuggled 
himself through Iran and then posed as a tailor in Nasiriyah.958 
 
958 Information, 2002/9/4, 0351, BRCC 2345-0002, HB, HIA. CRRC SH‐IISX‐D‐000‐360, A Study on How to 
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  Although the 1990s saw the Russians and Iraqis return to the understandings that had 
been common between them in the time of the Cold War, the Iraqis remained suspicious of their 
supposed ally.  In 1999, for example, a Russian national from Armenia was arrested in Kurdistan 
after smuggling himself into the country.959 The security of this northern region of Iraq was of 
particular concern to Baghdad. Iraqi intelligence agents were convinced that U.S. and British 
intelligence services were using Jalal Talabani, then the leader of the faction called the Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan (PUK), to conceal any action against Baghdad’s espionage centers in the 
north of the country.960  
In the region, the Iraqis were extremely concerned about activities to the north, especially 
in areas where Russia was operating. The Iraqis kept track of the movements of the Black Sea 
Economic Group, an organization first organized by Turkey in 1992.  Its members included 
Azerbaijan, Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Greece, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Romania, Turkey, 
and Ukraine.  Poland, Egypt, Israel, Slovakia, and Tunisia were officially “observing” states.961 
Although the Iraqis remained ever aware of perceived Russian encroachment into the region, 
Baghdad still considered Russia a “friend of the Arabs.” This relationship was supposedly “not 
based on sanctions or Iraqi interests alone”; instead, as the Baʿthist state argued, the relationship 
was founded “on the interests of the entire Arab Nation.”962  
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It is clear that Saddam had little sympathy for the United States. For Saddam, the anguish 
of Americans during 9/11 paled in comparison with the suffering of Iraqis, pain caused by the 
Americans.  Saddam argued:  
We are telling the American people that they should compare what happened on 
9/11/2001 to what happens to people in the world caused by their government, the 
American government, and their armies. For example, [international] organizations 
stated that more than 1.5 million Iraqis died as a result of the blockade imposed on 
Iraq by America and some Western countries; not to mention the tens of thousands 
who were martyred or injured during the military operations that America is 
executing along with its allies against Iraq. There are hundreds of bridges, 
churches, mosques, colleges, schools, factories, palaces, hotels, and thousands of 
homes that were destroyed due to American air strikes.963  
 
Saddam also chastised the United States for wondering why it was America that was attacked 
and not Europe.  Saddam argued that it was “because Europe is much older than America, thus 
Europeans are wiser than Americans, but American officials didn't learn from Europe.” Saddam 
believed that Iraq needed to “convince America that all the colonizers who attempted to be kings 
of all four corners were destroyed.”964 
 The Bush administration immediately pinpointed al-Qaeda, then based in Afghanistan 
and led by Osama bin Laden, as the mastermind behind the attacks. American operations, under 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, began on 7 October 2001.965  However, the Bush 
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administration also started laying the groundwork to link Iraq and al-Qaeda.  The debates, 
policies, and even conspiracies surrounding this linkage are beyond the scope of this work, but it 
should be stated that the tapes and documents involving Saddam captured later do not show an 
“operational relationship” between Iraq and al-Qaeda. The tapes do show that Saddam supported 
Palestinian terrorism, but even his sympathies with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat 
fluctuated.966 From Saddam’s view, U.S. accusations against Iraq were  evidence of the United 
States’ own terrorist activities and intentions. He went on with anti-Israeli rhetoric and talk of 
conspiracies linking the United States with “Zionism,” and he argued  that the U.S. was “a 
terrorism center.” September 11th, according to Saddam, was being used by the United States as 
justification to “continue their evil destruction against the Arab nation.”967 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, with the United States increasing its saber-rattling, 
the Iraqis began preparing both their military and political defenses.968 In a late December 2002 
meeting of the upper echelon of the Baʿthist regime, discussion revolved around mobilizing and 
preparing the Iraqi population to be attacked. The regime also blamed the United States and 
“Zionism” for aggressive intentions and their “false allegations and lies.” 969 However, the 
persistent paranoia of key Iraqis also played a role. Intelligence reports about the northern part of 
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Iraq suggested that “agents and saboteurs” were operating in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah on behalf 
of U.S. intelligence agencies. 970 
The year 2001 was unique in Russian-American relations. Under President Vladimir 
Putin, Russia “re-oriented” its foreign and defense policies to expand its cooperation with the 
United States. According to an April 2003 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, this 
reorientation was seen as vital for “economic reconstruction and revitalization proceeding from 
its integration in the global economic system dominated by the advanced industrial 
democracies.”971 Then came the 9/11 attacks. Russian journalist and dissident Mikhail Zygar 
argues that “9/11 offered a rare moment of unity between Russia and the United States. Vladimir 
Putin was the first world leader to call President Bush to offer his support.”972 Despite Russian 
perception of American ambivalence toward Islamic extremists in Central Asia, most notably in 
Chechnya, the Russians were eager to work with the United States.  The Russian government 
supported the United States in its quest to root out the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.  The Russians were especially eager to strike blows against 
the Taliban, the descendants of the mujahedeen (freedom fighters) whom the Soviets had fought 
a brutal ten-year war in Afghanistan. Thanks to the backing of the Russian government, the 
United States secured the use of an airbase near Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, which became the Manas 
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Transit Center.973 For once, the Russians and Americans seemed united. However, when the 
Russians asked when the United States would leave the base, National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice allegedly replied, “we need it permanently.” 974 Putin was irate, and a new rift 
opened between the Russia and the United States.  
When the United States turned its attention to removing Saddam from power in 2002, 
Russia was neither swayed by U.S. efforts to convince them that Saddam was developing 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), nor was Russia blind to the events in Iraq.  Many Russians 
had business interests in Iraq such as Lukoil, the Russian multinational oil conglomerate.975 
Russian dignitaries including former prime minister Yevgeny Primakov, the communist 
opposition leader Gennady Zyuganov, and populist Vladimir Zhirinovsky were frequently hosted 
by Saddam’s entourage.976 Even Russian airlines and managers of certain nocturnal activities 
were making money off Saddam’s eldest son, Uday—allegedly, the weekly Monday-morning 
flight from Moscow to Baghdad was full of Russian prostitutes. Other powerful groups, 
including the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations and the Russian Orthodox Church, 
received Iraqi kickbacks, either through the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme or through lobbying 
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efforts within the Russian state and society.977  The Russians preferred that Saddam remain in 
power because he was “predictable and controllable.” Moreover, according to Mikhail Zygar, the 
Russians believed that Saddam was surrounded by “corruption, but not weapons of mass 
destruction.”978 When Russia voiced concern about the possibility that the United States would 
invade Iraq again, Rice allegedly informed the Russians that the United States had the right to act 
unilaterally. 979 The United States’ desire for unilateral action in the Middle East only increased 
Russian entrenchment against U.S. hegemony.   
 
 Iraq’s “Friends” 
Predictably, as they had done in the 1990s, the Russians and the French defended Iraq 
from the Bush administration’s allegations,  fiercely protesting any American intervention in 
Iraq.  Iraq continued to be important for the French economy, so much so that the French 
allowed Iraq to open a new trade section within the Iraqi embassy in Paris to improve the 
relationship. Total Fina Elf, a large French oil conglomerate, also secured assurances from the 
Iraqi regime for drilling rights and contracts in Majnoon and Nahr Umar oil fields by signing 
preliminary agreements to invest over $7.4 billion USD.980 Saddam and Russian officials were 
meeting as late as 26 February 2003, according to captured records.981 
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In early February 2003 in Berlin, the Russian, French, and German governments issued a 
joint declaration calling for an alternative to war and advocating  a peaceful disarmament of 
Iraq.982 However, just as before, the Iraqis found their friends had more bark than bite when it 
came to confronting the Americans directly. Despite European uproar over the invasion led by 
the United States, many European states were eager to return to status quo ante with the United 
States. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin 
both called for the establishment of a democratic regime in Iraq.983 On 15 April, six  days after 
the Baʿthist regime collapsed, President Chirac called President Bush to express his satisfaction 
with Saddam’s removal and to propose postwar agreements.984 An 22 April 2003 CRS report 
claimed that the Chinese, Russians, and Europeans feared minimal interaction or even outright 
exclusion from  contracts and other economic opportunities tied to  oil reserves after the removal 
of the Baʿth regime. Other press reports suggested that the Bush administration was using 
countries’ fear of losing economic opportunities as a means of winning support or at least 
limiting protest against U.S. intervention in Iraq. 985 
Russia stood to lose a great deal economically in a post-Saddam Iraq.  On one hand were 
all the past debts—the Iraqis still owed $10-12 billion USD to Moscow for arms and weapons 
delivered during the 1980s. 986  Russia’s fight to defend Iraq against U.N. sanctions in the 1990s 
was largely driven by their concern to recover this debt. The Russians did not defend Iraq for 
altruistic reasons; rather, the Russians needed Iraq to pay its considerable debt in order to support 
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their own economy, helping it to recover from the economic shocks and failures of the 1990s. 
There were also legitimate fears that a post-Saddam Iraq would dump oil into the market, thus 
driving down the price per barrel. Estimates suggested that a $6 per barrel  drop in price could 
have cut Russia’s projected economic growth by nearly half in 2003. 987 
Trade had also steadily increased between the two. Russian imports from Iraq had gone 
from a net of zero in 1996 (due to sanctions), to $47.4 million USD in 1998, to $98.9 million 
USD in 2000, to $403.2 million USD in 2002, and to $240.2 million USD even in 2003 (before 
Iraq was invaded).988  According to a September 2004 CRS report, “Russia’s cumulative trade 
turnover” with Iraq was worth around $7.7 billion USD between 1997 and March 2003. Russia 
supplied Iraq with equipment in brands that was not typically competitive on global markets—
this included, for example, Volga cars, grain harvesters, and power-generation equipment.989 
Saddam’s paranoia likely spiked when he received news that in mid-2002 the Americans had 
allegedly offered to “respect” Russian economic interests in post-Saddam Iraq.  In response, in 
August 2002, the Iraqis signed a $40 billion USD five-year agreement for economic cooperation 
and trade with Russian oil firms and other industries in order to  “ensure Russian political 
support.”990   
But even trade could not guarantee Russian support for Iraq. Despite rejecting the notion 
that regime change was a “legitimate goal” and while opposing unilateral American action, 
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Russian President Putin steered Russia in the path of least resistance against the United States 
throughout the U.S. build-up towards the invasion—the Russians did not want this new Iraqi 
dispute to spill over into a new Russian-American conflict.  Putin’s decisions showed some 
ambivalence—he did not want to be seen as an “American vassal,” nor did he want to allow the 
Bush administration to operate at his expense or Russia’s.991 By working with China, France, and 
Germany within the United Nations, the Russians sought to soften any blowback they anticipated 
facing in confronting the Americans. For example, the French assumed the leadership role in 
pushing UNSCR 1441 (8 November 2002) whereas Russia played a moderate role at the 
sideline.992  But even China proved to be of little help as March 2003 neared.  According to 
Ronald C. Keith, the Bush administration moved to mollify the Chinese who remained uncertain 
about the invasion by easing Washington’s complaints over “human rights in Xinjiang and the 
listing of the East Turkestan Independence Movement as a terrorist group rather than a freedom-
fighter agency.” 993  
This passivity, however, should not be simply interpreted as Russia with its tail between 
its legs. It was a strategic retreat.  By sidelining themselves, the Russians could maneuver for 
favors, trading vetoes and abstentions with the Americans for promises of economic 
opportunities for Russians in Iraq.   The Russian press reported that, at a meeting in Washington 
DC late in February 2003,  high-ranking Russian and American officials, including Putin’s Chief 
of Staff Aleksandr Voloshin  “[attempted] to seal concrete economic deals in return for Russia’s 
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support or abstention on the Security Council.”994  According to the Washington Post on 22 
November 2002, this was a follow-up to an alleged “gentlemen’s agreement” that had been 
reached earlier in November 2002 between Russia and the United States. 995 
This “gentlemen’s agreement,” however, did not materialize the way the Russians had 
hoped it would. Although the Russians sought guarantees of their special interests chiseled in 
stone, the U.S. government demurred. Instead, Washington argued that Russia’s interests did not 
trump the interests of other states, that debts owed to Russia were not the only ones yet to be 
settled, and that the American companies, which had long been shut out of Iraq, were now due 
their time. There were some carrots—Congress granted Russia exemptions from the Jackson-
Vanik amendment on 10 March 2003.996  However, there were more sticks. One week before the 
invasion, the U.S. Ambassador to Russia publicly told Russian reporters on 12 March 2003 that 
any Russian veto concerning Iraq would damage Russian-American relations.997  
 
1991 Redux? 
Iraqi actions against Russia certainly did not help the Iraqi cause. In August 2002, under 
the pretense of capturing weapons illegally stockpiled by “Iranian elements,” a section of the 
Iraqi intelligence service stormed a house in Najaf in southern Iraq rented by Russians.   There 
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the Iraqis discovered only two guns but also “a group of female individuals, half naked with 
foreign appearances”— prostitutes, if one reads between the lines. According to the after-action 
report, this forced entry was an accident—either the intelligence or the address had been 
incorrect, and the Russian house was supposedly not the intended target.  Two Iraqis were sent to 
apologize for the “misunderstanding,” and they claimed that “their mission had no connection to 
our Russian friends.”998  
This, however, did not stop two Russian intelligence officers and their translator from 
barging into the local Baʿth Party office the next day. They demanded a thorough explanation of 
the raid. The Iraqis pleaded with the Russians, speaking to them about “the relationship of Iraq 
and all the Arab Ummah (community) with the Soviet Union and its great positions during [the 
premiership of] President Nikita Khrushchev....” They cited yet again “the current friendly 
relations between Iraq and Russia,” continuing with more praise, even while reminding the 
Russians that they were “guests of the great leader Saddam Hussein and [were] the dearest 
friends contributing to the construction of Iraq while evil America tries to destroy it.” After this 
explanation, the Russians allegedly applauded the Iraqis, which followed with everyone shaking 
hands and then sharing pastries and cakes with one another. The Russian “friends,” according to 
the report, were very satisfied with the explanation.999 Why the raid was ordered remains unclear 
and whether this was a spook tactic ordered by the Iraqi intelligence service, one cannot say with 
100% certainty. However, this incident is yet another symbol of the Iraqi-Russian relationship:   
Despite their shared goal, even with the United States increasingly engaged in saber-rattling and 
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in acting with something close to unilateral authority within the Middle East, these two states 
never fully trusted each other.    
Iraq remained antagonistic towards Russia, targeting the commodity most valued by 
Moscow—oil. In January 2003, the Iraqi government unilaterally terminated a $3.7 billion USD 
oil contract for the Russian oil firm Lukoil to develop the West Qurna oil field, located west of 
Basra near the Rumaila field. Outraged, Lukoil vowed to fight what it called “blackmail” in 
court.  The Iraqi decision stemmed equally from their frustration and the need they felt to 
retaliate.  Since 1997, the Russians had signed numerous oil and gas agreements with Iraq—
many of them with U.N. approval—including another deal with Lukoil to install equipment with 
a “capacity to produce 100,000 barrels per day from West Qurna's Mishrif formation” by March 
2000.  However, not much work had been completed on this project by 2003, or even started for 
that matter, since in October 1999 the Russians had asked Iraq for a delay in fulfilling the terms 
of the contract.  Lukoil cited the lingering threat of U.N. sanctions and disputes with  UNSCOM 
inspectors. Iraq granted this delay but warned Lukoil that it could lose its contract if work did not 
begin soon. 1000 Although they did not cancel the contract in 1999, by  January 2003, the Iraqi 
government was ready to make good on that threat.  
Iraq’s sense of betrayal was not entirely unfounded.  On 11 February 2003, The Financial 
Times reported that Lukoil CEO Vagit Alekperov had held earlier discussions with U.S.  
Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham and with Iraqi opposition leaders about Lukoil’s 
opportunities in Iraq after Saddam. 1001  Fears of economic loss drove Russian foreign policy 
during this crisis—the Russians ultimately feared that they could lose $5.2 billion USD in 
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contracts if Saddam Hussein’s regime collapsed and they were left on the outside looking in.1002 
If Saddam expected the Russians to save his regime, he must have been bitterly disappointed and 
angry when the Russians evacuated their citizens in February 2003 in anticipation of U.S. 
action.1003  On 12 March, Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Mamedov  said that the Russians 
wanted to “cooperate with the United States for an early resolution” of the conflict.1004   
For Saddam, it was First Gulf War all over again.  Three weeks before the invasion 
commenced, Putin dispatched former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov to Baghdad to consult 
with Saddam. According to Primakov, Putin directed him to go straight to Saddam, bypassing 
Tariq Aziz, and to suggest to Saddam that he “step down voluntarily from the post of the 
president and for the Iraqi parliament to call democratic elections.” Putin had hoped that, by 
doing so, Saddam would prevent U.S. action, bypass the U.N., and appear to offer a peaceful 
solution on his own terms.  Saddam reacted poorly to Putin’s proposal, accusing Russia of 
attempting to “deceive him once again.” According to Primakov, when Saddam left the room, 
Aziz shouted to Primakov so that Saddam, who was still within earshot, could hear: “[T]en years 
from now, we’ll see who was right—our beloved president or Primakov.” It was the last meeting 
Primakov had with Saddam Hussein.1005 According to captured Baʿth documents, rumors 
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suggested that children of high-ranking ministers and powerful financiers fled Iraq by way of  
Russia in the days leading up to the invasion.1006  The  U.S. invasion began on 19 March and the 
Baʿthist regime would fall by 9 April.1007  
 
 Iraq After Saddam 
Upon receiving news of the invasion, Russian President Vladimir Putin called the U.S. 
intervention a “big mistake” and “unjustified.” As the Russian media cried out against the 
invasion and anti-American mass rallies spilled onto the streets of Moscow and St. Petersburg, 
Putin called for a quick end to military action.1008 These public denunciations were made to 
appease Putin’s domestic supporters—over 90% of Russians opposed the war—yet the Russian 
government continued to err on the side of caution to preserve their relations with the United 
States.1009  In a 5 April telephone call, President Bush and Putin reaffirmed their support for one 
another and promised to continue “dialogue with respect to Iraq.” 1010 The Americans also 
pressed the Russians to cease any foreign support for the Iraqi war effort—including the sales of 
electronic jamming equipment and night-vision goggles—and formally protested to the Russian 
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government for “failing to prevent Russian firms from selling military equipment to Iraq in 
violation of United Nations sanction.”1011  
Once again, the Russian-Iraqi relationship could not surmount the pressure from the 
United States. The resolve of the U.S. government was unsurmountable, and the Russians 
certainly feared exclusion from a post-Saddam Iraq and other economic consequences if they 
seriously challenged Washington.  During Saddam Hussein’s rule, Russia and Russian-controlled 
firms held more oil contracts with the Iraqi government than other any other state or company.  
A September 2004 CRS report argued that this was a “strategic advantage Russia fears it might 
lose if Iraq’s government is replaced by a regime with greater allegiance to the United 
States.”1012 At the same time that Russia was important to Saddam and the Iraqis, Iraq was more 
important to Russia than Saddam was.   The Russian oil company Lukoil was reportedly 
“interested in participating in the country’s rebuilding” and was ready to maintain existing 
arrangements and to open new ones.   Even Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, appointed in 
September 2003, acknowledged that “Russia has legitimate interests in Iraq.”1013  
It is not yet clear why Russia hesitated and eventually refused to assist Iraq against  the 
American invasion. An April 2003 Congressional Service Report argued that Putin was trying to 
balance three competing interests: “protecting Russian economic interests in Iraq, restraining 
U.S. global dominance, and maintaining friendly relations with the United States.” With the 
military gap rapidly widening between the Americans and Russians, as evidenced by Russia’s 
humiliating stumble in Chechnya, and with the refusal of the United States to commit to 
economic agreements in post-Saddam Iraq that would be beneficial to Russia, there was not 
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much Russia could do.1014 The Russians wanted to continue challenging American hegemony, 
but it appears that, although they may have had the resolve to do so, they severely lacked the 
means.  
 Even after these events, Russia still maintained  a vital presence in the Middle East. The 
removal of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, thanks in part to NATO intervention and 
bombing campaigns, convinced the Russians that the West could not be trusted. According to 
Dmitri V. Trenin, the Russians believed that, "once [the Americans] pocket your concession, 
they ignore you; the United States and its allies have no compunctions about going beyond the 
limits set by U.N. Resolutions; Americans and Europeans are guided by grand but faulty 
ideologies and petty interests, as they lack strategic vision and fail to foresee even the immediate 
consequences of their actions.”1015 After the Arab Spring in 2011, the Russians came to view 
Syria as their most important partner and, arguably, as their key protectorate in the region.1016  
Moscow’s “comeback”  was a product of Russia’s growing economic strength and its autocratic 
tendencies. Just as they were during the Cold War, Washington and Moscow entered into a new 
standoff. The United States was backing Saudi Arabia while Russia was backing Iran, and both 
were seeking to control Iraq. At the same time, both wanted the civil war in Syria to end—but  
on their own terms. 
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 Legacies 
Even before Saddam Hussein and his family fled Baghdad,  al-Qaeda operatives and their 
affiliates circulated instructions and calls for Iraqis to fight the “crusaders” as early as the 
beginning of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003.  In one particular set of instructions, the 
author called for guerilla war, providing instructions on how to smuggle fighters into Iraq and 
urging readers to follow Osama bin Laden’s calls to resist the Americans, whom he called 
“invaders.” If Saddam and his regime failed to fight against the Americans themselves, the 
author argued, jihad must still be carried out:  
The enemy is careful to broadcast many explanations to confuse and weaken 
us. Whether Saddam and his forces disappeared and resurfaced to start 
guerilla warfare after a period of slackness by the American forces, or whether 
he fled and his forces were defeated; or that Saddam's power was just a big lie 
by the Iraqi Intelligence; or there was a conspiracy between him, the United 
States and Russia, all these had one result, that Iraq was invaded by the 
Crusaders, and we must apply Jihad to expel them.1017 
 
This passage argues that the strength of the regime was a myth perpetuated by the Iraqi intelligence 
service.1018 It also alleged that an American-Russian-Iraqi conspiracy helped to maintain the survival of 
the Baʿthist regime for as long as it did. It is ironic that Russia would be linked to this “conspiracy” 
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given that the relationship between Baghdad and Moscow was severely strained at times, both in the 
Cold War and in the 1990s. It is also interesting that  al Qaeda singled out Russia as part of this 
“conspiracy,” forsaking the likes of France and China, each of which played a vital and arguably equal 
role in Iraq’s diplomatic ambitions in the 1990s. It appears that even authors and operatives in al-Qaeda 
were well aware of the Iraqi-Russian relationship.  
Iraq’s foreign policy and diplomatic relationships during  the Cold War and in the 1990s 
were complicated. Its relationship with Moscow was often in flux, each manipulating the another 
for its own benefit. It was a relationship built on convenience but steeped in mistrust and 
betrayal, but one from which neither party could walk away entirely, no matter the level of 
frustration and the sense of treachery. The fall of the Soviet Union did not wipe away these 
sentiments, as they only continued through the rise of the Russian Federation. Even then, 
however, Iraqi interests did not rely on the Soviets, and Baghdad pushed its own agenda. 
Maneuvers into Lebanon and the Horn of Africa were predicated on the wish to expand Iraq’s 
regional influence and to prove  its ability to project power beyond its own borders. The Iraqi 
intervention in Lebanon and its diplomatic meddling in the Horn of Africa illustrate the scope of 
Iraqi foreign interests and its willingness to demonstrate the strength of its own autonomy.  They 
went well beyond Iraq’s dealings with Iran, the Kurds, and the Americans, upon which most 
Western literature has been focused. At the same time, even as Iraqi activities in Lebanon and the 
Horn of Africa indicate just how far Baghdad’s interests extended beyond their own borders, 
they also reveal how ineffective Iraqi efforts  were.  
Much more work is needed to grasp fully how Iraq acted within the Cold War and 
beyond.  Too often, Iraq’s history has been told from a Western point of view, slighting the 
326 
perspectives of the Iraqis themselves.  This study is meant as a step toward giving Iraq a platform 
from which to speak in its own voice, a voice which is just now beginning to be acknowledged. 
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Appendix A - Abbreviations 
BRCC   Baʿth Arab Socialist Party Regional Command Collection, Hoover  
Institution and Archives, Stanford University  
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency, USA 
CRRC Conflict Records Research Center, formerly held at National Defense  
  University at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.  
EO  Embassy Organizations (Iraq) 
FCO  Foreign Commonwealth Office records, the National Archives at Kew  
   Gardens, London, United Kingdom   
FOIA Freedom of Information Act 
FRUSA Foreign Relations of the United States of America   
GFL Gerald Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, MI 
GHWBL George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, College Station, TX 
HB Hizb al-Baʿth al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī Records, (Baʿth Arab Socialist Party of  
Iraq) Hoover Institution and Archives, Stanford University  
HIA   Hoover Institution and Archives, Stanford University  
ICP Iraqi Communist Party 
IPC Iraqi Petroleum Company  
JCL Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, GA 
KIDS   Kuwaiti Dataset, Hoover Institution and Archives, Stanford University  
NSC   National Security Council (USA) 
NIDS   North Iraqi Dataset, Hoover Institution and Archives, Stanford University  
NYT   New York Times  
OI Organizations of Iraqis 
RMNL Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, CA 
RRPL Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA 
TNA The National Archives at Kew Gardens, London, United Kingdom  
UN United Nations  
UNSC United Nations Security Council  
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution 
USD United States dollar ($)  
WJCL  William J. Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock, AR 
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